

CELEBRATION OF THE FREEDOM OF ANTWERP, 1863

[Frontispiece.]

SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

A HISTORICAL STUDY



BY

GERARD FIENNES

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PREFACE

It was while revising the lectures of which this book is chiefly composed that the vital part played by the maritime races in establishing and maintaining the freedom of mankind was borne in upon my mind. Hence the title of this volume, expressive, as I venture to think, of much which is in our thoughts to-day, and cheering withal.

I would ask my readers to remember that I did not set out to write a treatise on the relation of Sea Power to Freedom, but to prepare a set of lectures on the Meaning and Function of Sea Power which should interest an audience of Teachers, in whose hands rests so great an opportunity for impressing on the minds of those who are to follow us the lessons of duty and devotion which the history of maritime nations affords. The idea of the connection of Sea Power with Freedom is only one strain of thought out of many. The stress of the time did not admit of extensive revision and re-writing. Therefore I hope I may be forgiven a certain discursiveness of matter and colloquialism of style less proper to the printed page than to the spoken word.

The history of the world marches in orderly sequence. No study convinces one so clearly of this fact in the case of our own country as the study of Sea Power. Approached from this standpoint, the events of the ages show one steady stream of development, rich with purpose and promise. In the issue of to-day, Great Britain, her children oversea, and the United States could not have

PREFACE

been but where they are, without being false to their past and prodigal of their future. Nor can they, without certain disaster, sheathe the sword till all that for which they are fighting is fully won. "Here stand we. We can no other."

Those acquainted with the writings of Admiral Mahan will be at no loss to trace their influence in the following pages, I can hope for nothing better than that this book may induce others at present unfamiliar with those writings to study them at first hand, and also the no less valuable works of Sir John Knox Laughton, Sir Julian Corbet, and other British naval writers of far deeper learning and greater authority than I can pretend to. I must also acknowledge the debt I owe to Mr. E. Hallam Moorhouse for his invaluable volume, "Letters of the English Seamen"; to Mr. Archibald Hurd, most painstaking of naval writers, and Mr. Henry Castle for the information supplied by their "German Sea Power: Its Rise, Progress and Economic Basis"; to Miss Alethea Wiel's engrossing study of "The Navy of Venice," and to Mr. Ernest Law's "England's First Great War Minister," a book which casts light on a period of English history much overlaid by prejudice. For the early history of Sea Power, I derived great help from "The Historian's History of the World," published by the *Times*.

GERARD FIENNES.

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SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

As the Great War has taken its course, from August, 1914, when Great Britain and her Allies, aroused from their dreams of peace, stood up all unprepared, against the Central Empires which had made them ready for battle, till the time when, at last, they are bringing their full might to bear, it has become more and more evident that the bed-rock on which the hope of victory rests is sea power. The events of the years just past have taught us more of the meaning of the word than has been popularly understood, at least since Trafalgar. We have seen—or rather we have not seen, save with the eye of faith—the Grand Fleet standing ever on guard in “the Northern mists,” and we have realised, more or less, that, so long as it retains what is known as the “Command of the Sea,” we cannot be invaded. The war is being fought on other soil than that of Great Britain by reason of the predominance of that Grand Fleet. Great armies have been transported, not only across the Channel, but from the uttermost parts of the earth, with the loss of scarce a man or a pound of stores, again because the Grand Fleet has “banged, barred and bolted” the gates of the world against the Germans and their allies. We have learned that the reason why we suffer—but not un-

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bearably—from high prices is that the demands upon our mercantile marine and the depredations of the “U” boats have caused a scarcity of tonnage for the carrying of trade. We have been taught, by the logic of events, that, for us, security and prosperity rest upon the power to use the sea.

Sea Power means that, and it means nothing more—save the corollary: the power to deny the use of the sea to the enemy in time of war. This definition should be kept clearly in mind. It is all-important to what is to follow. The military navy is a necessary instrument of sea power, since it is on the military navy that a maritime State must rely to “impeach” the enemy, as the Elizabethans said, in his use of the sea-routes. But, in itself, it is only a part, though a most important part of the whole. The sea has no owner. It has been compared to a wide common, free to the use of all mankind. The right of ownership only begins within the curtilage of the house, so to speak: with the carriage-drive, the estuaries of the rivers and the harbours. Even within territorial waters—the much-quoted three mile limit—there is no right of possession until low water mark is reached. It follows, then, that sea power is not the monopoly of any one nation. All nations who have the requisite natural facilities may possess it in measure. Conceivably, all nations might possess it in an equal degree, so long as they remain at peace with one another.

In effect, however, though the right of all be equal, the possession of sea-power is limited by natural conditions. Switzerland has the same right as Britain to use the sea, but she has no more the power than has a paralysed man the power to cross the common. All she needs from over-sea must be brought her in the ships of other nations. The first condition of sea power is, obviously, access to the sea: favourable geographical position, an easily accessible coast, secure and commodious harbours. Thus baldly stated, it appears a mere

platitude to enunciate this condition. But there are many degrees of ability and disability, ranging between Switzerland, cut off entirely from access to the sea, and Britain or Japan, with the sea surrounding them, and ports, always possible of access, on all their coasts. There is Russia, for instance, with her Baltic ports sealed for nearly half the year by ice, and Rumania, whose only approach to the outer seas is through the Dardanelles, the control of which is destined for ever to rest in the hands of another Power. Or, again, there is Belgium, with her great port of Antwerp situated on a river, the mouths of which are controlled by Holland. The gradations are endless; but the instances given show that, in peace as well as in war, geographical position, apart from actual exclusion from the shore, is the first and most important factor in the incidence of sea-power.

Next in importance comes the need of the nation for over-sea commerce. So far as geographical position is concerned, France and Spain are but little less favourably situated than Great Britain. Yet neither of these countries has succeeded in maintaining a really developed sea power. Why?

The answer is partly to be found in the condition stated above. The first thing necessary to the life of man is eatables. When a nation produces at home all, or almost all, it requires in the way of eatables; when its soil is the true mother of the people; when they have, perhaps, a surplus of corn and wine and oil to barter for manufactures, or for luxuries of other kinds, they do not take that surplus in their own ships, seeking a market among the hungry. Just as, when Egypt was in plenty and there was scarcity outside the borders, Joseph hoarded the produce of the fat years and the patriarchs went down into Egypt to buy food for the famine of their houses, so the nation similarly situated nowadays will say, in effect, to the world, "If you wish to partake of our superfluity, come down in your ships and fetch it, and bring with you

your goods in exchange." The importing country is not, of course, necessarily a poor country, or short of resources. That could not be said of Britain with her coal and iron and immense industries, nor of Germany. But it is true, all through history, that the nations which have had to exchange their products for food-stuffs have been the great Sea Powers. Phoenicia, Greece, Venice, Holland, Britain stand on the one hand; ancient Egypt, Babylonia, France and the United States stand on the other. The instance of the United States is peculiarly instructive, for, until she began to develop her natural resources in the great lands of the West, she was a great Sea Power, with a mercantile marine at one time only second to that of Great Britain. Now she is one of the greatest exporting countries in the world, but, in comparison with the bulk of her trade, her mercantile marine is insignificant. As regards this country, which, of course, has a great agriculture, and, in early times, was at least self-supporting, it is interesting to note that her sea-commerce was small, and that she relied on Venetian and Hanseatic ships to bring her what she required from abroad—chiefly articles of luxury—up to Tudor times. Why was there then a change, and why did she become a maritime State?

Partly, no doubt, the change was due to the fostering care of her kings. Partly it was due to the discovery of America and of the passage round the Cape, which, in the long run, ruined Venice. But, in addition to these political and external causes, it may be remembered that during the fourteenth century the population was reduced to one-half by the Black Death, the whole system of villenage, on which agriculture depended, was overthrown, and that large tracts of land went out of cultivation, while, during almost the whole of the fifteenth, the land was distracted and recovery retarded by the troubles leading up to and ensuing upon the Wars of the Roses. These events upset the balance between town and country and

compelled the importation of necessities. Much has been attributed to the Black Death; but its possible effect upon our sea power has been overlooked by historians. Were the latter accustomed to pay much heed to maritime matters, their silence might condemn the conjecture as of little value. But it is an extraordinary fact that, with the exception of the few who specialise in the subject, our historians seem oblivious of the immense effect which the sea and the use thereof have had on the making of Britain and her history.

Next in order of the factors which go to building up sea power must be placed the character and habits of the people, a factor which depends, in part at least, on the condition just discussed. The need of food first drives men to seek the harvest of the sea, and, thus, fisheries are invariably the nurseries of mariners. But also it is to be noticed that the great seafaring peoples have been a stiff-necked breed, little wont to accept either foreign domination or tyrannical government at home. The docile subjects of the Pharaohs, the Chaldean and Persian kings, of Louis XIV and the Spanish monarchy were never imbued with the true sea-spirit, although, from time to time, some of them have shone as soldiers at sea. The temperament which endures personal rule is lacking in initiative and self-reliance. It was widely different with the Phoenicians, the Athenians, the Norsemen, the Venetians, the Dutch and the English. The restless mind, the independent and individualistic spirit with its love of adventure and desire for gain, have made of these true seafaring peoples, when once it was fairly aroused. True, the awakening may take centuries. It has been noted that the English people of the Middle Ages were of almost Oriental docility save for the turbulent Normans among them. But, in those centuries, their dwelling-place was wide enough for them, and the conditions of life, for all but the villeins and serfs, at any rate, easy. They had not yet begun to find the incentive to use the sea. The

French are a people with many of the qualities which go to make a great colonising and seafaring nation. But the true maritime spirit has never yet come to life in the people as a whole. No lands have offered them a fairer prospect than sunny France. They have always had elbow-room and plenty, and, to the detriment of the national life, they take care that there are never too many Frenchmen for the soil of France. They are a thrifty and home-loving nation. They lack the incentive to seek their fortunes over-seas, or, if they do, they look back with yearning and a determination to return to their native land. They have developed at least a theoretical passion for political freedom, and, in these latter years, seem to have acquired a practical capacity for self-government. But the causes noted above continue to operate to prevent the growth of the maritime and colonising spirit.

It will be gathered that what is meant by sea power is by no means confined to the military navy. The division of the maritime strength of a country into fighting and mercantile ships is, indeed, a plant of comparatively recent growth. After fishing, the earliest development of sea power was piracy. No need to boggle at the word. Piracy and empiricism have both the same derivation, though the pirate is regarded as a bloodthirsty ruffian and the empiric, at worst, as a harmless lunatic. They are both people who try experiments, discoverers. In Elizabethan times, pirates were known by the more endearing name of merchant, or even gentlemen, adventurers.

Regard the Phœnicians who first fared forth with their freights to Cyprus and, later, to Tarshish and beyond, seeking copper and tin. They went armed, for they knew not whom or what they might meet. They were not, perhaps, too nice in their methods of barter with the strangers they met in the lands they sought. It has not infrequently happened since that the simple savage has

held views on the subject of the comparative value of copra and beads which have led to a difference of opinion between him and the seafaring man, who has felt himself obliged to chastise him for the benefit of his commercial morals.

But there was no law on the sea, or in the lands beyond, to protect these early voyagers. Their safety and their success depended on the arms they carried and their ability to use them. When the Greeks in turn sought the riches of Spain, the Phœnicians fought the Greeks at sea, though there was no war between Phœnicia and Hellas, but trading relations continued. Merchants and merchantmen went armed for protection, but their object was not war but wealth. It was the same with the "adventurers" of our own land, though they had the added joy of striking a blow for the Protestant cause by snapping their fingers at the King of Spain and the Bull of Alexander VI. Merchantmen went armed at least down to the Peace of 1815, and many are the instances in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of combats and captures at sea while peace still nominally reigned between the home Governments. That there was—perhaps still is—no law on the sea save that of the States which use it is shown by the fact that, until quite recently, every crime committed on the high seas and cognisable by the British Courts was deemed to have been committed "in the County of Middlesex," and was triable at the Old Bailey alone.

That special types of ships fitted for war were early evolved by the maritime nations does not alter the case, nor that certain States which were not strictly speaking maritime built navies for the special purpose of war. It is in the main true that the military navy, so far from constituting the substance of sea power, is rather its accident, and that the need to possess the military "command of the sea" is exactly proportioned to the dependence of a State on sea communications for its wealth and sub-

sistence. To take the instance nearest at hand: If Germany were at war with us alone, she could still draw her necessary supplies of food from the sources whence she, in the main, draws them in time of peace: wheat and rye from Russia and Rumania, dairy produce and meat from Holland, Denmark, France, Italy, Switzerland, and so forth. She could draw raw materials for her industries from all the ports of Europe. She would have lost nothing but the power to carry these things in her own ships—a severe economic loss, but not fatal. As it is, she has, by her own act, turned herself into an island. She has failed to gain the advantage of the sea power for which she strove, and she has lost that of her continental position. “Bitter is the need,” not only of a strong German navy, but of one strong enough to keep open her sea communications, and this all the millions she has lavished have failed to provide. Her sea power for the time being has vanished, for she has lost the power to use the sea. With the impotence of her battle-fleet, there has disappeared her great mercantile marine.

The real separation between the functions of a military navy and a merchant fleet came with the introduction of cannon. The trader desired, of course, to devote all the space he could to cargo-carrying. He did not wish to carry a larger crew than was needed to work the ship. But guns and ammunition are bulky and heavy, and extra men are required to fight the guns. So the State took over certain functions necessary to trade by sea, both in peace and war. The policing of the trade routes, exploration, charting, lighting, the establishment of bases of supply and refreshment and their protection, were all essentials, and were all made the function of the military navy. Hence it comes about that, quite apart from the defence of the shores from invasion and the necessity to transport land forces by sea, which was the earliest purpose served by the construction of special war-vessels, the possession of a large mercantile marine involves the

establishment and the upkeep of a military force. But the essence of sea power must still be looked for in the use of the sea as a means of peaceful intercourse and commerce between nations.

The earliest known civilisations established themselves on the seashore, or on the alluvial plains stretching along the course of mighty rivers. Behind lay the hills or the desert; in front the sea. As population and wealth increased, the place where they dwelled became too strait for nomadic life. There was strife between the herdsmen, as between those of Abraham and Lot, for the most fertile and well-watered stretches of pasture. The strongest ceased to wander and settled themselves permanently on these. Man took to agriculture, then to dwelling in cities, to arts and crafts, to exchange and barter. But, directly you reach that stage, means of transport and communication become all important. The further you go from sea-level the more difficult does transport become. There were no roads, nor wheeled vehicles. But the rivers provided an inclined plane, up and down which goods might easily be transported, once the principle of buoyancy was understood. No doubt that elementary principle was mastered by our arboreal ancestors, who floated down stream on a tree trunk, wet but safe. From the trunk to the dug-out, or to the raft, made by lashing several trunks together, was an easy step; to fashion frames and knees and to cover them with planks or hides, and thus to form a hollow, cargo-bearing ship was less elementary, but not beyond the powers of rude races of mankind, as the records show. When means of propulsion by pole, paddle, oar, and eventually sail, had been devised, an easy means to transport large weights of merchandise on the broad bosom of the Nile or the Tigris and Euphrates was at the disposal of man. As a matter of fact, from very early days the produce of Armenia was transported to Babylon on rafts which floated down the Euphrates and were sold at the end of the journey to save the labour and expense of poling

or towing them up stream again. The same system prevails to-day.

It is, however, to the man in the coracle or dug-out that we must look for the first adventurer who put to sea from the mouth of the river where lay his fishing-ground. Perhaps he went to see what was round the next promontory, and there found a fishing village similar to his own, with the inhabitants of which he entered into relations, if they did not obey the time-honoured advice to "'eave 'arf a brick" at the stranger. Perhaps ahead of him he saw "summer isles of Eden, lying in dark purple spheres of sea," as one sees St. Honorat and St. Marguerite from Cannes, with the snowy mountains of Corsica behind them. Greatly daring, the voyager fared forth and crossed the strait, to find himself the first colonist. So traffic, demanding ever larger craft, would be established between himself and those who followed him and their mother city, and ever their eyes would turn to other islands lying yet further beyond. Consider the early history of Cyprus, and all that it has meant to the world. Here East and West first came into contact. The Phœnician, creeping along the coast of Syria to the mouth of the Orontes, saw Cape Andrea lift above the sea-rim and set his sail for it. The Greek, coasting along the shores of the Levant, saw it also. There they met, Aryan and Semite, and there they traded copper, all important in the Bronze age. Thence Cadmus carried letters to Greece, and there Ashtoreth of the Zidonians rose from the waves, Aphrodite Anadyomene of the Hellenes.

Adventures by individuals apart, however, what was it which first drove man to the sea? He had no knowledge of the lands which lay beyond. His progress, creeping from point to point, was slow and fraught with peril. Yet he dared the mysterious forces of Nature, leaving security and, perchance, ease behind him. First and foremost, no doubt, necessity, the *res angusta domi*.

Driven by the stronger, or the more cunning, from the fat pastures, a tribe of refugees, such as the Phœnicians or the Venetians, would take refuge in some undesired spot, protected by the ranges of Libanus and Anti-Libanus or by the swamps and lagoons of Venetia, and would there learn the hardihood and skill which, in process of time, enabled them to outstrip the oppressor in wealth or in power or in both. Or, again, the trouble might not be external, but internal. There might be those who felt themselves evil intreated of tyrants; those to whom the right of private judgment, so passionately claimed by some races, our own among others, was denied. Or the seafarers might themselves be fiery, turbulent spirits who would not submit to the reign of law. For law, be it remembered, is the compromise of individual right which man has found to be necessary if he is to live in a society. We still talk of the right of conquest as between nations. But it is obvious that, if conquest is admitted as a right between individuals, our lives would be one continual turmoil and strife. Man is therefore called upon to abandon his individual right when it impinges upon the right of his neighbour, and, if question arises, to submit the matter to judgment.

Since all law needs force behind it, it has frequently been found the most practicable plan to invest the sole right of plunder in the strongest or shrewdest member of the community, on condition that he allows no one to plunder but himself. Or he, being the stronger, has seized that power. Hence arose tyrants, and hence arose the necessity for those who could not, or would not, submit to betake themselves elsewhere. *Aut disce, aut discede. Manet sors tertia, caedi.*

There are two main refuges for the persecuted and the lawless: the hills and the sea. The weaker breeds have, as a rule, taken to the hills, where, in the hard school of adversity, they have learned hardihood, and in time

have avenged themselves upon the more prosperous and slothful dwellers of the plain. As the poet sings:—

“The mountain sheep are sweeter,
But the valley sheep are fatter.
We therefore deemed it meet
To carry off the latter.”

Those who took to the sea have been, for the most part, the stronger, the fiercer, the more adventurous. For the wrath of Nature is more terrible than the wrath of man. They chose the better part. The way of the sea leads to wealth as well as liberty; the way of the hills, to liberty indeed, but seldom to wealth.

We shall see as we proceed that the motives which have led man to take to the sea have had an immense influence on the future of the races from which they have sprung. The Phœnicians, the Venetians and the Dutch are instances of peoples driven to seafaring and colonisation by the narrow resources of the lands in which they dwelt, and the pressure of stronger races behind them. Although, in two cases out of three, the possession of colonies eventually overtaxed the strength of the mother State, and, in the case of Venice, the colonists made themselves fiercely hated by the peoples among whom they dwelt, yet, with all three, the exiled branches remained faithful to the parent stem, and trade, at any rate, did “follow the flag.” The same cannot be said of the colonies of the Hellenic States. Lack of subsistence, it is true, drove many of the colonists to seek distant homes, and they took Greek customs, Greek art and Greek culture with them. But the causes of their departure were, in many cases, political also, and the colonists were of little aid to Hellas in her struggles with the barbarian invaders; indeed, they were frequently themselves to be counted among her enemies. No Greek city, with the possible exception of Corinth, became a great mart of the world’s merchandise through the energies of its sons as did the Phœnician cities through those of the Carthaginians and

the settlers in Spain. The Greeks were essentially without sense of solidarity, factious and lacking in national spirit, except under stress of overwhelming danger and for short periods of time. Most of the Ionian colonies of Asia Minor marched under the banner of Xerxes to the conquest of Greece. Take again the case of the Northmen, whether Saxons, Danes or Norse. They planted themselves in England and in Normandy; they settled and became English or Norman. But they cut themselves off completely from Scandinavia. They ceased absolutely to belong to the nations from which they sprang. Our own case is particularly instructive, seeing that those who left our shores to escape political or religious persecution in the long run broke away, while those who went to distant lands to seek fortune, neglected, it may be, but left free in conscience and in their civil rights, protected by the long arm of British sea power without money and without price, are loyal to the Crown and Blood, as they are proving more magnificently than our warmest hopes have whispered to us. The sea has proved, not a barrier, but the strongest link of union. And, as we have every reason to believe, the best is yet to be. It is an idea of Empire quite new to the world, this free bond between free peoples, in which the Mother Country exacts no tribute and asks no special privileges. It is the latest and completest product of sea power in its widest sense: born of its spirit, nurtured by its genius. It will, of course, be one of the principal aims of this volume to inquire how the Ocean Empire was made and what are the conditions under which it exists. It is an almost miraculous story, and not the least marvellous part of it is that many of its chroniclers have almost seemed to miss the chief force on which it depends, so silent and invisible is it in its working.

The British boy, taught history in the schools, can name five British victories on land to every three at sea. Crecy, Poitiers, Agincourt; Blenheim, Ramillies,


Oudenarde; Minden, Dettingen, Corunna, Vimiera, Albuera, Badajoz, Talavera, Salamanca, Vittoria, Waterloo, Alma, Inkerman, Balaklava, and so on: these are all household words. On the naval side, he would perhaps name Sluys (probably knowing no more about it than that the Court Fool of the King of France announced it to his master by saying: "What cowards these English are! They had not the courage to jump overboard like the French!"), the defeat of the Armada, La Hogue, Quiberon Bay, The Saints, the Glorious First of June, Camperdown, St. Vincent, The Nile, Copenhagen and Trafalgar. Nineteen victories by land to eleven at sea. The proportion is a strange one for the greatest Sea Power in the world's history. But sea power has its perfect work in the slow and silent pressure it brings to bear, by denying to the enemy freedom of action while maintaining that freedom for itself and its allies, rather than in the actual clash of arms. It resembles in its working the serpents which arose out of the sea at Tenedos and wound themselves round the limbs of Laocoon and his sons. The Germans know—most painfully—this impalpable, impermeable force which surrounds the warring armies on the Continent and constrains them to its will. Belgium was overrun, beaten, crushed; yet Belgium lives. Her army has been refitted by the Power which has been untouched by the invader and has the resources of the world at its back. Its flank is secured by the British Navy, which has the control of the North Sea and has the dunes under its guns. Or take the case of Serbia. A rabble of starved and beaten men straggled down to the coast of the Adriatic in the autumn of 1915. They were rescued by sea power as the army of Sir John Moore was rescued after the retreat to Corunna, and was brought back to Salonika, equipped and reorganised, to aid in recovering the freedom of their native land. Take the Russians in France or at Salonika, brought all the way round from Vladivostok. Take the marvellous odyssey of the

British armoured cars, which were landed at Archangel and fought on the frontiers of Persia. These are but a few telling incidents. They do not show a tenth part of what sea power is accomplishing to derange the plans of the enemy, even in parts remote from the sea. That will be dealt with in its proper place. But they serve to illustrate the immediate point: that it is not amid the roar of the guns of Jutland Bank that the truest and most vital workings of sea power are to be sought. It is, rather, in the use of sea communications to succour and support the weaker combatants and to force the enemy to turn from his purpose and to strike his blows in the air. An army which has the free use of the sea is ever an elusive foe against whom it is almost impossible to seek a decision, unless he himself is prepared to welcome it. Besides which, there is always economic pressure working inexorably to derange his military plans and force him to adventures beyond his strength.


"He that commands the sea," said Bacon, "hath great liberty to take as much or as little of the war as he will." That is unquestionably true, and we shall find instances, in the histories of Phœnicia, of Greece, of Venice and of Britain, in which full advantage has been taken of this liberty. Indeed, Japan is exercising it now, in so far as she commands the sea in her own region of the world. To our credit be it said that, in the great struggle, of to-day, we are using our liberty to take as much of the war as we can.

The history of sea power to the Briton is the history of the evolution of the British nation and Empire. Towards that culmination all else moves. But before tracing the development of our race it is necessary to show something of the general working of sea power in the ancient world and of the gradual process by which maritime ascendancy crystallised round these islands. If the story is one rather of war than of peace, that is no contradiction of the statement made above that sea power is not primarily an affair

of the military navy. Just as the great sea battles are the events on which the imagination seizes in war-time, rather than upon the silent pressure of the Navy, which is of even greater moment, but which cannot easily be described in words, so war is the touchstone by which sea power is brought to the test. The use of the sea being its main end, the ability to use it depends on the ability to keep the highway clear in times of crisis. But let it never be forgotten that, since the British Navy won first place in the world, it has saved more wars than it has fought. It has been the instrument of peace, of law and of liberty, keeping open the highway of the sea so that "the way-faring men, though fools, shall not err therein." In this, we claim, it plays its destined part in promoting the welfare of mankind.



MAP OF MEDITERRANEAN IN ANCIENT TIMES.



THE HEREFORD MAP OF THE WORLD.

This Map was Executed about 1300 A.D.

At the top is a representation of the Last Judgment. The Earth is represented as round and is surrounded by the Ocean; the upper part is the East. Rather more than half is taken up by the Continent of Asia. Europe is at the left hand of the lower half, Africa at the right hand. By a singular error the words Europa and Africa are transposed on the Map, Europa being placed on the continent of Africa, and vice versa.

For convenience of reference the Key Map is divided into squares marked by Roman capitals, which represent approximately the following:—

- I. II. III. South-Western Asia.
- IV. Caspian Sea.
- V. Bokhara and Thrace.
- VI. Babylonia and part of Palestine.
- VII. Red Sea and Mount Sinai.
- VIII. Monastery of St. Anthony in Ethiopia.
- IX. Scythia.
- X. Asia Minor with the Black Sea.
- XI. The Holy Land.
- XII. Egypt with the Nile.
- XIII. Ethiopia.
- XIV. To the left is Norway, in the middle Russia; Scotland and part of England are shown in the lower part, but the British Isles are described in XIX.
- XV. Germany with part of Greece; Venice is shown on the right.
- XVI. Italy and a great part of the Mediterranean. About the centre is Rome.
- XVII. Part of Africa, including Carthage in the lower part to the left on a promontory.
- XVIII. Part of Africa.
- XIX. On the left are the British Isles, on the right France.
- XX. The upper part is Provence, the lower Spain.
- XXI. At the top to the left is St. Augustine of Hippo.

CHAPTER II

SEA POWER IN THE ANCIENT WORLD

To the ancient Greeks, from whom, apart from the Scriptures and the monuments of Egypt and Assyria, our knowledge of antiquity is almost wholly derived, the Mediterranean was the centre of the *Æcumene*, or habitable world. All the known races of mankind dwelled round its shores or to the east of it, as far as the Persian Gulf and the shores of the Black Sea and the Caspian. The Bálkans and the Alps formed its northern boundary; the Pillars of Herakles, set, according to the Phœnician legend, by Melkarth on either side of the Straits of Gibraltar, the western. West of these again, in the golden sea, which, struck by the setting sun, gave forth the sound of a harp-string, were the Islands of the Blest, the fabled Atlantis, the land where Hesperides guarded their golden fruit. To the south, the weary Titan upheld the roof of the world. To the north dwelled the Cimmerians in outer darkness, the Læstrygons in endless day, and the happy Hyperboreans in the "dancing places of the dawn." Outside all these, Okeanus flowed endlessly round the disc of the world. Such was the conception of geography and ethnography at the date of Homer. But the bounds of the *Æcumene* were ever being pushed further from the centre as knowledge grew with exploration.

It is then, among the races living round the Mediterranean that great and mighty empires developed,

advanced in many respects in civilisation to a degree which man has hardly yet surpassed. How much of their greatness did they owe to sea power? How much did it contribute to their upbuilding; how much to the fall of those which did not possess it, or, having possessed it, lost it? The question is asked of the history of Egypt, of Chaldea, of Phœnicia, Persia, Greece, Carthage and Rome, from about the year 2000 B.C. to the foundation of the Empire of the Cæsars at Actium.

The first two great Empires of the world were riverain: Chaldea, depending on the Euphrates and the Tigris, and Egypt on the Nile. They were self-supporting in the necessities of life; their capitals were situated on rich alluvial plains; the rivers afforded convenient inclined planes for transport and supply. Thus neither of them experienced the first and most cogent impulse for the development of sea power, and, in fact, neither of them developed it to any great extent; the Chaldeans, so far as we can tell, not at all. There are representations of galleys and even of naval engagements to be found on the bas-reliefs; but the ships are not Assyrian or Babylonian ships, but those of some ally, hired for the purpose of fighting, or of transporting Chaldean soldiers. The wares of Chaldea were carried overland to the Mediterranean, or along the great trade route by the oasis of Palmyra, thence down through Syria, and thus to Egypt. The Midianites to whom Joseph was sold were, perhaps, engaged on such a journey. There was no reason to think that Chaldean ships sailed the Red Sea or the Indian Ocean, though, as we shall see, the Egyptians occasionally made expeditions there, and the Phœnicians thought it worth while to maintain fleets in the Gulf of Akaba, in order to fetch the treasures of Ophir and Punt for the magnificent Solomon, and may, perhaps, have journeyed as far south as Taprobane, or Ceylon. It has been conjectured that the failure of the Chaldeans to use the sea was due to the lack of suitable woods for ship-

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building. This, however, can hardly have been the case, since they had the resources of Armenia behind them and easy transport by water. The reason must be looked for in the absence of necessity and the richness of the more temperate part of their dominions, which kept the people from seeking the sea coast. If the Chaldeans had established a sea power based on the Persian Gulf; if they had been the bold and hardy sailors the Phoenicians were, the history of the world might have been fundamentally different. They would have sailed south and east, and have established intercourse with the peoples of India, perhaps even of China. The course of empire might well have taken its way eastwards instead of westwards.

So also it might if the Egyptians had developed into a maritime people. With fleets in the Mediterranean and in the Red Sea, they would have brought the eastern and the western world into contact many hundreds of years before that contact actually occurred. Without any doubt they would have constructed the Suez Canal—mere child's play to the builders of the Pyramids—and, securely seated on their two seas, they must have been the rulers of the world, which might never have had occasion to look elsewhere for a master. But the Pharaohs developed no great measure of sea power. From time to time, some ruler, more ambitious or more far-seeing than the rest, maintained a fleet in the Mediterranean or the Red Sea, but these were all comparatively small achievements for a people so favourably situated for sea trade and endowed with so high a measure of constructive skill. The ancient Egyptians were never a seafaring people. When the Phoenicians and the Greeks had developed their civilisation sufficiently to engage in maritime industry, the Egyptians resigned their pretensions to sea power altogether and were content to make use of foreign shipping for their trade. In this they followed the universal rule already laid down, that the peoples which have a surplus of the necessities of life to dispose of make those who

want that surplus come and fetch it, bringing with them the luxuries and superfluities which the favoured nation desires. Yet ancient Egypt was destined to fall by sea power, and she has ever since been the prize of that nation which had the supremacy at sea. It is not going too far to say that there is no people in history more blind to the things which belonged to their peace and greatness than the subjects of the Pharaohs in their neglect of the sea and all it might have given them.

Mention must be made, however, of one or two notable enterprises during the short periods when some monarch arose who was alive to the opportunities afforded. The earliest maritime expedition of which we have any authentic record was fitted out by Sankh-ka-Ra, the last Pharaoh of the Eleventh Dynasty. It sailed to Punt, or Somaliland, about the year 2800 B.C. Eleven hundred years later, the enterprise was repeated by Queen Hat-Shepsu. The expeditions were undertaken, not to fetch articles of necessity, but "resin of incense, ebony, ivory set in pure gold, scented woods, paint for the eyes, with dog-headed apes, long-tailed monkeys and greyhounds, with leopard skins and with natives of the country, together with their children." All these for the luxury of Pharaoh and energetic Queen Hat-Shepsu. One is reminded of King Solomon's cargoes of almug trees, of ivory, apes and peacocks, fetched by the navy which was built for him by King Hiram of Tyre. The earliest recorded sea fight, however, was won by Rameses III at Mygdol, over the Colchians and Carians, about 1200 B.C.

For many hundreds of years Syria was the scene of struggles, first between the mysterious Empire of the Hittites and Egypt and Assyria in turn, and then between the Egyptians and Chaldeans. Carchemish, Megiddo, Lachish are names which are continually recurring as the scenes of great battles, according as one State or the other obtained a temporary mastery and carried the war into or towards the territory of another. None of these cam-

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paings appear to have been decisive, save that the Assyrians eventually broke the power of the Hittites in pieces. Egypt never subdued Chaldea, nor Chaldea Egypt, until the time of the Medes and Persians arrived, and their kings made tributary to them a confederation of small States, which placed in their hands the weapon needful for success, namely, sea power.

The Phoenicians were the first of the early peoples to become great by sea. They were probably a Canaanitish race, driven by more powerful tribes from the fertile plains of Palestine to the narrow strip of country which is shut in between Libanus and Anti-Libanus and the sea. This strip is some two hundred miles long, nowhere more than forty miles in breadth. Here they founded cities, Byblus, Berytus, Akko, Arvad and, above all, Sidon and Tyre. Sidon was the oldest of them all. An interesting legend makes its founders to come from the shores of Lake Gennesaret. The name "Sidon" means "fishing," and it is said that, even at this remote period, the Lake was famous for its fish. But it is more probable that the name of the city was derived from the earliest occupation of its inhabitants, fishing being generally the first stage of sea power. These communities were united in a loose confederation; they were too weak and incoherent to resist attack by land from their powerful neighbours, and they fell, over and over again, into the position of tributaries. But they always retained their autonomy and their pre-eminence in trade, till their final subjugation by Alexander the Great.

The history of Phoenicia bears striking resemblance to that of Venice in the Middle Ages. Both alike were the sea-mercenaries of great land Powers. Both alike, from a constricted and unprofitable homeland, planted great colonies, developed into the foremost trading nations of their times, and owed their eventual fall partly to the exhaustion caused by this very colonisation, partly to the pressure of their military neighbours, and partly to a

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diversion of the great trade-routes of the world. But the Phœnician colonies were of greater importance than those of Venice, and, on the whole, the influence of Phœnicia on the world has been more widespread.

The history of Phœnician colonisation is, indeed, a remarkable one. As early as 1950 B.C. the Phœnicians had subdued at least a part of Cyprus. That is in pre-Homeric times, before the history of Greece had emerged from the realms of myth. From Cyprus they spread to Rhodes; to Cythera, sacred, like Cyprus, to Aphrodite, whence they obtained the *mureux*, from which was made the far-famed Tyrian purple; and to Thasos, where their gold workings were the marvel of the Greeks. Their influence is seen in the ruins of Tiryns and Mycenæ; from their intercourse with the Greeks sprang the first rude beginnings of a law of nations, which did not, it is true, run on the sea, but rendered the person and goods of the voyager who had divided a potsherd with his host inviolate on shore. The seafaring peoples had now come into contact, and it was necessary to regularise their intercourse in their common interest. From the Phœnicians, according to common tradition, the Greeks learned letters, numbers, a rudimentary banking system and the art of navigation by the stars.

By 1500 B.C., still before Agamemnon, Phœnician traders had penetrated beyond the Pillars of Herakles and had established their colonies of Gadeira (Gades, or Cadiz) and Tarshish (Tartessus) in Spain. It is possible, though not certain, that they penetrated further and brought tin from the Cassiterides, which some have identified with the Scilly Islands, but which others think are the islands of Morbihan at the mouth of the Vilaine. At any rate, tin was an essential commodity in the Bronze age, and the only known deposits of it were in north-western Europe. It may, however, have been brought by land to Mediterranean ports.

These Spanish colonies preceded those on the shores

of the Mediterranean, at Lixos and Utica in Northern Africa, in Sicily and the other islands, and, by very many centuries, the great offshoot, Carthage. By the time that Hiram, the friend of David and Solomon, sat on the throne of Tyre, the Phœnician States had arrived at a very high pitch of wealth and splendour. They built navies on the shore of the Red Sea, and they traded not only with the Greeks and the peoples of the far West. Their argosies sought the wealth of Punt and Ophir: that is to say, of Somaliland and India. If Herodotus may be believed—and one is inclined to give credence to a story so inconsistent with the ideas of geography which a Greek of his time would have held—they anticipated Bartholomew Diaz by two thousand years and more by sailing round the Cape of Good Hope and returning by the Pillars of Herakles. They spent two years on the voyage, going ashore in the autumn to sow their crops, and putting to sea again when the harvest was reaped.

The magnificence of Tyre in her days of highest glory is a continually recurring theme in the books of the Prophets. The Phœnicians were not only the “wagoners of the world,” as were the Dutch in the seventeenth century. They were also its greatest manufacturers and its leaders in art as well. But their sea power was peaceful. Not that the Phœnicians were by any means unwarlike. They had sharp conflicts with the Greek colonists of the Mediterranean shores and islands. But their object was not conquest, but trade. Sea power wins empire by taking the line of least resistance. It does not seek the conquest of nations in an equal state of development. It has often been harsh in its dealings with inferior races. But, on the whole, it has brought benefits to these, and its empires tend to endure longer than those of the great world-conquerors.

When the Phœnician cities passed under the control of foreign empires, in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C., they became a potent factor in the struggle between

Europe and Asia. They were the carriers in turn of the armies of the Persians and of Alexander the Great. What they accomplished for their masters, and what they refused or failed to accomplish, are both equally significant.

In 525 B.C., or thereabouts, Cambyses invaded Egypt, defeated Psammenitus at Pelusium, and added the country of the Pharaohs to his empire. In this enterprise, the navy of Phoenicia was used by the conqueror, and Egypt fell as she had never fallen beneath the arms of the Chaldeans, even when divided against herself by the hated Ethiopian rule. But when Cambyses wished to extend his conquests further and to attack Carthage, the Phoenicians refused their aid, alleging the impiety of aiding in the downfall of their own offspring. Cambyses was fain to make the attempt unaided by the power of the sea, and his army perished in the Libyan desert. It is very striking that the Great King, lord of the armies which had subdued Chaldea, and himself the conqueror of Egypt, made no attempt to coerce the little maritime people which defied him. He was not prepared to undertake the arduous task of subduing the cities by force of arms. Besides, he required the help of their navies for other enterprises. So the Persian Empire did not extend beyond the western border of Egypt, and Carthage survived to give Hannibal to history and to engage in her duel with the power of Rome.

The meaning of what happened to Cambyses is illustrated by an episode in the career of Alexander the Great, which, for the sake of clearness, shall be dealt with here, though it occurred two hundred years later. After the battle of Issus (333 B.C.), Darius was driven beyond the Euphrates, and Alexander found himself in almost undisputed possession of Syria. Sidon, Aradus and Byblus submitted to him; but Tyre held out, faithful to the Persian rule. Alexander wished to conquer Egypt, in order that he might have a free hand to follow his great adversary in northern Asia; but he dared not

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undertake an expedition to Egypt while the Persians, through the power of the Phœnician navy, held command of the sea. He therefore set himself to reduce Tyre, a result which he accomplished after a desperate and bloody siege of seven months. These events of the remote past are highly instructive as to the workings of sea power. Cambyzes, aided by the Phœnicians, reduced Egypt. When they refused their aid, he failed to carry his conquests further into Africa and to subdue Carthage. Alexander, one of the greatest strategists of the world, recognised that the attempt to conquer Egypt without such command of the sea as would ensure his communications was a hopeless task in the then condition of the world. Napoleon was destined to learn the same lesson regarding an attempt to invade Asia Minor from Egypt. He marched across the desert and over the plain of Palestine, to find himself held up at Acre (the ancient Akko) by a small garrison of Turks which had the support of a squadron under Captain Sydney Smith. He could not take Acre; he dared not leave it on his flank untaken; his own fleet had been destroyed by Nelson at the battle of the Nile in the preceding year. So the great conqueror killed his prisoners, poisoned his wounded and returned to Egypt a baffled man. Mehemet Ali, the Egyptian, was similarly held up at Acre by Sir Edward Codrington and his fleet. Sea power along the Syrian coast has always been the key to Egypt, and the attempts of the Turks to take it from us, with the command of the sea in our hands, have been hopeless from the first.

The sea power of the Greeks differed from that of Phœnicia both in its origin and in its workings. It was more truly military in its nature. The Greeks resembled the Phœnicians in that they were divided into a number of quasi-independent communities individually weak and still further weakened by internal dissensions; difficult to unite, save under the most overpowering sense of danger. The restless, the insubordinate and the adventurous found

the place wherein they dwelled too strait for them, and Greece, like Phœnicia, threw off numerous swarms from the parent hive which settled on the coasts and islands of the Mediterranean, in Propontis and on the shores of the Euxine. But there was a wide difference between the Greek colonies and the Phœnician. The Greeks went as settlers rather than as traders, seeking fertile lands to till, determined to settle down under a government suited to their own minds. Greece had no industries, such as glass-making and dyeing; in those early days, no products for sale or barter. Phœnicia set up "factories," or trading establishments; Greece, "plantations," or agricultural communities. The Greek colonies were seldom a support to their parent States. Moreover, in the cases of the former, whether the colony was planted by Tyre or Sidon, the settlers were simply Phœnician. In the case of the Greeks, they remained Athenian or Corinthian or Phœcean; Ionian or Dorian. They exacerbated the differences, instead of supplying a cement of union.

How would it be with the British Empire if Canada had been settled entirely by the Scots, Australia by the English and New Zealand by the Irish? Most probably unity would have suffered, not only in the over-sea Dominions, but also at home. The growth of separate English, Scottish and Irish communities across the seas would have accentuated the racial differences in these islands. Certainly, what we know of the strong Nationalist feeling of the over-sea Irish, even when mixed with settlers of English and Scottish descent, does not tend to the belief that the Imperial tie with an Irish New Zealand would be a strong one. It is no disparagement of the gifted Irish race to say so. Fortunately, British colonisation was not widespread until the organic union of the greater island, at any rate, was complete. Among the Greek States, there never was any organic union at all.

Greek colonisation began in the seventh century B.C., and spread both east and west. To the east, the chief

settlements were on the coasts of Asia Minor and Thrace, on the shores of Propontis, or the Sea of Marmora, in the islands of the Ægean and even on the shores of the Euxine. To the west, the chief settlements were, of course, those in the Ionian and Tyrrhenian seas, on the coast of Italy and on the island of Sicily. Greek colonies and Phœnician were intermixed. While the Phœnicians held Sardinia, the Phœceans were in possession of Corsica. The Greeks founded a colony at Tartessus, in Spain, two hundred years after the settlement of the Phœnicians at Gadeira. The two peoples were dove-tailed in with one another in Sicily, much as the French and the British were in India in the eighteenth century. The Phœnicians held Malta and Gozo; the Greeks Capri and the Lipari islands. Lastly, in the sixth century B.C., the Phœceans founded the colony of Massalia, which is now Marseilles. On the northern shore of Africa, the only Greek settlement was in Cyrenaica, now part of the Italian possessions. All the rest was held by the Phœnicians.

In this mosaic of civilisations was the germ of inevitable trouble, even had no other seafaring races, such as the Etruscans, been involved. The Greek colonies along the coast of Italy, the Phœnician in northern Africa, important as both were in themselves, became links in the chain of communications which joined their parent States with the possessions in Spain, or, in the case of the Phœceans, with Massalia. The collision came in the sixth century B.C., when the Phœnicians of northern Africa, joining with the Etruscans, attacked the Phœceans in Corsica, with the result that, despite a victory in a fleet action, Massalia was isolated, and the Phœnicians possessed themselves of the Greek colony of Tartessus. They had Carthage to rely on as a base of sea power, nearer than the bases of the Greeks. Oversea possessions must always be a source of anxiety under such circumstances. Hence the nervousness of the Australasian Dominions at the growing sea power of Japan.

The conflicts between the Phœnicians and Greek colonists, however, were but preliminaries to the great trial of strength which was to come when Darius and Xerxes attempted to make the land conquer the sea. The Persian monarchs were able to overrun, and to join into one great Empire, all Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Syria and Egypt. In doing so, they were helped to no inconsiderable extent by Phœnician sea power. But, so far, the armies of Asia had met with no opponent who was formidable upon the water. It was left to Greece, or rather to parts of Greece, weak, selfish and divided as were the Hellenic States, to pronounce "Thus far, and no farther," on the schemes of the first aspirants to the dominion of the world. That has been the immemorial and the noblest function of sea power.

The first encounter took place by land. The Persians sailed across the Ægean unchecked by the Greeks, and landed on the east coast of Attica. The Spartans, the leading military people among the Greeks, were late in coming to the assistance of the Athenians and Plateans, who gave battle on the plain of Marathon, between the mountains and the sea, where the Persian cavalry had not room to act. The Persians were completely defeated in what has been described as one of the decisive battles of the world. They took to their ships, and, sailing round Cape Sunium to Phaleron, hoped to storm Athens before the Greek army could arrive for its defence. But Miltiades by a forced march forestalled them, and the Persians sailed for home.

Ten years later, Xerxes renewed the attack with an immense armament, gathered from all the nations of his realm. The army marched by way of Thrace, Macedonia and Thessaly, the fleet sailing parallel with it along the coast, as the fleet of Henry V sailed parallel to the army marching from Harfleur to Calais, which fought at Agincourt. Mardonius, Xerxes' general, was met with and withstood for a time by Leonidas at the renowned Pass of Ther-

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mopylæ. The Greek and Persian fleets, meantime, lay in the straits which separate the island of Eubœa from the mainland, the Persians having the advantage of position off the mainland itself. Two indecisive actions were fought here, the Greeks bearing themselves well against superior numbers. But on hearing of the fall of Thermopylæ, Themistocles resolved to retreat. He sailed round Sunium to Salamis; the defence of Athens was abandoned and the city stormed and taken by the Persians.

So far, it would appear that Greece was more effectually defended by land than by sea. In 490 B.C., the Persians had command of the sea, but Miltiades beat them by land at Marathon, and forestalled them when they attempted an attack on Athens. Ten years later, owing to the failure of the Greek resistance on land, Mardonius advanced over the terrain where Artaphernes had been successfully withstood, and sacked Athens itself. Had the Persians made a proper use of their superiority at sea on the former occasion, however, the result might well have been different. If Artaphernes had made use of a portion of the fleet to threaten the coast of the Peloponnesus, he would have broken up the Hellenic confederacy, and he could have landed his army at some spot where his still overwhelming superiority in numbers would have enabled him to break down the resistance of the Athenians. But the Persians did not understand the use of sea power. All the same, Marathon has no title to be described as a decisive battle. The Persians got away practically unscathed. The land fight was a portent, not a decision. The decisive battle was to take place at sea.

When Themistocles arrived at Salamis, the separatist tendencies of the Hellenes at once began to show themselves. The Peloponnesians, under the leadership of Sparta, gave no proper assistance to the defence of Attica. They busied themselves with building a great wall across the Isthmus, and wished to withdraw their ships to defend its flanks. If they showed in this a realisation of the

elementary principle that it is the fleet and not the sea which defends, they ignored the far greater maxim of naval strategy, that the proper objective is the enemy's fleet. Themistocles, with that mother-wit which is not incompatible with baseness of character, anticipated Drake and Nelson in his realisation of this. The Council, overborne by the Spartans, decided on retreat. Themistocles adopted the doubtful expedient of sending word to the enemy of this decision. Whether he was actually in treasonable correspondence with Xerxes is a much-debated point. It may be that, like Judas Iscariot, he was a traitor with the firm belief that his treason would bring gain to himself and no great harm to the betrayed. He gained his purpose and brought on a battle, in which the Persians were signally defeated. The light, well-handled ships of the Athenians and Æginetans dashed among the heavy craft of the enemy, jammed together in a too-narrow space, broke their oars and left them helpless upon the water. The Greeks, like the English of Elizabeth's time, were sailors, and had evolved a system of sea warfare. The Persians, who had control of the fleet, though it was mainly composed of Phœnician and Ionian ships, were landsmen and fought as soldiers upon the water. Artemisia, Queen of Halicarnassus, who was fighting in the Persian cause, rammed and sank an Ionian trireme which stood in her way of escape. Xerxes, watching from the "rocky brow" immortalised by Byron, imagined the vessel sunk to be an enemy. "My men have become women, my women men," he exclaimed, and loaded the indomitable queen with honours. Herodotus says that the Greeks lost forty ships and the Persians two hundred, exclusive of those which were captured with all their crews. A contingent of troops which had been landed on the island of Psyttalia was also destroyed.

The sea battle of Salamis saved Greece and Europe. Xerxes became nervous about his communications, fearing that the Greeks would sail up the Hellespont and destroy

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the bridge of boats, as, indeed, Themistocles was anxious to do. The king therefore left Mardonius with three hundred thousand men, and retired with the rest of his army and the remnant of his fleet. Mardonius was defeated and slain at Platea, and, on the same day, or a few days later, the Athenians won another great naval victory at Mycale, which detached the greater part of Ionia from the Persian cause. Thus ended the attempt of Xerxes to add Europe to his empire. Of the Persian fleet, one-fourth was Phoenician, and one-third at least was contributed by the Greek colonies. The defection of the latter shows the moral effect of the Athenian victory.

The war left Athens—the one State which had grasped the meaning and function of sea power—with the hegemony of Hellas, which had previously belonged to the Spartans. The League of Delos, which comprised most of the States of Central Greece outside the Peloponnesus, and the Ionian States, was formed immediately afterwards. In process of time, the smaller members became mere tributaries of Athens, which was thus able to build up a centralised and homogeneous sea power. The mutterings of the storm which was to burst in the Peloponnesian war hardly disturbed the glories of the era of Pericles. It would be too long a matter to follow in detail the events of that protracted struggle in which Hellas, having saved Europe, did her best to destroy herself. One fact stands out pre-eminent: that Athens, surrounded as she was on land by forces greatly superior to her own; ill-supported by jealous allies and tributaries whom her domineering conduct had alienated from her, was yet able to sustain the unequal contest, and even to emerge the victor in the first period which ended with the peace of Nicias. She owed her escape from destruction entirely to her sea power. She lost battles even by sea; the hoplites of Sparta ravaged the lands of Attica; her people fell by thousands before the plague. But she surrounded the Peloponnesus with her fleets and naval stations, and the Spartan armies fought

with their heads ever turned over their shoulders, never daring to be long away from their own soil. She cut off her foes from the granaries of Syracuse. She suppressed the revolts in Mitylene and elsewhere with a high hand, preventing the succour which Sparta would have sent from reaching the rebels. Her fleets forbade co-operation between the Spartans and their allies in the north, and at the time of her deepest distress she was able, by her superiority at sea, to hold on tenaciously to the blockade of Potidea and to compel the surrender of that stubborn town. It is interesting to note the great name of Sophocles among those who had the best grip of the vital importance of sea power to Athens.

In the second phase of the war, the conditions completely altered. The baneful influence of Alcibiades dragged the Athenians into a war of aggression, for which sea power is ill-suited, and distant adventure. With the Spartan at their gates, they were compelled to use their fleets excentrically, and they underwent, in consequence, the disasters of Syracuse and Ægospotami. After the ruin which fell upon their sea power in consequence of the latter defeat, Athens itself was taken, and the Athenians, having lost command of the sea, had no means of repairing the disaster as previously they had done by the victory of Salamis. The strategy which led to Ægospotami, fought just above the Narrows of the Dardanelles, was correct enough. Alcibiades and Conon followed the main force of the enemy to bring it to battle. They were defeated, not because their plan was bad, but because its execution was grossly faulty, owing to carelessness. The disaster might still have been repaired, for Conon escaped from the battle with his squadron "in being." The position was not much worse than that of Britain after Torrington's defeat off Beachy Head in 1690, when the army of James II in Ireland represented the threat to Athens of the land power of Sparta. But James was defeated at the battle of the Boyne twelve days later, while the army of Sparta

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remained intact, and the Athenians had lost the power to harry the coast of the Peloponnesus. So they were subjected to the humiliation of digging down the Long Walls which connected Athens and the Piræus at the behest of their enemies.

The walls were destined, however, to be rebuilt by Conon, who, with the assistance of Evagoras, the co-called "tyrant" of Cyprus and Pharnabazus, the Persian satrap, won a great victory at sea over the Spartans at Cnidus, with a mixed fleet of Athenians and Phoenicians. Henceforward, the history of Greece, to the foundation of the Empire of Alexander the Great, is one long struggle of contending States, in turn supported by the Persian power, for the mastery of Hellas. Of all these it may be said that the State which had command of the sea was master. Inevitably; for, by command of the sea alone could the Persian aid be enjoyed.

In the meantime, the power of Carthage and of Rome was ripening in the Western Mediterranean for their decisive struggle. The common estimation that Carthage was a great sea power is somewhat unaccountable. It is true that the Carthaginians have considerable maritime achievements to their credit. They spread colonies over northern Africa, and they overran Spain to the Ebro. They certainly sailed to the North and had trading relations with Britain, perhaps also with Scandinavia. But the analogy, of which the Germans are particularly fond, which compares Carthage with Britain, is superficial. The Carthaginians, of the era of the Punic Wars, had ceased to be a maritime nation. They deserved that title only so long as they maintained their connection with the mother States of Phœnicia, and these had by now been absorbed into the Alexandrine Empire. It was said of the Carthaginians—and it was meant as a compliment—that they "chose to live in Libya and not in Phœnicia." That is, they cut themselves off from the maritime confederation of their race, as the United States cut themselves off

from ours. They fitted out great fleets, and, at the beginning of the Punic Wars, before the Romans had developed their navy, they won several battles. But that they should have been worsted on what was supposed to be their own element by a people which had to copy a wrecked trireme as a model for their ships and taught their sailors to row on dry land, proves that they had not the real "sea-sense." The pure blooded Carthaginian of this period, enervated by riches and the command of mercenary armies of this race, had ceased to learn war. In this Carthage differed utterly from Venice, where, to the very end of her period of power, the commercial nobility took their own part in the fighting by land and sea. Only a few of the great Carthaginian houses, notably the Barca family, gave personal service in the wars. Their hired or impressed Libyans, Numidians, Spaniards, when led by a Hannibal or a Hasdrubal, could be formidable enough as soldiers, as the Romans learned. But sea power only rests securely on the character and sea sense of the race which is dominant in the State, and on the personal service of its sons. Great Britain has this indispensable qualification; Carthage had not. The German analogy, built on the German view that all volunteers are "mercenaries," is therefore unsound. Great Britain is no more comparable to Carthage than is modern Germany to republican Rome.

The course of events had been such that, when Rome and Carthage came into conflict, there was no great sea power any longer existing. Alexander, for his own ends, had broken the strength of Tyre, and the tradition of the Macedonian Empire, as represented by Pyrrhus of Epirus, was not naval. His alliance with the Carthaginians brought them no effective aid. Hellas, in the thrall of the Macedonians, had ceased to count. In the country of the blind, therefore, the one-eyed was king, and the one-eyed proved to be Rome. Mahan has made the naval lessons of the Punic Wars the starting-point of his most

famous work, "The Influence of Sea Power upon History." He points out that, although many people have held, because there was cross-raiding, and the Carthaginians occasionally won a battle at sea and sent supplies and reinforcements to Hannibal, that the command of the sea remained in doubt, this opinion is erroneous. No navy, however superior, can reckon on being able entirely to prevent occasional incursions by its enemy. The crucial fact which shows the supremacy of Rome is this: that the Carthaginians elected to use the long and perilous land route into Italy by Spain and the Alps instead of the direct sea route, making use of their Sicilian bases, and that Scipio, grasping the supreme importance of maritime communications, struck unhindered at the Carthaginian base in Spain by means of an oversea expedition. Hannibal, one of the three superlative military geniuses of the world's history, lost two-thirds of his army on its march to Italy, and his brother, Hasdrubal, made the toilsome journey only to be cut to pieces at the Metaurus, owing to the disorganisation and exhaustion of his troops. It is impossible to believe that Hannibal did not grasp the advantage of the shorter line of communications, and would not have used it if he could have done so with safety. The campaign of Zama, like that of Waterloo, clinched a business which had been already settled by sea power.

The ruin of Carthage was quickly followed by the Roman conquest of Hellas, and that, in turn, by the overthrow of the Ptolemies. Rome was mistress of the Mediterranean and its shores. The dominion of the world was yet to be settled by sea power, but in a fight between Roman and Roman. Octavianus beat Anthony at Actium, almost on the scene of Lepanto and Navarino, and but a short distance from Salamis, the region where contests between East and West are fated to be settled. Thus the Empire of the Cæsars came into being. But the Romans can hardly be counted among the races which have been great at sea. They depended rather upon the

subjects over whom their land power gave them dominion, the Liburnians, Illyrians, and so forth, than upon themselves. The ponderous galleys of the regular Roman fleet were simply platforms from which soldiers were to fight, as were, much later, the galleys of the Venetians, the ships of the Armada and, indeed, the vessels of all the navies designed primarily for service in the closed waters of the Mediterranean. The Romans met the Carthaginians when the latter had forgotten the habit of the sea and were morally and politically degenerate. That was the determining factor, and not any special aptitude for sea-warfare on either side. The methods which gave them victory were merely extensions of the method of land warfare to the water. They could not have prevailed against a foe of real maritime instinct.

CHAPTER III

"A PLACE WHERE TWO SEAS MEET"

DESPITE what has been written above, as to the decadence of Carthaginian sea power at the time of the Punic Wars, it has to be recorded that this people made a notable contribution to the knowledge of the world beyond the bounds of the *Œcumene*, if their early and scanty records are to be believed. We are the more bound to notice this because it is from a Carthaginian source that we obtain our first knowledge of Britain. Accounts have come down to us through Pliny and the late Roman writer, Rufus Festus Avienus, of two expeditions which the Carthaginians sent into the Atlantic about the year 500 B.C. The one, under a leader bearing the common Punic name of Hanno, sailed south; the other, under Himilco, turned northwards. Hanno's expedition coasted along the east of Africa, and reached the mouth of the Senegal, or of the Gaboon. They saw many wonders on their way, including mountains and rivers which streamed with fire; and they reached an island "full of savage people, the greater part of whom were women, whose bodies were hairy, and whom our interpreters called *Gorillæ*." "Though we pursued the men," the story continues, "we could not seize any of them; but all fled from us, escaping over the precipices and defending themselves with stones. Three women were, however, taken; but they attacked their conductors with their teeth and hands and could not be prevailed upon to accompany us. Having killed them, we

flayed them, and brought their skins with us to Carthage." One is less surprised at the reluctance of the hairy ladies than at the abrupt methods of their captors.

Himilco sailed northwards, as has been said, and reached a promontory which he called Æstrymnis, near the tin-bearing isles known as the Cassiterides. Æstrymnis was two days' sail from the Holy Island, identified with Ierne, or Ireland, "near which is the large island of Albion." If this be really the genuine account of Himilco and not a late gloss of Avienus, as the name Albion leads one to suspect, we have the earliest certain mention of our islands. Æstrymnis may be Point St. Matthieu, in Ushant, or it may be Le Croisic. But the mention of Ierne as being two days' sail, and of the large island of Albion lying "near it," is strange. For, if Æstrymnis be Ushant, Cornwall, and not Ireland, would be the nearest landfall after the Scillies, if we take the latter to be the Cassiterides. But Himilco's mention of our islands is probably from hearsay. It is unlikely that the Carthaginian explorer trusted himself to the open sea. If he visited Albion, it would probably have been after coasting along the northern shore of France and reaching the Straits of Dover. Himilco, however, seems to have seen the coracles of the British and Irish, who, no doubt, came over—hardy fellows!—to Northern France to trade, as they did five hundred years later in Julius Cæsar's time. It was probably from them that he heard of the islands lying to the northwards, and formed an extremely hazy idea of their geographical position. It is rather strange that either Himilco or his supposed informants should have known that Albion and Ierne were islands, and it must be confessed that it looks as if the more recently acquired knowledge of Pliny and Avienus has been interwoven with the Carthaginian's tale. Be this as it may, we are, perhaps, entitled to conclude that the Britons, *penitus toto divisos orbe*, came into contact with the civilisation of the Mediterranean as early as 500 B.C.

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Himilco says that the sea through which he sailed to reach Œstrymnis was sluggish, with the winds so light that they would scarce drive the ship; that it was full of weed, which held the vessel back, and shallow withal, so that the water sometimes barely covered the land. Nevertheless, it abounded in sea monsters. Some people have conjectured, from the mention of the weed, that Himilco reached the Sargasso Sea. But the rest of the description, and especially the shallowness of the water, forbid this interpretation. It must be remembered that, coming from the Mediterranean, he was unacquainted with the phenomena of the tides. His voyage was a coasting voyage, and therefore, at low water, he would be liable to find himself aground, or almost aground, in the shallow seas off the western coast of France. The sea monsters were, no doubt, the whales of the Bay of Biscay.

With Himilco, the period of Phœnician exploration closes, so far as our knowledge goes. The next explorer is a much more important person, namely Pytheas of Massalia, a Phœcean, who undertook one or more voyages to the North between 330 and 325 B.C. This was just before the defeat of the Greeks by the Phœnicians off Corsica gave the latter control of the communications between southern France and Spain. Pytheas was an astronomer of some repute, and seems to have been the first who had the idea of dividing the world into degrees of latitude. He left an account of his adventures which, though doubted by writers like Polybius and Strabo, is much better authenticated than that of Himilco. He added no little to the store of geographical knowledge. But the first interesting point about his voyage is that he appears first to have established intercourse with the Northmen, through Britain.

He sailed round Cape St. Vincent and up the coast of Iberia and Gaul. He circumnavigated Britain, and gives a measurement of the circumference of the island which, unfortunately, is just twice too great. He discovered

the Orkney Islands and passed thence to a land still further to the north, which is identified with the Thule of the Romans. Here he saw the midnight sun, and came upon the fringe of the arctic ice in what he speaks of as "a sluggish and congealed sea" (*mare pigrum et concretum*). He calls Britain *Brëttanice*, which seems to confirm the opinion that he had first-hand dealings with the inhabitants.

Thule is generally identified with Iceland; but, for many reasons, it is practically certain that Iceland was not the country which Pytheas reached. It is more plausibly identified with Norway. He places it "six days' sail north of Brettanice." The Phoceans, like the Phoenicians, were coastwise sailors, and it is very unlikely that Pytheas would have launched out into the unknown, where, according to the geographical ideas of his time, there was no land, unless he had some positive evidence that land existed. It is therefore concluded that, even at this remote date, there was communication between the Scandinavian countries and Britain. If this be so, there was already a race of seafaring men in the North who used the sea at least as boldly as the Phoenicians and the Greeks. More boldly, in fact, for the voyage across the open and stormy waters of the North Sea was more perilous than a coasting voyage along the shores of the Mediterranean. It may be asked how it came about, if this were so, that the subjugation of the Britons by the northern tribes did not take place many centuries sooner than it did; for our woad-painted forerunners could hardly have resisted the invaders in their coracles. The only reply which can be given is that, so far as we can gather from the accounts which have reached us of the writings of Pytheas (it must be remembered that his book, "On the Ocean," is not extant), those northern peoples had already reached the agricultural stage of development. They were not yet pressed by the more powerful tribes from the East, and they perhaps found little to tempt them in forest-

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covered Britain, especially as its inhabitants were not yet enervated by Roman rule and protection. The purpose for which the Northmen came can only be conjectured. But, as there was trade between the Britons and the inhabitants of north-western France, it is possible that the amber of the Baltic actually found its way to the Mediterranean through Britain, which was thus already an *entrepôt*.

If we accept the evidence, such as it is—and it cannot be given in detail here—for early intercourse between Britain and the North, it was in these islands that the sea power of the North and the Mediterranean first met, in peace, not in war, engaged in exploration and in trade. It was for Britain that they were destined to contend, and it was to Britain that the sea power of both was eventually to pass. The facts of geography decided the matter. When once the race fit to wield sea power was established and the incentive to adventure was present, the supremacy of Great Britain at sea was a natural growth, and not an artificial development fostered by policy. But, in the era of Pytheas, the Viking age was yet a thousand years distant, and the eagles had not yet flown over Britain.

The Romans, by nature and tradition, were an agricultural and military, not a trading and maritime, people. Their legions conquered the races round them by their incomparable soldierly spirit and discipline. The provinces so acquired were held by garrisons to whom grants of land were given, and who settled down and intermarried with the subject peoples. Our Allies, the Rumanians, for instance, boast themselves descended from the *coloni* of Trajan. When, therefore, Rome became mistress of the Mediterranean; when the engineering skill of the Romans had opened up the highways of Europe, it is the coracles of Britain and the ships of Frisia which bring the tin and amber to the markets of the Continent, not the galleys of the Greeks and Phoenicians which fetch it thence, as aforetime. Rome is only in appearance an exception to the

rule that the peoples which have need of the necessities of life send and fetch them. It is true that, in the time of the Cæsars, the city was fed by corn from Egypt, brought in ships of Adramyttium. But these all owed the sovereignty of Rome. They represented the seafaring portions of her Empire. In the North the rule worked. Long sea trade, by way of the Atlantic, almost ceased from the beginning of the Roman dominion, and was never really revived till the discovery of the New World.

Small claim as the Romans had to be considered a great maritime people, our naval history opens with a defeat at their hands. Julius Cæsar, in his victorious march through Gaul, in the first century B.C., reached the western coast, and there came into contact with the Veneti, a seafaring tribe which dwelled about the mouth of the Loire. Cæsar ordered that a fleet should be built on the river, and, when it was completed, marched his soldiers on board and attacked the Veneti off the rocky coast, which, many hundreds of years later, was to be the scene of Hawke's great victory of Quiberon Bay. At this time, as for many centuries later, the Mediterranean peoples relied on oars as the prime means of propulsion; the Northerners rather upon sails. The former remained soldiers on shipboard; the latter were destined to evolve a system of real naval war. In this action, however, fought in the narrow waters at the mouth of the river, their reliance on sails was the bane of the Veneti. They had two hundred and twenty ships, of which a proportion were British, probably small trading ships which happened to be in the river, as was their wont, on "their lawful occasions." The following is Cæsar's own account of the first recorded sea battle in which Britons took part. He says:—

"About two hundred and twenty of the ships of the Veneti, fully equipped and appointed with every kind of naval implement, sailed forth from the harbour and drew up opposite ours; nor did it appear clear to Brutus who

commanded the fleet, nor to the tribunes of the soldiers and the centurions to whom the several ships were assigned, what to do, or what system of tactics to adopt; for they knew that damage could not be done by their beaks; and that though turrets were built on their decks, yet the height of the stems of the barbarian ships exceeded these, so that the weapons could not be cast up from our vided by our men was of great service: namely, sharp by the Gauls fell more forcibly upon us. One thing provided by our men was of great service: namely, sharp hooks inserted into and fastened upon poles. When the ropes which fastened the sail-yards were caught by them and pulled, and our vessels vigorously impelled by the oars, the ropes were severed, and the yards necessarily fell down, so that, as all the hope of the Gallic vessels depended upon their sails and rigging, the entire management of the ships was taken from them at the same time."

Eventually, the Veneti turned to fly—such of them, presumably, as retained their sails intact—but the wind suddenly dropped and a flat calm prevailed, in which the Romans annihilated their enemy. The battle is an instructive contrast to that which was fought when "Hawke came swooping from the West," taking "the foe for pilot and the cannon-glare for light." If such conditions had prevailed, Cæsar would have got "the father and mother of a batin'." He won by means of a landsman's device, comparable with the use of the "corvi," or spiked gang-planks which enabled the Romans to swarm on board the Carthaginian ships. Hawke, on the other hand, dashed in from seaward and annihilated the foe among the rocks. The stormy wind and tempest, dreaded by soldiers on ship-board, are ever the allies of the true seaman. Therefore,

"Thank him who isled us here and roughly set
His Briton in blown seas and storming showers."

Marching eastwards again, Cæsar looked across the Channel to the white cliffs of Dover, whence come the name of Albion. In 55 B.C., Gaul was sufficiently settled

for him to lead his legionaries across the Strait. The Britons gathered in such numbers to resist him that the attempt to land at Dover was abandoned, and the transports sailed on to Deal, where the Roman eagles for the first time were borne on British soil. If the Veneti and their British allies had won in Quiberon Bay, Cæsar might never have crossed to Britain. But the silver streak of stormy water was no protection in itself. Rather the contrary. Had the cliffs of Dover guarded a Pass of Thermopylæ, Cæsar might not have been able to turn the flank of the British defence. As it was, it was easier for him to sail to Deal than it was for the defenders to transfer their army thither by land. He was ashore before their levies could come up with his forces. "Far distant, storm-beaten ships" are a defence, whether they lie off Brest, off Toulon, or at Scapa Flow; stormy water without the ships, is none. A second landing was made the next year, but affairs recalled Cæsar to the East, and the conquest of Britain was left to Claudius, a hundred years later. The Roman occupation of Britain lasted three hundred years. Rome reached her zenith and fell into decay during that period. But Roman Britain never learned that her future lay upon the water. The Norsemen were passing from Norway and Denmark to Iceland, and then to Greenland, and, eventually, to "Wineland the Good," identified with Labrador. The mysterious "Eruli," the pirate tribe whose name is, perhaps, a Latinised form of Jarl, or Earl, were sailing south and east, even as far as Lucca. The Viking age, with all its consequences, was beginning; but the Britons were content to be defended by the legions of their Roman masters. The latter built the great Wall of Hadrian, to keep out the Picts, and they appointed a Count of the Saxon Shore, to keep out the Northmen. But as, generally speaking, they gave him no fleet to assist him in his task, the poor gentleman must have had a sorry time of it. Perhaps, however, they were wise in their generation, for, when

they set a thief to catch a thief, by appointing a noted pirate, one Carausius, Count of the Saxon Shore, he incontinently entered into a compact with the pirates he was set to catch, shared their gains with them, and used the money to invest himself with the Imperial purple. He sacked Boulogne, and played havoc with the Roman communications with Britain before he was finally suppressed.

The disciplined legionaries of the Romans sufficed to protect Britain from serious invasion, so long as they remained. But when the number was far greater than Rome could spare with the Visigoth thundering at the gates of the city, the legions were withdrawn, and the Britons, spoon-fed and unwarlike, left to their fate. The Northmen attacked the flanks of the Wall from east and west; the Picts broke through and marched almost to London; the Britons were fain to call in the Saxons and other marauders along their coasts to defend them. They came; they chased the Painted People home again—and they stayed. Hengist landed at Ebbsfleet in 449 A.D., and for the next hundred and fifty years there was a continual influx of Saxons, Jutes and Angles. The latter people migrated in a body from their homes in Frisia and Schleswig, driven out by the pressure of still stronger and fiercer races behind them. All Britain east of Seven Sea and south of the Forth became Saxon, Jute or English, eventually to be unified under Egbert. It seems difficult to account for the fact that these sea-wolves, as we have been taught to consider them, had no sooner settled in the conquered land than they drew up their long keels on the beach and forgot the habit of the sea. It is, however, the case, certainly so far as the Angles are concerned, that they came as settlers, not as rovers, while the other tribes, no doubt, found Britain a pleasanter, more sunny and more fertile land than their own, and were glad to put what they regarded as the barrier of the sea between themselves and the warrior peoples which were pressing upon

them from the East. They brought their own social customs and political system with them; they were used to the life of a community. They were not Vikings like the Norse and the Danes. They hoped to be able to pursue their peaceful occupations of husbandry and herdsman-ship in the new land which they had made theirs. Only Offa of Mercia seems to have maintained a navy, prior to the days of Alfred.

If such were the hope of the Anglo-Saxons, it was writ in water. Already, before the end of the reign of Egbert, the Danes had harried the coast, landing not only in East Anglia, but even at the mouth of the Dart, and, finally, in Cornwall, where they were joined by the revolted Britons. Egbert gained a decisive victory at Hengest's Down in 836 A.D. But the Danes came in ever-increasing numbers during the next three reigns, and, though often defeated, made East Anglia a Danish kingdom, and penetrated even into Wessex as far as Reading. The history of the Danish incursions shows us how hopeless is the defence of an island without a navy superior to all possible assailants. The invaders attacked at all points, from Bamborough in Northumbria to Cornwall, and the task of marching and counter-marching an army to resist them wherever they might land was a hopeless one. This was realised by one alone of our Saxon kings, the great Alfred, who began his glorious reign in 871 A.D. He has been called "The father of the British Navy," and, so far as the realisation of the meaning and function of sea power is concerned, he has considerable title to the honour. Five years after his accession, he built a small flotilla of ships and fell upon the Danes on the coast of Dorset, routing a squadron of seven ships and taking one. The effect of this victory on a small scale was as remarkable as that of Salamis on a large. The Danes became nervous about their communications and swore a peace with Alfred—which they immediately and treacherously broke. Both fleets were reinforced, and the Danes,

landing at the mouth of the Exe, laid siege to Exeter. They, in their turn, were blockaded by Alfred's fleet in the river. A formidable Danish fleet sailed from the mouth of the Thames to raise the blockade; but a storm scattered the ships and destroyed half of them. The rest were met by Alfred's fleet and utterly defeated. Guthrum, meanwhile, had taken Exeter, and Alfred had invested him there. Hearing of the destruction of his fleet, the Danish king capitulated, and marched out of Wessex into Mercia. Since the Danes had been allowed to settle in large numbers, however, the war continued by land, terminating in Alfred's great victory at Ethandune, and the Treaty of Wedmore, which established the Danelagh and brought Guthrum to Christianity.

The races with which we are now dealing, however, were not traders or agriculturists. They had no idea, as the Phœnicians had, of making the sea the great pathway for commerce. They were out for plunder. The sea was, for them, a broad line of military communications by which one swarm succeeded another. No treaty which Guthrum could make could keep new-comers from pouring in and overrunning the boundaries which had been allotted to the Danelagh, though these were ample enough, the Danelagh extending well into the Midland shires and having for its western limit a chain of forts built at Derby, Leicester, Nottingham and Stamford.

Seven years later came the invasion of Hasting, which overran the greater part of the country, and was at last scotched, though not killed, by the ingenious device of Alfred, who dug channels from the Lea, in which Hasting's fleet was lying, to the Thames, and so lowered the level of the water that the ships, left high and dry, were captured by the rejoicing Londoners, and were, doubtless, used in the ensuing years in the encounters which took place with Northumbrian pirates and the lawless Danes of the Danelagh. Alfred died in 901 A.D. In the concluding years of his reign the land had peace, and

this was entirely due to his grasp of the essential condition on which the defence of his realm was founded. The Danes settled ashore became helpless when cut off from succour by the way of the sea. The peace lasted for nearly eighty years after Alfred's death, thanks in part to Athelstan's great victory of Brunanburh. But his successors forgot the lesson of his reign, and allowed the sea power of the country to decline. Now came Sweyn and Olaf of Norway, and to the Danelagh was added the degrading burden of the Danegeld, or tribute paid to the marauders. Ethelred the Unready did, indeed, build a great fleet of eight hundred vessels, after he had aroused the mortal anger of Sweyn by the massacre of the Danes on St. Brice's Day. But it was destroyed by internal dissensions among its leaders. Sweyn subdued the country, and England had Danish kings for twenty-six years.

It was not only into Britain that the Northmen poured. About the time that Alfred made his treaty with Guthrum, Rolf Ganger and his men established themselves in the North of France, in what, thenceforward, became the Duchy of Normandy. The Franks, like the Saxons, were unable to meet them at sea for want of a navy, and found it impossible to drive them from the land when they had the way of the sea open behind them. So Charles the Simple made over the Duchy of Normandy to Rolf Ganger, to hold as a fief of the Frankish Crown.

Rolf, or Rollo, had taken part in the piratical forays which sailed up the Seine and sacked Paris in the reign of Charles the Fat. But the invasion which resulted in the settlement of the Norsemen in Normandy was no mere piratical raid. A whole population had migrated from Norway under the leadership of Rolf, to escape loss of liberty, when the whole of the Northland was united under the rule of Harold Harfagar, the Dane. The Norse, in particular, could not brook this incursion into their tribal freedom, and, in this exodus of Rolf Ganger and his followers, we have another instance of one of the prime

motives which lead to sea power: the claim of men of independent spirit to live their own lives. Probably Rolf's following contained Danes as well as Norsemen, as the inhabitants of the Danelagh contained Norsemen as well as Danes. The names were somewhat indiscriminately used. But, in contradistinction to their compeers, the Normans remained warriors and seamen. It is said that they introduced into Brittany the Norse method of catching whales with the harpoon, and thus set up a lucrative trade on the Biscayan coast. Their sea power took them to the Mediterranean, where they founded the kingdom of Sicily, and were for centuries a thorn in the flesh of Venice, and the stoutest of Crusaders.

The influence of the Norman power on the history of the West can hardly be over-estimated. For the conquest of England by the Normans and the mastery of the Channel demanded by the necessity to maintain communications between the kingdom and the Duchy led to a realisation of the function of sea power, and to the welding of all the elements of the English nation. If the claim of the Angevin kings to the crown of France gave rise to centuries of warfare between the French and the English, the fact that the Norman families were for so long the leaders of political and social life in this country is the main reason why Teutonic *Kultur* has not altogether prevailed with us, and why we are not, at this moment, members of a Germanic confederation for the enslavement of the world, instead of being ranged with the peoples which are fighting for its liberties. No wonder the Germans furiously rage together at seeing their "cousins" the backbone of the opposition to their ambitions.

On the other hand, supposing the Romans had understood the meaning and functions of sea power, and the Romano-British, after the withdrawal of the legions, had been able to keep their island free from the assaults of the Barbarians, there would have grown up in these islands a Celto-Latin race which would naturally have linked itself

with Gaul, and, thrown like a barrier across the path of the Northern nations, would certainly have barred the way of discovery and expansion to the West. The contrast between Latin America (so-called) and Anglo-Saxon America, with all the limitations which must be made in the use of such terms, will serve to indicate what the result might have been on the history of the world.

Britain is fashioned by nature to be the seaman's prize, and only in the hands of a race inured to the habit of the sea could she have taken any considerable part in the world's affairs. Had the invasion of Saxons, Angles and Jutes been postponed until there had risen a great and highly organised kingdom in the North, she would have been the mere annexe of that kingdom. Had the Norman conquest not been achieved until the realm of the Capets was unified, an event which would have happened much earlier, save for the fact that the Dukes of Normandy were kings of England, she would have been an annexe of France. We have reason, then, to be thankful for the slowness of vision which prevented our Saxon kings from recognising that sea power was the backbone of their strength. Had they done so, one or more of the valuable elements which make up our nation would have been wanting.

Britain is, indeed, the "place where two seas meet." The early civilisation of the Mediterranean and the rude barbarian of the North found in her, the one, its latest, the other its earliest goal. We have seen how the floods of Romans, Saxons, Angles, Jutes, Danes and Normans poured in upon her. When the ingredients of the English people were ready for the mixing, the flood was stayed by the rise of sea power. When mixed, they came forth, a peculiar people, to fulfil their mission in the world, with an audacity, tenacity, flexibility and adaptiveness which are not found in the same degree elsewhere. We English, of course, have the defects of our qualities. The Continent sneers at our "insularity," as if an island people could,

or ought, to avoid being "insular." But his insularity does not prevent the Englishman from being first without a second in the art of handling the less advanced races of mankind over which it is his destiny to rule. Whatever he may be at home, in the dark places of the earth he is, if insular, not narrow-minded, but tolerant, inflexibly just, with a happy way of fitting the means to the end. Moreover, when the ingredients which make the English people were mixed, there was added to them the gifted Celtic races which fringe the land, in a union which, we trust, will soon be rendered complete by the true reconciliation of Ireland.

Of what elements is an Englishman really made? The descendants of the Britons, we know, survive among us in the inhabitants of Wales and Cornwall. Danish blood there unquestionably is in the men of the East Coast, and almost throughout Lincolnshire. It all probability, our great Nelson was of Danish descent. It used to be held for gospel, however, that the two ingredients of the English nation which so entirely swamped all others as to make them negligible were the Anglo-Saxon masses and the Norman aristocracy. The idea that any strain of the old Roman blood remained was laughed at. That opinion is no longer dogmatically held, nor is it likely to be correct. The Roman legions were here for three hundred and fifty years. They were not changed every ten or fifteen years, as are our regiments in India. One legion at least remained in Britain for over two hundred years. The legionaries were not all of Roman race, it is true. Many were Iberians and Gauls, Dacians and other subject races of Rome. But, at any rate, there was a large element which settled permanently in the land and took wives of the daughters of the people. When the Saxons came, they plundered and massacred as the Romans never did. But, in the beginning, at any rate, they were warriors who came without their women, and they stayed and settled. The complete subjugation of the country was a

long business, spread over a hundred and fifty years. In that time there must have been intermarriage. That the idea was familiar to both the Romano-Britons and the Saxons is shown by the story of the marriage of Vortigern to the daughter of Hengist. Moreover, the persistence of Roman place-names in a Saxonised form seems to show that the inhabitants of the country were neither entirely exterminated nor driven out. Chester, Leicester, Lancaster survive and, in other cases, the present names, while of Latin derivation, differ from those by which the cities were known in Roman times. Camalodunum became Colchester at some period; Venta Belgarum, Winchester; Calleva Atrebatum, Silchester. These bear the appearance of folk-names, bestowed by a Latinised people. But the question is, How did the names survive at all, if those who gave them were exterminated?

Then there is the survival of old tradition, and the glorification of British heroes. At Silchester there lingers to this day the legend of a certain giant, whom the country folk call Onion. He threw a great stone a mile from the city, and there it stands unto this day. It is called the Imp-stone, from the letters I.M.P. inscribed upon it, doubtless the first syllable of Imperator. But the interesting point is that, when the exploration of Silchester was systematically undertaken, an inscription was found which proved "Onion" to have been a historical personage. He was an ancient British king or chieftain. In accordance with the usual growth of myth, he has become a giant. But who made him a gaint? The Saxons would not have extolled his prowess. There must have been a surviving population by whom the story, growing into legend, was passed down. There is no question here of the story having been carried to the hills of Scotland and Wales and there cherished among an undoubtedly British population, as the legend of Arthur may have been. It grew and survives on the spot among the country folk. It may be claimed, surely, that there is evidence here that

the Romano-British survived in parts of the country other than Wales and Cornwall.

The events and the elements which have contributed to the making of the nation which has wielded sea power as no other nation has in history; which has made of it a tempered and a balanced weapon with which to carry out its destiny, cannot be otherwise than germane to the study of sea power. We are the heirs of all our past. If we owe our turbulent love of liberty and adventure to the Saxons and the Danes, our stubbornness of purpose to the Normans, may it not be that the inflexible love of law and justice and the practical aptitude which drives the road and bridges the ford descend to us from that great people who were the first conquerors of Britain, and left these same marks as their most enduring monument in the world?

CHAPTER IV

THE MAKING OF ENGLAND

WE now reach the point at which the last of the essential elements which went to the making of the English nation was added to it; at which strong central government was substituted for the chaos of Saxon times, tempered in turn by the gradual growth of civil and political liberties which were won by struggles oft-repeated between king, Church, baronage and people. These forces were grouped in different ways, from time to time, but were gradually welded and fused by the fires of strife behind the closed door which was guarded by sea power. It was but slowly that the meaning of that vital bulwark began to dominate the minds of monarchs and statesmen; still more slowly those of the people. But the days of tribal incursions are henceforward at an end. Progress in freedom coincided with development of maritime greatness. The two things are inseparable in the British conception of the State.

Homer, we are told, sometimes nods. It is not surprising that our great Shakespeare should occasionally follow his example. The noble rhapsody of John of Gaunt in "Richard II" was written a very few years after the defeat of the Armada. When Shakespeare wrote of

"This precious stone set in a silver sea,
Which serves it in the office of a wall,
Or as a moat defensive to a house,
Against the envy of less happier lands,"

he must have had the great deliverance in his mind. He speaks of England "bound in with the triumphant sea"; but there is not the faintest allusion to the men and ships which secured her safety. Of course Shakespeare was not writing a naval treatise. But the description of the sea as "a moat defensive to a house" is a very bad comparison save on the supposition that the enemy has no ships in which to cross it. The bold, bad baron who attacked his neighbour's moated keep did not, as a rule, drag a flotilla with him, and an attempt to swim the moat in casque and hauberk would naturally lead to a visit to the fresh-water equivalent of Davy Jones's locker. With draw-bridge up and portcullis down, the besieged could sleep as soundly in his bed as did Sir Robert de Shurland when his stronghold was attacked by the *Posse Comitatus* of Kent, though counter-attack eventually became necessary in that historic instance.

But the aggressor from over-sea is, *ex hypothesi*, provided with a fleet. Being able to move in secret, he can choose his point of attack. The total defending force may be ten or twenty times that of the invaders, but it cannot watch the whole coast at one and the same time and hope to be able to concentrate in sufficient force at the point where the attempt at landing is to be actually made. We saw this when Julius Cæsar, finding a great concentration of Britons to oppose his landing at Dover, moved his point of attack to Deal, and got ashore there before the defenders could bring up their forces. No frontier is so unsafe as a sea frontier, unless the defender is in superior strength at sea, for almost all land frontiers have natural or artificial strong places which can be held with a minimum of force, while the invader is tied to the roads or railroads for his line of advance. To prove this, it is only necessary to look at the war map of to-day, and to consider the effect of the Carpathians, the Alps, the Pripet Marshes, the inundations of the Yser, the Wilderness of Sin, and the floods of the Tigris, alternating with the

drought of Mesopotamia. So many lines of advance are closed by natural obstacles that the defenders can foresee the points of attack and concentrate their forces accordingly. But the sea has no natural obstacles. It is a broad, level highway, and the army which can use the sea unopposed is free from the great bane of all armies moving by land: that they have to defend and maintain long trains of transport. Even when it is placed on shore, an army carried by sea can often shorten its lines of communication by judicious co-operation with the fleet.

But a defending navy does not best fulfil its function by hugging the shore and waiting to be attacked. That is a fallacy which has persisted since Salamis. It has given rise to such monstrosities as coast-defence ships, on which we, like other nations, have wasted millions. Coast-defence ships are merely the Martello tower idea, transferred from the land to the water. Drake pleaded in vain for leave to "impeach" the Spaniards off their own ports. Nelson laid down the golden rule that "our first line of defence is close to the enemy's coast." But the delusion is not yet dead. It cropped up after the German bombardment of East Coast towns.

A third delusion is that defence can be secured with an inferior navy. That, in some mysterious way, a "fleet in being" which is not strong enough to fight will keep the enemy away from the shore. Under certain geographical conditions, it is true that an inferior navy may exercise considerable influence. It would be foolish, for instance, to ignore the influence which the German fleet has exercised. The short coast-line of Germany, and the possession of a back door at Kiel, together with the difficulty of forcing an entrance into the Baltic, make the position of our chief enemy to resemble rather a land-position than the broad and accessible path of the sea. The "wet triangle" and the narrow passages of the Sound and the Belts are comparable to river estuaries. The value of the German fleet rests upon the possibility that, under con-

ceivable circumstances, it might obtain a local and temporary superiority in one sea or the other. Moreover, in estimating superiority or inferiority, it is unsafe to reckon numbers only. The question cannot be determined until it has been put to the test of war. Efficiency, the habit of the sea, superior resources, may make up for lack of numbers. The Japanese were inferior to the Russians in 1904, by the book. Yet the Russian squadron in Port Arthur was powerless to prevent them from landing both in Korea and the Shan-tung Peninsula. But such modifications as have been here noted do not affect the general principle. If a nation elects, or is compelled, to place its faith in sea power for its defence, then it must see to it that its navy remains indisputably supreme in all respects to any possible assailant or probable combination of enemies.

If Harold, the son of Godwin, had grasped these points, the last great invasion of this country, nearly nine hundred years ago, might never have taken place. He had a fleet, and, at other times, made good use of it. For instance, he beat back the first attempt of his rebellious brother, Tostig, on the sea. But when the crisis came in 1066, his fleet kept its ports, thinking, perhaps, to defend England off her own shores, instead of "impeaching" the Norman Duke off his. Nor was any attempt made to meet the armada of Harald Hardrada and Tostig by sea. It is likely enough that the Saxon fleet was not strong enough to fulfil the double task. But it was employed on neither. The army was made the first line of defence. Harold marched north to give battle to Harald Hardrada and Tostig, apparently in the hope that William would remain weather-bound until his return. He accomplished his immediate purpose at the battle of Stamford Bridge, where both the invaders were slain. But ere he could reach London again the Normans were ashore in Sussex. It must be remembered that Harold's fleet was not a royal navy. The ships were furnished by London and what were after-

wards known as the Cinque Ports. Their owners were not required to give continuous service, but only for a certain number of days in the year. Very possibly, these had expired before William got a fair wind which brought him to Pevensey and the field of Senlac.

Being now both King of England and Duke of Normandy, William learned of necessity something of the function of sea power. The rebellion of his son, Robert Curt-hose, and other disturbances in his Duchy alternated with outbreaks both of the Saxons and of his own barons in England. The constant passage of large bodies of men between the two countries became an imperative necessity, and so continued during the reigns of all the Norman and Angevin kings. Sea power, at first a matter of transport only, now became a serious preoccupation to the rulers of England. The use of the sea, however, was not all on one side. There was much cross-raiding. Sometimes an English army was conveyed to France; sometimes a French army was landed in this country. But gradually, as the true English nation was formed and became conscious of itself, it tended to realise that its own shores might be rendered inviolate by predominance at sea. The Anglo-Normans began to regard the Channel as their highway and the opposite coast as their frontier.

The centre of power soon shifted from Normandy to England. It was on the island, not on the continent, that the descendants of William the Conqueror consolidated their strength for the great struggle with their Frankish suzerains. And thus they made a nation. An English party arose, led by the Norman barons themselves. Stephen Langton, the Churchman, and Simon de Montfort, the Frenchman, stood boldly for the rights of Englishmen against intrigues to make of England a province of Rome or a satrapy of France. The greatest of our early English kings had to meet the opposition of his feudal vassals when he wished to use English power to further his designs on France without the consent of Englishmen.

It has never been the right of the Kings of England, said Bigod, Earl of Norfolk, to force their vassals to serve in Flanders. "By God, Sir Earl," exclaimed the King, with a profane pun, "you shall either go or hang!" "By God, Sir King," replied the Earl, "I will neither go nor hang!" And he neither went nor was hanged. Eventually the kings themselves came to rely on the English bowmen rather than upon the Norman chivalry for their armies, for the latter had kindred whom they would not harm and estates on which they feared reprisals, among the king's enemies. It was the clothyard shafts of the English which gave victory to Edward III and Henry V. The English kings, no longer Dukes of Normandy, thanks to the merciful incompetence of John Lackland, yet held a bridgehead at Calais. The long struggle was fought out upon the soil of France, while the English nation consolidated itself behind the fleets and the armies. In the end, fortunately for our future, the hopeless attempt to subdue the French nation failed. All France was lost save Calais, and then Calais itself. But England was ready for her mission in the world. She was ready to expand, first into Great Britain, then into the British Empire.

But as yet her sea power was insecurely based. In Norman and Plantagenet times, the sailor was scarcely more than a ferryman. His function was to carry armies, though this came to involve the corollary that he should prevent the carriage of the enemy's armies. The impulse of the nation, as a whole, was not yet towards the sea. Nevertheless, a true conception of naval strategy and tactics was beginning to emerge. In 1215, Louis the Dauphin was in London, called there by the barons who were in revolt against John. But the arrogance of the French roused the spirit of the English people, and associations were formed which equipped ships and continually raided the communications of Louis in the Channel. John died in the following year, and, in 1217, Louis was utterly defeated and his army destroyed under

the walls of Lincoln. An armament of eighty galleys was fitted out at Calais for his relief, commanded by a noted pirate, named Eustace the Monk. Hubert de Burgh, the Justiciary, collected forty ships of the Cinque Ports, with which he gave battle. The English manœuvred for the "weather gauge," as it came to be called later: that is to say, they got to windward. They then hurled quicklime into the air and, thus blinding their enemies, fell on board them with such good will that only fifteen of their ships escaped. Eustace himself was found hiding in the hold of his vessel, and his head was struck off by Richard Fitzroy, a bastard son of John. This fight is notable for the evidence it gives of the insight of Hubert de Burgh. When he went afloat and took command of the fleet, he was holding Dover Castle, always looked upon as the postern gate of England. So fully did he recognise the desperate chances against him that he gave orders before he set forth that Dover Castle was not to be surrendered even to save his life, should he be taken prisoner. But nothing blinded him to the fact that, if England was to be saved, the foe must be met at sea. His was the policy of the wooden walls as against that of the Martello towers, and eternal honour crowns the name of Hubert de Burgh for this reason, though not for this alone. "This victory," it has been said, "settled for ever the question how England could best be defended. From this time forward we have produced no great naval or military leader who has not placed his trust in the navy as the first line of defence when invasion threatened the country." Yet many of our historians do not mention it at all.

Our two warrior kings, Edward III and Henry V, both made full and correct use of sea power. In 1340, Philip of France lay at the mouth of the Scheldt with a great armament consisting of nineteen ships of unusual dimensions, two hundred other ships of war and a host of smaller vessels. His object was the invasion of England. Hastily collecting all the ships he could from the Cinque

Ports and the south generally, Edward sailed to "impeach" the enemy off his own port. Thus early, the Scheldt had become a "pistol pointed at the heart of England." The whole of his Council opposed Edward in this matter. "You are all in a conspiracy against me!" he exclaimed impatiently. "I shall go. Those who are afraid may stay at home." The battle was fought off Sluys, at the mouth of the river. The French drew up their array across the passage. Edward at first put out to sea as if to decline an engagement. He was, however, but manœuvring to avoid the sun, which shone full in the eyes of his men. His purpose gained, he bore down on the French with wind and tide in his favour. Every ship in the first division of the enemy was captured, and, at this opportune moment, Lord Morley arrived with a fleet from the northern counties. Joining forces, the combined fleet fell upon the second and third lines of Philip's ships. The French were seized with panic and jumped overboard. The fourth line, consisting of sixty ships, made a brave resistance, but was overpowered. With the exception of a few stragglers, the whole French fleet remained in the hands of the victors. Edward lost two ships which were sunk, and about four thousand men. The French losses in men are said to have amounted to nearly thirty thousand.

This great sea fight, of far more consequence to England than Crecy or Poitiers, is usually dismissed by historians in a few lines and treated merely as the prelude of the land campaign. Nevertheless, Sluys settled the question whether the war should be fought on the soil of France or England. Edward grasped the full significance of his victory and claimed the title of "The King of the Sea," which none disputed with him. He insisted that foreign ships in the Channel should veil their topsails to his flag in acknowledgment of his sovereignty. The custom prevailed for near three hundred years, and, as we shall see, was the overt cause of the first Dutch War. Sluys was not the only sea battle in which Edward

commanded his fleet. In 1348 he attacked a Spanish fleet from the Biscayan coast which had joined the French and was harrying his communications and the English trade in the Channel. The battle, which was commonly known as that of Espagnols-sur-Mer, was fought within sight of the town of Winchelsea, and resulted in a complete victory for the English, fourteen of the enemy vessels being sunk.

The use made by Henry V of his navy was strategic, and led to no engagement of first-rate importance. But it is, none the less, extremely interesting. The army with which the King embarked at Southampton on August 2nd, 1415, cannot have been fewer in number than 20,000 men. In six weeks it had lost more than half its number from wounds and disease under the walls of Harfleur. With 9,000 men Henry set out to march from Harfleur, which had surrendered, to Calais. It was a piece of bravado, for his intention was to re-embark his weakened army at Calais and carry it home. This extraordinary flank march through a hostile country, in face of an enemy at least ten times his strength, was made possible by the fact that his fleet moved parallel with him along the coast and that he was supplied from it. All went well until he was strongly opposed at Abbeville at the mouth of the Somme. He was then compelled to turn inland and to follow the course of the river along its left bank until he could find a ford. He crossed near Péronne, in the heart of the great battlefield of 1916, and then, turning northward again, he met and utterly defeated the French at Agincourt on the Ternoise, where the Dauphin and the Constable of France attempted to bar his way to Calais. His strategy may be compared with that of the Duke of Wellington in the Peninsular War, when, marching from Lisbon to the Pyrenees, he shifted his base from the former port to San Sebastian. Little British armies have often been made to go a long way by the skilful use of sea communications. Henry, of course, had complete com-

mand of the Channel, though, in the following year, the French disputed it with him. They blockaded the mouth of the Seine and nearly reduced the English garrison of Harfleur by starvation. But they were defeated by the Duke of Bedford and the siege was raised.

What was the Navy which stood Edward III and Harry of Monmouth in such good stead? The question is not very easily answered. It has been asserted that Henry V was the first king to establish a war-navy, which now became separated from the merchant service. This is certainly not the case. The separation from the merchant service did not take place till many years later. England, indeed, had very little sea-borne trade at this time. The carriers of the world were the Hanseatic cities (of which later), the Venetians and the Genoese. England was still in the agricultural stage, feeding her own people, and using the surplus and the products of her fisheries to purchase luxuries from abroad. London was a great *entrepôt*, but the *entrepôt* trade was carried on in foreign ships. The establishment of the Staples and the grant of Charters, such as the Charter of Merchants by Edward I in 1303, which were devices to enable the kings to get money without appealing to the Estates, acted in restraint of foreign trade. On the other hand, the navy was not yet the King's Navy. At least, the kings maintained no permanent fleet. The feudal idea prevailed that the dwellers by the seashore should give service by sea, as the tenants *in capite*, their sub-tenants and retainers gave it by land. In return, those who provided ships and men had certain privileges. The most famous of these corporations was the Cinque Ports, originally the five ports of Sandwich, Dover, Hythe, Romney and Hastings. Afterwards, the number increased to seven by the addition of Rye and Winchelsea. The defence of the realm by sea, and, more especially of the communications with Normandy, and thus centred in the narrow gate of the Straits of Dover, a strategical position which has maintained its importance

ever since. Whether the threat has come from the South or the North, the fleet in the Downs has always been one of the bulwarks of England.

The first Charter of the Cinque Ports was granted by Edward I. Under it, the five towns were bound to furnish fifty-seven ships for fifteen days in the year, and victualling for others. They received in exchange their own civil and criminal jurisdiction, exemption from taxation and tolls, and the right to assemble in their own parliament, which sat at Shepway, near Hythe. To this day the Corporation has its Courts of Guestling and Brotherhood, though their functions are ornamental. (In point of fact, however, the Cinque Ports possessed special rights and owed special duties long before the date of their first Charter. In Domesday Book the contingent of Dover is fixed at twenty ships, and those of other towns in proportion. There are even traces of their obligation to furnish a fleet as far back as the reign of Edward the Confessor. By the Charter of Edward I the Warden of the Cinque Ports was Admiral of the Coast from Dover to Cornwall. This, however, was subsequently modified, and Portsmouth was made a separate command.

There were, besides, other Admiralties and other obligations to furnish ships. London, for instance, was required to furnish a contingent, known as "ships of the Tower." This was the nearest approach to a Royal Navy in existence in pre-Tudor times. The Lord Mayor was Admiral of the Thames. One stout fellow, Sir John Philpot, after whom Philpot Lane is named, actually commanded at sea. A notable Scottish pirate, one John Mercer, was ravaging the traffic in the North Sea, and Richard II, who was busy with his own none too prosperous affairs, made no attempt to put an end to his depredations. Said sturdy Sir John, "We must catch the wasp which stings us, and do our best to smoke his kindred from their nest. The nobles who should defend us are laggards and excuse-makers. They do not feel the prick of

this thorn as we merchants do, and so they neglect to pull it out. But, an they like it or not, the thorn shall out, and, if they will not attempt it, why, we must." Despite its confused metaphor, this eloquent passage puts the interrelation of sea power and commerce in a nutshell. Sir John collected a fleet of fourteen ships and manned it with a thousand picked men. He found the pirate cruising in the Channel with twenty-one ships; fought him to a standstill; captured or destroyed sixteen vessels, and brought three hundred prisoners, including Mercer himself, back to London. The King, however, considered that Philpot had taken too much upon himself and placed him on his trial. He was honourably acquitted; the King kept his prisoners, and eventually pocketed their ransom. The King's sovereignty was vindicated and his pockets filled; the merchants traded in peace, and "Box and Cox were satisfied." Sir John afterwards placed his fleet at the King's disposal, as was his bounden duty and service.

Besides the Warden of the Cinque Ports and the Lord Mayor, there were Admirals of the North and the West. The functions of these officials appear to have been less to command at sea than to exercise the administrative and judicial functions which now belong to the Admiralty. They had, however, to furnish a contingent of ships to the King's service, as Lord Morley did at Sluys.

The idea of local defence runs strongly through all these arrangements: an idea which is unsound according to the more developed strategical theories of our own times. But the enemy to be met was less often a national enemy than one or other of the pirates which then infested the seas. Moreover, the communication of intelligence was slow and uncertain, and prompt action often necessary. Nevertheless, we can see the strong tendency towards centralisation and the firm hold which our English kings kept over the abuses of the feudal system in the repression of private war, as evidenced in the case of Sir

John Philpot. If the ships were not the King's ships, he was, nevertheless, as effectively the Overlord of their owners as he was of the tenants *in capite* to whom he forbade the practice of sub-infeudation.

The forces wielded by these subordinate Admiralties no doubt consisted largely of small craft, manned by the hardy fishermen of the coast. But the contingents of ships furnished by the Cinque Ports must have included bigger vessels, some engaged in trade with the Continent in time of peace, and some laid up for the King's use. There is, however, ground for the suspicion that they were occasionally used on enterprises not easily distinguishable from piracy, which were disguised under the specious name of "reprisals." In such days as those of Henry III, Edward II, and Richard II, when the central power was loosened, "Pirates of Penzance" may have had an actual existence.

The feudal obligations of the Cinque Ports, the City of London and the Admiralties of the North and West do not, however, account for the whole of the great armaments which our kings sometimes took to sea. The numbers vary from the two hundred ships with which Edward III fought the Battle of Sluys to the twelve hundred which he mustered in the Channel four years later. The ships can hardly have been men-of-war as we understand the term. They had certain distinctive features, it is true, such as the forecastle from which the men-at-arms fought, of which the name survives, though the thing itself has vanished, and fighting-tops for archers on the masts. These were fitted on ships hired for the purpose of war, and often from abroad. But the ship herself only became a real instrument of warfare when she became a floating gun-carriage. Artillery was first used, so far as our own waters were concerned, by the Spaniards in an engagement fought by them and the French against an inferior English force off La Rochelle in 1377. The Venetians used it about the same time in the Mediterranean. It was more easily adapted to oared galleys than to sailing ships. It

had not been generally adopted by the English even in Henry V's time, and it was not made the primary armament of warships till the Tudor era. That, then, must be regarded as the epoch when the Royal Navy really had birth.

At this point it is convenient to say something about that famous institution the Hansa, or Hanseatic League, through which the Germanic peoples made their first bid for sea power. It has been mentioned that Edward I granted a Charter of Merchants in 1303. The Hansa was, at that date, already established in London in the Steelyard, where Cannon Street Station now stands. The Easterlings, as the merchants were called, had begun to acquire those privileges which eventually gave them an alderman of their own and the right to follow immediately after the Lord Mayor and Corporation in all civic processions. They had establishments also in Boston and elsewhere. They were fostered by the kings, to whom they lent money or paid toll. Their trading system was similar to that of the Phœnicians in earlier days and to that of the English and the Dutch in the East Indies afterwards. That is to say, they established what were later called "factories" in England, in Flanders and in the Scandinavian countries. The parent cities were scattered throughout the Germanic Empire, and they were not all maritime, for Cologne and even Cracow, Dinant and Göttingen were, at one time or another, Hanse towns. But the majority were situated on the shores of the North Sea and the Baltic, and of these Lübeck and Hamburg were the most considerable. Their prosperity was founded upon the herring. They bought the greater part of the catch off our shores; but the main part of their supply came from the Sound, where herring swarmed during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries so that at certain seasons, it is said, "they raised boats out of the water." The Lübeck merchants set up establishments for catching and curing the fish at Skanör and Falsterbo, on the southern

tip of the Swedish Peninsula. They had another important establishment at Wisby in the island of Gothland.

So far, the Hansa were peaceful traders, collecting the merchandise of northern Europe in exchange for their catch of herring, and selling it in England, France, Spain and the Netherlands. But in 1248 the herring involved the League in war. Lübeck, in retaliation for some alleged infringement of fishing rights, attacked Denmark and plundered Copenhagen. A century later, the great conflict between the League as a whole and the Danes under King Waldemar IV occurred. Wisby was sacked by the Danes, and a fleet of fifty-two Hanseatic ships, incautiously denuded of their men to take part in the siege of Helsingör (Elsinore), was attacked by Waldemar and destroyed. However, in 1367 the Hansa met in Cologne and agreed to raise a new fleet and army. Making alliance with the Swedes, they again seized Copenhagen and ravaged the islands of Laaland, Moen and Falster. Norway-supported Denmark, but the superior sea power of the Hansa enabled the Swedes to bring their military force to bear, and the Danes were forced to sign the humiliating Peace of Stralsund in 1370. The Danish realm consists in the main of islands, and we see once more that islands can only be successfully defended by a fleet strong enough to keep open sea-communications and to deny their use to the enemy. For lack of this power, the aid of the Norwegians was useless to Denmark, while that given by the Swedes to the Hansa was decisive.


After the Peace of Stralsund, the Hansa took to piracy. Bodies were formed, known as the "Victualling Brothers" or the "Equal Sharers" (the Germans have always been pastmasters of the art of finding fair names for rank iniquity). These established strongholds at Wisby and Emden, and plundered all and sundry. Complications with England followed, in which the whole League was involved. It was noted that, in the negotiations, the League endeavoured "to get everything and give nothing,"

the right of the German to possess the earth being already a Teutonic article of faith. Matters culminated in an actual conflict in 1417, when the English seized a number of Hanse ships returning from the Bay of Biscay. Again, in 1451, a fleet fitted out by the East Coast ports took one hundred and eight ships in the Channel. A long and desultory conflict followed during the years when the central Power in England was embarrassed by the Wars of the Roses. It is hardly distinguishable from piracy on either side. The Steelyard was stormed by the Londoners; but the Hansa was too useful to the kings to allow of the expulsion of the Easterlings for the present. Their privileges were confirmed by Edward IV and Henry VII. However, in the reign of Elizabeth, they filled up the cup of their iniquity by trading with the enemy during the war of the Spanish Armada. Drake and Norris seized sixty of their ships in the Tagus. Philip of Spain retorted by obtaining a decree from the Emperor expelling all Englishmen from Germany, so the masterful Elizabeth bundled the Easterlings out of London bag and baggage. But a worse misfortune awaited the Hansa. About the same time, the wayward herring, for some reason, deserted the Sound for the waters of the English and Dutch coasts. The foundation of Hanseatic prosperity was cut away, and, in its place Amsterdam, as has been said, was "founded upon the herring." It may be noted, as bearing upon German complaints to-day, that the Hansa, in the heyday of its power, insisted on the principle that "hostile ships make hostile goods, and hostile goods make hostile ships."


The first great naval Power of northern Europe, subsequent to Viking times, was German. It was built upon trade and it vanished with the chief source of its trade, just when the maritime stars of England and Holland were rising. But it had an instructive history. Politically, the Hansa was a loose confederation of cities, united for trade and defence, though separated from each other

geographically. It was held together by the sea, the power to use which was secured by the maritime towns, supported by subsidies from the rest. It dispensed with any rigid political bond, though it had its own Parliament, where common policy was discussed from time to time as necessity arose.* It was driven to fight for one reason, and for one only: to maintain its sea-communications with the lands with which it traded and its right to use the sea. The Hansa navy was in no sense the arm of an organised Power. Yet it obtained so complete an ascendancy in the Baltic and North Sea that Gustavus Vasa, the great King of Sweden, declared that the three Scandinavian Crowns "remained small wares of the Hansa up to the sixteenth century." Hanseatic sea power was securely based on the interests of the citizens.

Perhaps the greatest, though undesigned, work of this remarkable Confederation was that it taught England to become a Sea Power in a similar sense. The shrewd, money-loving Henry VII did not fail to perceive that the Easterlings were absorbing two profits, that for trading, and that for carrying. The discovery of America opened men's eyes to the immense advantage of our geographical position, and the cessation of civil strife set free the minds of rulers to consider the affairs of peace. The economic position of the country was greatly altered by the Black Death and the consequent and gradual substitution of hired labour for villeinage. The capture of Constantinople by the Turks, and other causes which will be dealt with in the next chapter, put an end to the monopoly of the Eastern trade which Venice had so long enjoyed. The result was that private adventurers became busy fitting out argosies for trade, and the kings took in hand the establishment of the fighting force by which that trade was to be protected and its opportunities increased. That, perhaps, was not their sole intention. Dynastic considerations, usually the most powerful with more or less absolute monarchs, compelled this course.



STATUE OF ALFRED THE GREAT AT WINCHESTER.



HENRY VIII. EMBARKING AT DOVER.

The Baronage had been practically destroyed by the Wars of the Roses and the proscriptions and attainders which followed; the feudal system as an engine of defence was at an end; there were pretenders abroad who would not look in vain for assistance from enemies or rivals of this country. So Henry VII built him ships of war. It was about the only thing, save architecture, on which he could be induced to spend money.

But it is rather his greater son, Henry VIII, who deserves the title of "Father of the British Navy," claimed for so many. He put the hoards extorted by Empson and Dudley to the best use ill-gotten wealth has ever been put to. Extravagant as he was in his personal expenditure, he laid aside each year a certain sum for the building and equipment of ships. He was himself no mean navigator, and delighted to go aboard his ships at Portsmouth with the whistle, the badge, in those days, of admiral's rank, hung round his neck. He appointed a Controller of the Navy under the Lord High Admiral, thus separating administration from command and initiating the Navy Office or Board, which long co-existed with the Board of Admiralty, after the office of Lord High Admiral had been placed in commission. He also founded Trinity House at Deptford, committing to the care of "the Brethren of the Sacred Trinity" the supervision of pilotage and the buoying and lighting of the coast.

Among the ships which King Henry built were the *Henri Grace-à-Dieu*, or *Great Harry*, of 1,500 tons, the *Trinity Sovereign* and *Henry Imperial*, each of 1,000 tons, the *Gabriel Royal* of 800 tons, the *Great Galley* of 700 tons, and the *Mary Rose* of 600 tons. The fleet which left Portsmouth in Holy Week of 1512 for the war with France is said to have numbered eighty vessels and to have carried over 20,000 men. It was well armed with serpentines, cannon and demi-cannon, sakers, culverins, murderers and all the rest of the quaintly-named ordnance of the day, some throwing shot as heavy as were used at

Trafalgar nearly three hundred years afterwards. These ships were designed for a regular sea-fight, although boarding, then and for many years later, was contemplated as the decisive stage of the action. They were no longer merely platforms for men-at-arms to fight upon.

With this armament, Henry kept command of the Channel. The French were driven into Brest after a fight which was, tactically, indecisive. The English followed them through the Goulet Passage, and then occurred a strange incident which has never been satisfactorily explained, but which cost the life of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Edward Howard. He appears to have boarded the French flagship which was lying inside the harbour, with the intention of cutting her out. He was left on deck almost single-handed, the French throwing off the grappling-chains before his whole crew could get on board. Howard, seeing himself doomed, threw his whistle, the badge of his rank, overboard, and was shortly afterwards hurled into the sea. His adversary, Pregent, or "Prior John," as the English called him, a notorious corsair, recovered the body, and salted the heart as a "souvenir." His motive was not "frightfulness," as one would hastily conclude. He honestly wished to honour a doughty foe.

Henry VIII had his ups and downs by sea. The English coast was repeatedly raided, despite his general ascendancy. As Mahan has said, and as recent experience has proved, no superiority, however great, can wholly prevent such enterprises. On one occasion, the fishing hamlet of Brighthelmstone, not yet become "Doctor Brighton," was burned. In a later war, the French sent a great fleet to the Isle of Wight, which actually sailed into Spithead. Henry's fleet on the spot was much inferior in numbers, and, to make matters worse, the *Mary Rose* the "beauty ship" of the squadron, as was our lost *Queen Mary*, capsized and sank. Loud was the laughter of the French. But a sudden shift of wind prevented them from making use of their advantage. Night came on, and, in

the morning, to the astonishment of the English, the French fleet had disappeared. So impressed were the pious minds of English churchmen that two suffrages were embodied in the Liturgy to keep the event in remembrance:—

“Give peace in our time, O Lord!”

“Because there is none other that fighteth for us:
But only Thou, O God.”

It was to this fleet also that the password, “God Save the King!” with the countersign, “Long to reign over us!” was given. Herein is supposed to be the germ of the National Anthem.

It is once more to be noticed that the chroniclers of the time and later historians tell us very little of the means by which the English obtained their mastery at sea. The battle off Brest was an indecisive affair, in which we lost the *Regent*, one of the most powerful vessels of the fleet. But the French sought refuge in their harbours, and, during the rest of the war of 1512-13, only essayed “tip-and-run” raids. The moral appears to be that the side which will not fight is beaten, and that all the advantages go to that which seeks battle, even without a struggle. In other words, sea power is power over communications at sea.

With Henry VIII's reign began the real era of England's maritime greatness. Kings and people had learned their lesson as to the true basis of defence. The introduction of cannon, the discoveries of new lands and of new sea-routes, the altered economic condition of the country, the abolition of restraints on trade, even the personal rule of the Tudors, all helped to foster the growing disposition of the English people to turn towards the sea. The use of sea power by the earlier kings to maintain their communications with France had accustomed the public mind to the idea of a fighting navy. The real, solid foundation of sea power was now supplied. The growth of commerce went hand in hand with efficiency in naval war. Each supported the other. The King's

ships kept the Narrow Seas secure; but the merchantman went armed on his great adventures beyond. Therefore, in time of peril, he was a valuable auxiliary to the naval force. The English became in greater and greater degree a seafaring people. And there was soon to come a wave of enthusiasm, partly born of religious antagonisms, partly of intolerance of restraint, which lent weight and vigour to these impulses. These things, and much else, came to fruition in the Elizabethan age.

CHAPTER V

THE MEDITERRANEAN IN THE MIDDLE AGES

IT has been truly said that the shores of the Mediterranean are strewn with the wreckage of Empire. The Pharaohs, the Phœnicians, the Carthaginians, the Greeks and Macedonians, the Romans, Vandals, Saracens have in turn borne sway and vanished. The Turks are in a fair way to vanish. Some have left their monuments, some their literature and art, and all have left abiding lessons to those who study the meaning and the function of sea power. The period we now have to trace is one in which ancient civilisations were impinged upon by Barbarism from the North and from the East; in which religious zeal or fanaticism moved the nations to almost continuous war, and in which Christendom, divided against itself, gave ground before the fierce onslaughts of Islam. Thence emerged a new contest between East and West, which ended in the bounds of the East being set further to the westward than in the last great incursion in the days of Xerxes. Nevertheless, the tide was stemmed, and stemmed mainly by sea power. The bounds of the Turkish Empire in northern Africa were set where the bounds of Cambyses' Empire were set, for Ottoman control beyond the borders of Egypt was little more than nominal. On the European side, however, the sword of the Faithful bit deeper. It was only under the walls of Vienna that the plague was stayed. The failure of the Byzantine Empire and of the other States which should have supported it in

the task of holding back the Turkish onslaught are at the root of the troubles of to-day, for it is the heritage of the Turk, derived by conquest from Byzantium, which has stirred most deeply the cupidity of the Teutonic rulers.

The History of sea power in the Mediterranean during the Middle Ages can best be understood by following the long, tortuous, but withal glorious, history of Venice. It is the story of perhaps the most completely organised naval State the world has ever seen. Everything in that paradise of merchant princes gave way to trade. All policy was founded on the acquisition of wealth, and had that for its end. And the Venetians, in consequence, had both the virtues and vices of traders. They were punctilious in keeping the letter of a bargain, but not equally scrupulous about its spirit. They indulged in little idealism. It was impossible to sway them by sentiment. But, being sea-traders, they were of high spirit and tenacious of their ends. At last, they lapsed into the torpor of wealth, and allowed themselves to be undone by circumstances which they would have overcome, had they retained their early stiffness of purpose—namely, the discovery of America and the route to India round the Cape.

Venice was founded in the fifth century of our era by a band of fugitives who fled from the Huns. They were of the most stiff-necked breed of the Italian peoples, and they found among the lagoons at the head of the Adriatic an abode easily defensible and as easily adapted to the acquisition of wealth and power. From small beginnings, merely punting from island to island, carrying fish and other produce; then gradually extending their range to fetch corn and wine from Apulia; afterwards, pushing their trade down the narrow waters of the Adriatic, the people of Venice built up their great navy, trusting their all to the sea, and living by it alone. Protection was needed from the pirates of Illyria and the northern coast of Africa, and thus arose the war navy. It

was the deliberate creation of the State for the protection of its merchantmen. The Venetians started at the right end. The first Doge, Paolo Lucio Anafesta, little more than two hundred years after the small beginnings of Venice, enforced the building of merchant ships and provided for the fortification of the shipyards, and Doge Orso Ipato, in 726, definitely set himself to create a war navy for use against the Lombards. Fourteen years later, the Venetians won their first smashing victory, taking Ravenna, crushing a serious rival, and thus winning the supremacy of the Adriatic.

Venice became later the "Safeguard of the West." But at this time she was fairly constantly on the side of the Empire of the East. Charlemagne attempted to win her over. His policy was brimstone and treacle. He sent his son, Pepin, to sack the town. But Pepin met with a great disaster—so great that the scene of the battle was known as the Canale d'Orfani. Charlemagne then tried propitiation, opening the doors of his empire to Venetian trade. The Venetians took his gifts and used them as a lever to secure similar concessions from Alexius, Emperor of the East. Thus Venice became the *entrepôt* of trade between East and West, a position she was to maintain till the sixteenth century. Her power and wealth grew by leaps and bounds.

Attention has been often called to the configuration of the Adriatic coasts during the war. On the Italian Peninsula there are few good harbours, until the Gulf of Taranto is reached. On the other side, there is not only the Peninsula of Istria, with the three naval ports of Trieste, Fiume and Pola, but also a rugged coast along Illyria, Dalmatia and Epirus, fringed with islands and provided with the ports of Cattaro, Sebenico, Durazzo, Ragusa, San Giovanni di Medusa, Prevesa, Valona and others. To develop full sea power in the eastern Mediterranean, the masters of Italy must be masters also of the eastern coast of the Adriatic. All these ports were, from

time immemorial, nests of pirates, and it was the first task of the Venetians to clear them out. The first condition of the profitable use of sea power is the establishment of law and right at sea. Throughout the latter part of the ninth and the early part of the tenth century, Venice fought for her life against a combination or succession of enemies—Saracens, Slavs, Huns, Narentines. Sometimes she received a half-hearted backing from the Empire of Byzantium. But, on the whole, it was her arm alone which, in the end, made her the mistress of almost the whole of the eastern shore. Her very misfortunes turned to her advantage, for, being defeated in a naval battle at Taranto, which they fought in alliance with the Greeks in 839, the Venetians were unable to prevent the enemy from sacking Ancona. A disaster thus befell a formidable commercial rival, at which the Venetians did not show themselves inconsolable.

So long as the Greeks in Constantinople were strong, Venice clave to them and, through her friendship and the maritime help she was able to afford, sucked out no small advantage. Her eyes were always on the commercial opportunities afforded by Constantinople. She constrained successive Emperors to reduce the dues in her favour, so that, at last, she obtained pretty nearly the monopoly of trade with the Levant. She adopted the same policy as did the Phœnicians, the Hansa, and, later, the English and Dutch, of establishing settlements or factories in the ports with which she traded, winning many valuable privileges, political, commercial and also ecclesiastical. One of her first demands on any State to which she sold her help was the site for a church—and the tithes appurtenant thereto.

This policy of peaceful trade led her into almost continuous war. For this there were several reasons. In the first place, she had to purchase the continuance and extension of favours from the effete Empire of Byzantium by armed help. In the second place, she had to contend

with the jealousy of commercial rivals, such as Genoa, that other great trading Republic of Italy, which did not by any means consent to take the supremacy of Venice "lying down." In the third place, the Crusades led to a demand for her services to carry the warriors of the Cross to the Holy Land, and she inevitably got embroiled in the strifes between the Christian Powers which throw such a dark shadow across the picture of these pious undertakings. It was the Crusades which finally detached Venice from the East and made her "The Safeguard of the West." But first, having made her position secure in the Adriatic and debouching into the Mediterranean, she was destined to come into contact with the Normans, who had established themselves in Sicily, Apulia and Calabria.

They came, a band of adventurers in the beginning of the eleventh century under Tancred of Hauteville, thus bringing the power of the Northman into the Mediterranean. Tancred's son, Roger, drove the Saracens out of the greater part of Sicily, which, as in the days of the Carthaginians, had been an outpost of northern Africa and the East, and established himself there. His brother, Robert Guiscard, completed the subjugation of the southern States of Italy. By the conquest of Salerno and Amalfi, Robert got a footing in Constantinople itself, for Amalfi had rich possessions there. He set himself to build up his sea power, determined to make himself master of the East. The resolve of the Normans to increase their commerce and to assert their right of way into the Adriatic could not fail to bring them into collision with the Venetians, even if the jealousy and fears of the Greek Empire had not called on the latter to intervene. Both Venetians and Normans aimed at an uncontrolled and exclusive right of way through the Adriatic; each people considered its right to supremacy at sea to be paramount; each had interests to guard and further in the commerce of the East. Venice was in possession. Therefore she stood in alliance with Byzantium to secure to herself the use of the sea-

routes and to forbid them to her rival. The primary function of sea power could not more plainly be brought out.

In 1078, Duke Robert espoused the cause of the dethroned Emperor, Michael VII, against Alexius Comnenus. The latter sought the aid of Venice, which was granted on these terms:—Alexius promised, whether successful or not, to pay an annual tribute of twenty pounds of gold to the church of St. Mark; to compel the citizens of Amalfi to pay a yearly tax to the said church; to make a free gift of a warehouse, some houses, four landing-stages and a bakehouse, with its dues, to the Venetians resident in Constantinople; to make a gift to them of the church of St. Andrew in Durazzo with its tithes and to grant to the Venetians absolute freedom of trade in all parts of the Empire, except in Cyprus and Candia. In exchange for this charming compound of piety and business, the Venetians promised to arm every vessel in their possession and to lend the Greeks further help by land. They kept their promise.

The events of the war need not be recorded in detail. The Normans were heavily defeated in a sea battle off Durazzo. Nevertheless, they took the town, and, in their turn annihilated a weak Venetian fleet off Corfu. But Robert Guiscard died, and the threat to Venice and Constantinople was removed. The impotence of Byzantium, which lacked sea power, despite the foremost maritime position in the world, to defend its possessions on the sea-board and on the islands against a much smaller State which possessed an efficient navy, enabled Venice to extort what terms she pleased for her assistance.

Now, however, the time had come when Venice was to abandon her close connection with the Empire of the East and, speaking generally, to take her place as "The Safeguard of the West." It was the era of the Crusades. The hosts of the Cross, drawn from all the Christian lands of the West, needed the services of the maritime republics of Italy to furnish them with transport, to carry provisions

and munitions of war, and to keep the coasts and the sea-communications against attack by the still-powerful fleet of the Saracens. Genoa and Pisa were first in the field. The former sent an expedition to the help of Boëmond, the son of Robert Guiscard, who was besieging Antioch in 1097, and, in reward, received valuable grants when the city fell. Next year, the Pisans, attracted by the advantages obtained by the Genoese, also sent their aid to Boëmond. This was too much for the Venetians. Genoa and Pisa, up to now, had contented themselves with trading with Sicily and the northern coast of Africa. Their presence in the East threatened the monopoly so carefully built up by Venice in that quarter. In 1099, Baldwin, the Frankish King of Jerusalem, applied to the Republic for assistance, and the Doge, Vitale Michiel, pressed the project on the willing Venetians. The expedition was got ready and sailed for Rhodes, where it wintered. But the reality of the crusading spirit which animated the Venetians was shown by a bloody quarrel which broke out between them and the Pisans who formed part of the armament. The Venetians were victorious, but restored to their foes all the ships and prisoners they had taken, on condition that the Pisans bound themselves not to trade with any places in the Levant. The dear allies then sailed off amicably together and arrived off Jaffa in June, 1100, in time for a conference with the dying Godfrey de Bouillon, from whom the Doge extracted an agreement, giving Venice the third part of every city captured and other privileges as the price of her assistance. In conjunction with Tancred the Norman, the Venetians captured Haifa; but the victors fell out over the spoil, and Vitale Michiel took his fleet home.

The events of the next two years are instructive as showing the motives which swayed Venice, and the sure grasp she had on the principle that command of the Adriatic was a matter of life and death to her. She made an alliance with the King of Hungary to curb the Norman

power on the Dalmatian coast. Brindisi was sacked, and the object of the allies on the whole obtained. Next, Boëmond, now Prince of Antioch, finding himself sore beset by the Turks, Greeks and Saracens who were besieging that town, escaped to Europe and raised a new army with which, instead of returning at once to the Holy Land, he besieged Durazzo. Venice at once entered into a league with Byzantium, harassed Boëmond's communications, and forced him to raise the siege. This done, they set out for Palestine to the assistance of Baldwin of Jerusalem. There they, indirectly, at any rate, assisted the Normans against the Greeks who had, a few months previously, obtained their aid against the Normans. To complicate matters still further, Caloman of Hungary deemed the moment favourable to break his treaty with Venice and to possess himself of some towns in Dalmatia. The Venetians applied for aid to the Emperor Alexius; but their need of Byzantine help by land did not prevent the fleet, which had been sent to the Syrian coast and had taken part in the capture of Sidon, from paying a visit to Constantinople and showing its friendliness to the Greeks by carrying off the body of St. Stephen from one of the basilicas. Alliances and enmities alike sat lightly on the business men of Venice.

In all this, however, there is a clear and definite line of policy, though the rape of the saint's body was not essential to it. The Venetians lived by the trade of the sea, and they realised that, to enjoy that trade and its fruits, they must be in undisputed command of the sea communications, since, according to the economic thought of that time and of long afterwards, successful trade required monopoly. They were so placed geographically that they could act both as a barrier and a channel of intercourse between East and West, so long as they maintained their sea power. While the Normans, Genoese, Pisans and Saracens were kept in a state of comparative weakness, these communications and, with them, their valuable monopolies, were secure. Nay, more, they could be increased

almost indefinitely by the sale of Venetian aid, first to one claimant and then to another. It was not very noble, but it paid. And the patrician of Venice would have been the first to tell you that "business is business."

Moreover, in justice to the Venetians, it must be remembered that at this time there was no vestige of a law which ran at sea, and also that their position was not entirely insular. Situated as they were at the head of a narrow sea, they were compelled by necessity to keep control of the Dalmatian coast so far as they could, and this necessity brought them into direct contact with great land Powers. A land frontier with powerful States on the other side of it is always a dire complication for a maritime State, rendering incomplete the advantage of sea power. Holland is another instance of the same embarrassment.

The position of Venice at the time of the Crusades is thus summed up by Gibbon:—

"The policy of Venice was marked by the avarice of a trading, and the insolence of a maritime, Power; yet her ambition was prudent. Nor did she often forget that, if armed galleys were the effect and safeguard, merchant vessels were the cause and supply, of her greatness."

Venice had now entered upon the policy of planting colonies or settlements abroad. The first was in Sidon. Others were shortly to follow, both on the coast of Syria and in the islands of the Levant. Her colonies brought her wealth; but, as in the case of Phœnicia of old, they taxed her strength both by the demand for settlers and the need of providing for their defence. Moreover, the Venetians had not the art of ruling. They exploited their colonies for the advantage of the Mother City. They were cordially disliked by their subjects. Sea power easily permits of the foundation of an over-sea Empire; but whether that Empire is to be a source of strength or weakness to the Mother Country depends, first on geographical position; secondly, and, perhaps, mainly, on the character of the race and its capacity for government. Gibbon, in the passage

quoted above, talks of the "insolence" of a maritime Power. He probably intended a back-handed cut at his own country in so doing. But, although, from time to time in our history, we have, without doubt, displayed arrogance towards other nations and even to people of our own flesh and blood, it is the absence of insolence and the large tolerance which Britain has displayed; her respect for the rights and interests of others, which have made the British Empire a source of strength to the Mother Country and not of weakness. We have not exploited the lands over which our flag flies; we have not exacted tribute from any, at any rate for the last century and a half. We have freely extended to all the protection of the Navy and have sought no monopoly in return. Therefore, each Colony and Dependency has developed normally, if slowly, under the British Flag, and the strain which was felt by Phœnicia and Venice, as, later, by Spain and Portugal, has been avoided. A vein of idealism and a strong sense of justice and freedom are necessary, if sea power is to lead to Empire. Enterprise and commercial capacity are not in themselves enough.

The Fourth Crusade witnessed the final breach between Venice and the Empire of the East, and the passing of Constantinople itself into the hands of the Western Powers. Enrico Dandolo, one of the greatest names in Venetian history, was elected ~~Doge~~ in 1192, at the age of eighty-four. In his youth he had been taken prisoner to Byzantium and cruelly treated, his eyes being held so close over white hot steel that the sight was almost destroyed. To him came an embassy ten years after his election from Louis Count of Blois, Thibaud Count of Champagne, and Baldwin Count of Flanders and Hainault, to negotiate for the hire of transport ships for an expedition they proposed to undertake against Egypt. Dandolo not only readily agreed to hire them the ships, but proposed himself, though ninety-four years of age and nearly blind, to take the Cross, with a great host of Venetian

nobles. The terms were, of course, favourable to Venice. But the extraordinary thing is that, in the document which ratified the agreement, no destination is named for the expedition. Dandolo, in haranguing the ambassadors on its conclusion said, "All these conditions which we have explained to you will last a year, dating from the day when we leave the port of Venice to perform the service of God and Christianity *in whatever place it be.*"

The Venetians were soon ready, but the Knights of the Cross tarried, nor could those who assembled find sufficient money to pay the agreed sum to their hosts. So Dandolo made a proposal. If the Crusaders would help the Venetians to recover Zara, a possession of Venice on the Dalmatian coast which was then in revolt, the latter would consent to defer the payment of the money to a more convenient season. The Crusaders agreed reluctantly, and Zara was reduced in November, 1201. The Knights now expected to push on to Egypt, but Dandolo explained that it was too late in the year. Then came young Alexius, son of Isaac II, Emperor of Byzantium, who had been dethroned and blinded by his brother, another Alexius, six years before. He implored the aid of the Crusaders, promising, among other things, that, if his father were restored, he would promote the reunion of the Churches of the East and the West. The bait took. The Crusade became a crusade of the Western Church against the Eastern, instead of one against the Infidel. Constantinople fell; Baldwin of Flanders and Hainault became Emperor of the East. The triumph was complete but short-lived. Baldwin fell in battle with the Bulgarians, and old Dandolo died shortly afterwards at the age of ninety-six, having set his country on her highest pinnacle of greatness. He bequeathed to his successors the title of "Masters of a fourth and an eighth of the whole Empire of Rome." But his success, by destroying the power of the Empire of Byzantium, was fatal to the cause of Christendom in the East.

The story of the Fourth Crusade marks an epoch in the history of the Mediterranean. We now come to the long struggles between Venice and Genoa for the mastery of that sea, which had for its consequences, first, the destruction of the Frankish Empire in Constantinople; secondly, the restoration of the Greek Empire in the house of the Palæologi and the alliance of the latter with the Genoese; thirdly, the delivery of Venice from destruction by the heroism of Vettor Pisani, and, finally, the decay and overthrow of the sea power of Genoa. There were intervals of peace; but from first to last the war lasted nearly one hundred and fifty years, from 1238 to the Peace of Turin in 1382. Venice was forced to cede the coast of Dalmatia to the King of Hungary, to hand over Tenedos to the Count of Savoy and to give up Treviso to the House of Carrara. Her sea power was hampered much by attacks from the land side; but, in the end, she emerged not visibly weaker, since a powerful rival had been destroyed. But the seeds of decay were sown. Moreover, Tyre, Sidon and Acre were now lost to the Christian cause by the advance of the Turks, and the bulwark of Christendom was weakened by the establishment of several feeble States across the path of the Ottoman instead of a single strong Power. Venice was the true Safeguard of the West as long as she lent the support of her sea power to the East, or was herself supreme in the vital position of Constantinople. She was yet to offer a splendid resistance to the oncoming Turk; but neither her navy, nor the armies of Greek, Serb, Hungarian or Rumanian could now prevent him from blighting the East of Europe with his presence for five hundred years and more. Had the Turk not mastered the European shore of the Dardanelles—and he could not have done so had Venetian sea power been predominant in Greece and in the islands—he would no more have established himself firmly in Europe than Xerxes did.

The folly and blindness of the Venetian leaders

during the ensuing century are almost past belief. With the threat of the Osmanli power to all Europe, and to themselves in particular, growing greater and greater every year, they forsook the sea, the only element on which they could hope to resist it, allowed their fleet to decay, and devoted themselves to conquest on the mainland of Italy. They possessed themselves of a great part of Lombardy and of Padua and other places, by which means they drew down upon themselves the hostility of the Florentines, who intrigued with the Turks incessantly, and finally banded a great part of Europe against themselves in the League of Cambrai. They lost their continental possessions thereby, and also their pride of place as the foremost bulwark of Europe against the Turk. But long before this date they had lost much else. In 1453, Mahomet II stormed Constantinople, a cataclysm which shook Europe to its foundations. The Greek Empire crumbled to the dust, never to revive. Venice attempted to make terms with the conqueror, humbly congratulating him upon his success, and accepting at his hands renewal of her commercial privileges at the cost of her honour. The feeble efforts of the King of Cyprus and the Knights of Rhodes utterly failed to stay the progress of Mahomet. He possessed himself of the Morea; yet the League of the Powers of Europe, formed in 1493 at Peterwaradin, which the Venetians joined, failed to act. The Pope and Venice were left to face the Turks alone. The Pope wrote to the Doge, Cristoforo Moro, urging him to remember the example of Dandolo and to put himself at the head of the Venetian armament. The poor old man, however, though he had nigh reached Dandolo's years, lacked everything of his spirit. He pleaded his infirmities and his ignorance of nautical matters. But the Senate was determined that the head of the nation should lead the national forces. "Serene Prince," said Vettor Capello, one of the ducal counsellors, "if your Excellency will not go willingly, you shall be made to go forcibly, for we hold the honour of

our country above any consideration for your person." The Doge went accordingly, but by the time the expedition had reached Ancona Pius II was dead, and the Venetians faced the fury of the Turks alone.

The latter revealed themselves to an astonished Europe as a great naval Power. Secure within the Straits of the Dardanelles, they had built up their strength, and the Ottoman Admiral confronted the Venetian leader Antonio Canale, with an armada of three hundred ships to which he could oppose but sixty. Mahomet in person marched into Greece by the old route of the Persians, while the Venetians lay off Eubœa, where they hesitated to try conclusions with the Turks. Negropont was taken and sacked with the most appalling horrors, and Canale was brought back to Venice in irons and banished.

The two invasions of Greece which bear so remarkable a likeness—that of Mahomet and that of Xerxes—may be compared. Themistocles, like Canale, lay off Eubœa in inferior force. After the defeat of Leonidas at Thermopylæ, the Persians, like the Turks, marched into Greece. Themistocles, however, showed fight, and, though the actions he fought were both indecisive, they saved Eubœa, and enabled him to withdraw his fleet in safety to Salamis, where, in victorious battle, he forced the withdrawal of Xerxes, who became nervous about his communications. Command of the sea saved Greece then; now the Greeks had no fleet of their own, and the succouring fleet of Venice was inferior. Therefore, Greece, under precisely similar strategical circumstances, was lost. Mahomet, holding both shores of the Dardanelles, moreover, had no need to be anxious for his communications, had the event proved less favourable to him than it actually was.

After Eubœa, Scutari—the Albanian Scutari, for which the Montenegrins fought so hard in 1912—was taken by the Turks, and, ere long, the burghers of Venice could see the fires of destruction from their city. Nothing

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
remained for them but to make peace, and the Queen of the Adriatic, crowned with shame, paid tribute to the infidel. It is a ghastly lesson to all those who, having the gift of the sea for their protection, misuse that gift through sloth or penury, or indulge in ambitions of aggrandisement on another element.

Now there begin to appear in the Mediterranean European Powers which had not hitherto made their weight felt there by sea. In 1499, Venice declared war on the Ottoman Empire in alliance with King John of France. This venture was no more prosperous than the preceding one, chiefly owing to the supineness, if not the cowardice, of the Venetian Commander, Grimani. The Venetians lost Modon, Coron, Navarino and Nauplia, and had to put up with insults both from French and Turks. "You Venetians are wise in councils and abound in riches," said the French King. "But so fearful are you of death that you have neither spirit nor manliness in war." "You have wedded the sea till now," said Mahomet's Grand Vizier to a Venetian envoy. "For the future that belongs to us who have more on it than you." Bitter words for Venetian ears to hear!


After the French, the Spaniards put in an appearance in 1509, but proved of little more avail. The Venetians, however, under Benedetto Pesaro, gained some victories, which enabled them to conclude a peace by which Cephalonia and Nauplia were restored to them. Soon, however, worse things befell them than any which had gone before. War broke out again in 1538, when Venice joined a new League promoted by the Pope after the fall of Rhodes. The League was utterly defeated at Prevesa by the Ottomans under the famous corsair, Hairredin Barbarossa, whose name and fame were fitly perpetuated in one of the battleships bought from Germany by the Turks and sunk in 1915 by a British submarine in the Marmora. Selim the Drunkard, who had succeeded Solyman the Magnificent, himself the great-grandson of

the conqueror of Constantinople, made ready to attack Cyprus. Plague broke out in Venice, and the Arsenal was burned down. The Christian Powers had their own pre-occupations elsewhere, and would render no aid. Venice was left to face the storm alone. It did not break till 1570, when the great Turkish fleet, with an army of 100,000 men, laid siege to Nicosia. Christendom was at last aroused; but Philip II of Spain, of Armada fame, alone sent aid. Even he was something less than half-hearted. The opportunity was thrown away in futile debate; Nicosia was taken, and then Famagosta. The whole of Cyprus fell into the hands of the Turks, so to remain until Disraeli drove his bargain in 1878 and placed it in British hands.

Next year there came the last brilliant flash of the expiring glory of Venice, which also marked the definite turn of the tide of Turkish conquest. Philip roused himself in earnest. He got together a great armament of Spanish, Neapolitan, Papal and Venetian ships under the command of his bastard brother, Don John of Austria. Giannandrea Doria, the Genoese, was at the head of the Spanish contingent, Sebastiano Veniero in command of that of Venice. As usual, there were dissensions among the allies. The Venetian ships were not well found—a fact perhaps excusable, in view of the recent destruction of the Arsenal—and there was a long relay at Messina. Veniero and Don John, moreover, were not on good terms. The Venetians, fallen from their high estate at the head of the Powers of the West, had to endure many insults. But the leaders were at least united in their determination to fight, and on Sunday, October 7th, 1571, the Turks were met off the rocky cluster of the Curzolari, north of the Gulf of Lepanto. A Council of War was held on board the flagship, and some of the commanders were for retiring. But Don John was of a higher spirit. "Depart, gentlemen," he said. "This is not the time for counsel but for battle." The great Flag of the League, bearing the image of the Crucified Redeemer, was run up



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THE DEFEAT OF THE ARMADA.

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to the masthead of the flagship. Don John, catching sight of Veniero on his quarter-deck, waved him a friendly greeting which wiped out all soreness, and then, to show his joy in battle, danced the "gagliarda" on the poop of his ship in the sight of his whole fleet. Thus encouraged, the Christian host fell on. The galley of Don John lay aboard that of Ali Pasha, the Turkish Commander-in-Chief, and a desperate hand-to-hand fight resulted in the capture of the Turk. By nightfall the victory of the Christians was complete. A hundred and seventeen galleys and twenty galleons remained in their hands; fifty more were sunk; eighty thousand Turks were slain, and ten thousand more taken prisoners. The losses of the allies were about 7,500, of whom 2,000 were Venetians. Pope Pius V eulogised the victor by quoting, "There was a man sent from God, whose name was John." All Christendom agreed.

Lepanto is justly included among the decisive battles of the world. The Turks were yet to add Crete to their possessions; but Don John, on that October day in 1571, pronounced upon them the sentence, "Thus far and no farther!" Off the indented coast of the Morea, among the islands of the Greek Archipelago and within a few miles of Salamis, Actium and Navarino, the question whether East or West should prevail was again decided. It was too late to push the Turk back from the position he had won. The control of the Dardanelles, which he had acquired owing to the jealousies and ineptitudes of the Christian Powers, was too strong to be forced, though the Venetians were, in the next hundred and twenty years, to win four victories at the mouth of the Straits, thanks largely to the genius of Francesco Morosini. But the Ottoman advance in Europe was definitely stayed. The victory of John Sobieski under the walls of Vienna a century later followed Lepanto as Waterloo followed Trafalgar. Yet the day of Venice was at an end. At Lepanto, for the first time in all the long struggles with the

Turks, she had been second, not first, in the armament of Christendom. It was significant. She kept the shadow of her power, but the substance had departed. The Spaniards, the French, the Dutch, and the English—all the maritime Powers—came into the Eastern Mediterranean in the seventeenth century. If the Venetians failed to seize the opportunity afforded by the discovery of America and the Cape of Good Hope to extend her commerce beyond the pillars of Hercules, the Westerners did not miss theirs to garner their share of the lucrative trade with Constantinople and the Levant, so long the monopoly of Venice. Their warships followed their merchantmen, principally to protect the latter from the forays of those strange pirate States which grew out of the loosely knit Turkish Empire in North Africa, which its sea power, broken by Lepanto, could no longer control. The last was not suppressed until Lord Exmouth reduced Algiers in 1816. Henceforward, the history of sea power in the Mediterranean is interwoven with that of the seas beyond. By the end of the seventeenth century there were conflicts between the English and the Dutch in its waters; in 1704 Gibraltar passed into the hands of the English.

Venice was great at sea partly by reason of her geographical position which, so long as the States which lay behind her did not become too powerful, so long as she did not cherish ambitions of continental conquest, and so long as she kept on friendly terms with the Empire of the East, gave her freedom to develop her oversea trade and the sea power which that trade created. The reasons why she nervelessly dropped her sceptre when the way round the Cape of Good Hope was found are probably three: First, her nobles, grown rich and luxurious, were in no mind for further adventure, involving hardship. Secondly, she was led away by ambition to increase her realm by land, and thus abandoned in some degree the element which alone had made her great. Thirdly, as a Mediterranean Power, she relied on the oared galley, and her seamen were probably less skilled than those whose coasts fronted the ocean.

This limitation is not absolute, for the Venetians were in the habit of sending a galley to Britain every year, and therefore had some experience in oceanic voyaging. But to hug the shores of France and Spain, even to cross the Bay of Biscay, was a different thing from turning the prow boldly to the distant horizon and sailing forth into the unknown. Three of the four great explorers of the coming age were, of course, Mediterranean seamen—Genoese, not Venetians—but they were all in the service of foreign States and gained their experience outside the Middle Sea. When the Venetians made an attempt to contest the right of way to India with the Portuguese, with the help of the Turks, Egyptians and Arabs, they proved no match for the ocean-tried seamen of Vasco da Gama.

Venice lingered independent till the end of the eighteenth century, but she lingered inglorious. Then Napoleon put an end to her career, until she resumed it with brighter hopes as part of the kingdom of United Italy.

Since the construction of the Suez Canal the Mediterranean has recovered the importance it formerly held for any Power aspiring to the command of the sea. Indeed, it never really lost it, for the Peninsula of Italy, long divided between Hapsburg and Bourbon, had always a great strategical value in the struggles between those houses, and the Mediterranean was always the shortest line of communication with the vital military position of Central Europe on the middle Danube. Moreover, Egypt remained the pivot of the communications with the East, and was therefore the desired prize of any ruler with oriental ambitions. It is notable that, as will be seen later, almost the whole of Nelson's career was bound up with Mediterranean questions. We have always found a grasp of the Mediterranean essential to our policy of thwarting any attempt at the domination of the Continent by a single Power. As it has been in the past, so it is still to-day. The abandonment of the Mediterranean has been frequently advocated, and by authorities of deserved weight. It has never been found a possible policy in practice.

CHAPTER VI

THE AGE OF DISCOVERY

As the Middle Ages end, we stand at the beginning of that great era when learning ceased to be shackled, when man's thought became free, and when the horizon of his vision was extended by the discovery of new lands and new routes across the ocean. The world, nay, the universe, underwent a sudden expansion, and not only the material world, but the world of the mind and spirit also. A short table of dates will be sufficient to show the magnitude and the suddenness of the change:—

Constantinople was taken by the Turks ...	1453
Ferdinand and Isabella succeeded to the thrones of Aragon and Castile ...	1474
Caxton set up the first printing press in England	1476
Bartholomew Diaz sailed round the Cape of Good Hope	1486
Columbus discovered the Bahamas ...	1492
Luther posted his Confessions at Witten- berg	1517
Henry VIII broke with Rome	1529-36
Copernicus published his "De Revolu- tionibus Orbium"	1543

In these events, the product of a single crowded century of history, are included almost all that is essential in the great movements which we call the Renaissance and Reformation. There are two political events among them :

the taking of Constantinople by the Turks, which filled western Europe with the treasures of Greek learning, and the accession of Ferdinand and Isabella, who promoted the enterprise of Columbus, and thus, indirectly, at any rate, brought about the Spanish claim to the empire of the New World, which, being ratified by the Pope, brought religious antagonisms into play as a factor in the long strife for the freedom of the sea. Furthermore, it was in the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella that Spain was unified, and under their famous grandson, the Emperor Charles V, that Spain, Naples, and the Netherlands became one realm, while his sons, again, were Philip, the husband of Mary Tudor and enemy of Elizabeth, and Don John of Austria, the victor of Lepanto.

It seems the natural thing that the boundless development of men's minds which followed upon the revival of learning, the collapse of feudalism and the spread far and wide of the printed word should turn their thoughts to the ocean and what lay beyond. We have to think of a world enlarged by the whole of the American Continent and the islands adjacent to the Atlantic coast thereof; by the coast-belt of Africa south of a line drawn, roughly, from the Atlas mountains on the west to the entrance to the Gulf of Suez on the east; by the islands of the Eastern Archipelago, Madagascar, the coasts of India, Siam, Cochin China, Japan, and, very darkly and mistily, Australia. •It is not, of course, the case that all these lands, or even half of them, were unknown by repute, or even that they had not had intercourse overland with Europe before. If we believe ancient legends, even North America and the Cape of Good Hope were known to the Norsemen and Phœnicians respectively, and Marco Polo had visited China. But the Mohammedan power barred the way to all the East by land, so that effective intercourse with the regions named did, in fact, originate in the wonderful century which began with the fall of Constantinople and ended with the accession of Elizabeth. Naturally, the

effect on men's minds was stupendous. Is it wonderful that the world was re-born, or that the throes of the new birth were violent, devastating to old beliefs and systems, fraught with misery and wrong? They were all that. But, nevertheless, the age was irradiated with a splendour of thought and achievement such as no other age in the world's history has seen.

To the little kingdom of Portugal, rather than to her greater neighbour, must be given the palm as the pioneer of discovery. In the first place, whereas the great explorers who gave the main part of South America to Spain, Columbus and Amerigo Vespucci, were Italians, the far longer list of Portuguese navigators contains only the names of the native-born. Bartholomew Diaz, Vasco da Gama, Tristan d'Acunha, Cabral, and Magellan, though the last-named was employed by the Spanish Government, were all pure Portuguese. With the exception of Cabral, who discovered Brazil, and added that rich country to the empire of Portugal, and Magellan, who sailed round Cape Horn in the service of Spain, the Portuguese navigators undertook all their voyages to the south and east. It is curious that the chief preoccupation of King Manoel the Fortunate in sending first Diaz and then Vasco da Gama to discover the passage round the Cape of Good Hope, should have been to find the mythical realm of Prester John. It is related that, when the Portuguese reached Calicut, they worshipped the image of the Hindoo goddess Gauri, under the belief that it was a representation of the Virgin, and that the natives were the Christian subjects of Prester John. The Hindoos, for their part, worshipped the images of the Virgin under the belief that they represented Gauri. The Portuguese were greatly disappointed to discover eventually that Prester John could only be identified with the half-savage monarch of Abyssinia.

They had much to console them, however. The silken stuffs, precious stones, and spices of the East

aroused their cupidity. Expedition followed expedition, and what has been rather magniloquently called the "conquest of India" took place. As a matter of fact, the Portuguese did little more than possess themselves of a few places on the coast, of which Bombay, Goa, Cochin, and Diu were the most important. They had to engage in hard fighting, in the course of which they stained their hands with much cruelty; but they fought rather against the Turks, Egyptians, Venetians, and Arabs who were already established as traders with the Indian Rajahs, than with the natives. One of the Governors sent out by Manoel, Almeida, laid down a policy which closely resembles that pursued later by the British in their dealings with India, and which, if it had been followed, might have done much to consolidate Portuguese power by making oversea expansion a support to the home Government instead of a source of weakness to it. "Let all our strength be on the sea," he says. "Let us refrain from appropriating the land. The old tradition of conquest, the empire of such distant lands, is not desirable. Let us destroy these new races," the Arabs, Turks, etc., "and reinstate the ancient races and natives of the coast. Then we will go further. Let us secure with our fleets the safety of the sea, and protect the natives, in whose name we may practically reign over India. There would certainly be no harm in our having a few fortresses along the coast, but simply to protect the factories against surprise, for their chief safety will lie in the friendship of the native Rajahs, placed upon their thrones by us, and maintained and defended by our fleets. What has been done so far is but anarchy, scarcely an outline of government, a system of murder, piracy, and disorder which it is necessary to remedy." If the idea of Almeida be compared with the practice of Clive and Warren Hastings, the likeness is certainly remarkable. His great contemporary, Albuquerque, however, thought differently, and, in Ormuz, Goa and Malacca established the limits of the empire, which,

in Almeida's judgment, would have floated securely, if somewhat vaguely, on the water.

The range of that Empire was enormous. From Macao, forty miles from Hong-Kong, in the East, and the island of Timor in the South, it spread over the Portuguese settlements in India itself to the East Coast of Africa—Mozambique, Zanzibar, and Lourenço Marques—and round to the West, embracing Angola and Portuguese Guinea, and then across the Atlantic to Brazil. The Portuguese nowhere spread across a whole continent as did the Spaniards in South America, but they had their settlements on the fringes of many lands; they held dominion over countless islands. Their imprint to-day is as strong upon the Malayan race as is that of the Arabs.

The fleets of Portugal were never large; the riches obtained by maritime trade were never great. Nevertheless, this little country must be accounted one of the real sea Powers of the world, for its maritime ascendancy was based on that love of adventure and desire for achievement which is the true foundation of all maritime enterprise. The Portuguese, during the short period of their power, came into conflict with no European foe, save the Venetians, in the Indian Ocean. Their communications with their oversea possessions were disputed by no other nation, for the Dutch and the English were but in their infancy as sea-faring, or, rather, ocean-faring peoples, and the desires of the Spaniards were set in a different direction. When causes of quarrel arose, which, however, were not maritime, Spain easily crushed her smaller neighbour on the land side. Portugal possessed a fatal disqualification for sea power. She was a small continental State, with a powerful neighbour behind her. She suffered this inconvenience in common with Holland and Venice, and, in her case, as in theirs, it was instrumental in bringing about her fall. In 1583, Portugal and all its foreign possessions, with the exception of the Azores, passed into the hands of Philip II of Spain. Sixty years later independence was

recovered, and, with the help of Britain on most critical occasions, has since been maintained. But the power of Portugal was a thing of the past, and the Dutch now succeeded to the position of the Portuguese mariners as the boldest of traders and explorers. One by one, the Eastern possessions of Portugal, save Macao, Timor and a few towns in India, fell into their hands. But the African Empire was maintained, and remains to this day almost intact. Brazil remained Portuguese until the nineteenth century.

At the present time the Empire of Portugal abroad consists of Macao, a part of Timor, Goa and Diu, in India, Mozambique and Delagoa Bay, Portuguese Guinea, Angola, San Thome, and Principe Islands, the Azores, and Cape Verd Islands. It is still considerable, judged by area and even by population. But the mercantile marine consists of no more than seventy-five steamers and one hundred and eight sailing ships, altogether just over 200,000 tons. The war-navy consists of one old coast-defence ship, four light cruisers, a few torpedo-boats, and one submarine. *Quomodo ceciderunt validi!* The power to defend its sea communications has long departed. The independence and the Empire of Portugal rest on British defence. Consequently, while the flag of Portugal still floats over many of the possessions of our ancient Ally, the profit which so great possessions might bring is to others. The alliance between Great Britain and Portugal is the oldest and least-interrupted in the world. Its true basis will be best explained hereafter.

The sea power of Spain was as suddenly created as that of the Romans, and, like theirs, it was entirely military. The caravels and carracks crossed the Atlantic, not to trade, but to bring home booty. If the Portuguese Empire in the East rested on pepper, that of Spain in the West had the gold of Peru and the silver of Potosi for foundation. And the foundation proved rotten. Nevertheless, while it endured, the dominion of Spain upon the ocean was remarkable enough.

Until Ferdinand and Isabella joined the two Crowns of Arragon and Castile, Spain was not. Navarre still owned a separate sovereign, the South was in the hands of the Moors. The taking of Granada in 1492 sealed the unity of Spain. It was in the self-same year that Columbus landed in the Bahamas. Next year, Pope Alexander VI granted the Bull by which the Atlantic was magnificently divided by a line drawn down its centre, all discoveries to the east being given to Portugal, and all on the west to Spain, in the name of Holy Church. Forty years later, Cortes had conquered Mexico, and Pizarro was master of Peru. The Spanish system was in full swing; the treasure galleys were bringing the golden store of the Incas to the mother country. At this date the Netherlands were a province of the Spanish Crown, and Henry VIII had not yet begun that rupture of relations with Rome which was the first step in the English Reformation. It is important to bear these facts in mind, for they explain in part why the Spaniards were able to establish their empire in the New World unmolested. The Bull of Pope Alexander VI protected them against the restless spirit which was growing up in England, as in other European countries, thanks to the travellers' tales which were passing from mouth to mouth.

It has been pointed out above that the great seamen who served Spain in this epoch were not Spaniards, but Italians and Portuguese. The great Spaniards were not seamen, but soldiers. Their principle was the very opposite of that recommended by the Portuguese, Almeida. They set up a vast empire on land, and trusted to the monopoly given them by the Papal Bull and the restrictive legislation of the motherland to preserve to Spain the fruits of their endeavour. No export, other than that of the precious metals, was at first permitted from the new territories; the vine and the olive were not to be cultivated in the New World, lest they should interfere with the Spanish trade in oil and wine; commerce was confined

to the port of Cadiz, and might only be carried on in the galleons specially appointed for the purpose. Spanish America was made the personal appanage of the sovereign. Under such conditions, sea power could not grow healthily. It is, of course, true that a large number of ships were employed; but, as Columbus said, in the early days, when once the passage was made, the course was so easy that every tailor sought a licence to turn explorer. The Spaniards no more acquired the true habit of the sea, necessary to meet the emergencies soon to confront them, than do the stewards of a transatlantic liner in our own days. So far as the military navy of Spain was concerned, the soldiers ruled it, and to the soldiers' conception of sea fighting it had to conform.

It was essentially a Mediterranean, not an oceanic, fleet. It won glory in that inland sea; little, if any, outside it. But a new conception of sea warfare was arising, which was destined to make it a thing apart from land warfare. The English mariners, who now began to fare forth, seeking the North-West Passage to India, or braving other stormy seas which called for skill, resolution, and resource, were, for the most part, private adventurers. Their ships were small, as had been the ships of Columbus and Bartholomew Diaz, and they remained small, handy, and weatherly when the Spaniards turned to building their huge sea castles. When the break with Rome removed the reverence inspired by Pope Alexander's Bull, and made it a pious duty, as well as a profitable recreation, to "sing the beard" of his Catholic Majesty, they necessarily went into forbidden seas, and thus they came to evolve a system of purely naval tactics. They had no soldiers to carry, and, if they had possessed them there was no room for them in their little ships, in which all available space was needed for rich cargoes. So the sailors themselves learned to work the guns which the dangers of the sea compelled all traders to carry. They fought their ships as well as sailed them.

Finally, in the years immediately preceding the Armada, the Netherlands revolted against the Spanish Crown. The religious quarrel was already acute, and the English instinct, which sees in Antwerp a pistol pointed at the heart of England, began to take alarm at the presence of Spanish armaments in the Flemish and Dutch ports. The "sea-beggars," as the naval forces of the Revolutionaries were called, did not lack volunteers from England, nor even direct aid from the cautious Elizabeth, before hostilities were actually declared between the Island State and the great military Power of the Continent.

Before entering upon the story of the Armada, it may be well to describe briefly the part which England played in the work of discovery and the growth of the sea spirit among our people. It is noteworthy that the two explorers who first brought fame to England and laid the foundation of her over-sea Empire were Italians, as were those who went forth for Spain. John Cabot, a Genoese by birth, but a citizen of Venice, was settled at Bristol at the end of the fifteenth century, and had become a wealthy merchant. In 1497, having heard of the exploits of Columbus, he sought and obtained from Henry VII the following remarkable licence:—

"Henry, by the Grace of God King of England and France, Lord of Ireland, to our trusty and well-beloved subjects, greeting:

"Be it known to all that We haveⁿ given and granted, and, by these presents, do give and grant, to Our well-beloved John Cabot, citizen of Venice; to Lewis, Sebastian and Sanctius, sons of the said John, and to their heirs and deputies, full and free authority, leave and power to sail to all parts, countries and seas of the East, of the West and of the North, under our banners and ensigns, with five ships of whatsoever burthen and quality they shall choose, and as many mariners and men as they will take with them in the ships upon their own proper costs and charges, to look out, find and discover what-

soever isles, countries, regions or provinces of the Heathen or Infidels, wheresoever they be, and in what part soever of the world, which before this time hath not been known to all Christians."

He proceeds to give the Cabots authority to occupy and possess all cities and towns, subject to an obligation to pay him one-fifth of all their profits on their return to Bristol, at which port only they were bound to arrive, and he bids all his subjects give their aid to furnish them forth.


This licence observes very strictly the Bull of Alexander VI. Cabot may sail "East, West, or North." He is not empowered to sail South, the only direction in which he could interfere with either Spain or Portugal, and his rights are limited to the lands inhabited by heathen or infidels not hitherto known to Christians. So had he discovered the North-West Passage, and reached India by that route, he would still have been debarred from poaching on the Portuguese preserve. The conditions imposed bear a striking resemblance to those imposed later on their subjects by the Kings of Spain. If British discovery had depended altogether on voyages made by Royal licence the British system would probably have prospered no better than the Spanish.

Cabot sailed from Bristol in the *Matthew* in 1497, and, on June 24th, discovered Newfoundland. He then went on to St. John's and the continent of North America. He returned, bringing with him three men from Newfoundland, just as Columbus brought back the Caribbean Indians. He was persuaded that the land he had discovered was the dominion of the Cham of Tartary, just as the followers of Vasco da Gama imagined that they had fallen in with the subjects of Prester John. Shakespeare, in whose plays the wit, wonder, and audacity of the time so bubbles forth, makes Benedick profess his willingness "to bring you the length of Prester John's foot: fetch you a hair from the great Cham's beard," rather than hold

three words' conference with "my Lady Tongue." Shakespeare knew how England had "suffered a sea change," and he knew it direct from the men who sat round the tavern fire at Wapping or Deptford. His large humanity was not learned in the Temple. He lived nearer the salt of the sea.

After Cabot's return, the traders of Bristol formed the "Company of Merchant Adventurers," seeking the North-West and North-East Passages to India. Sir Hugh Willoughby, in 1553, essayed to find the latter, but perished with seventy of his men in the ice. The rest, headed by Richard Chancellor, reached Archangel, and travelled thence to Moscow. This led to the establishment of trade with Russia through the English Muscovy Company.

Thus we come to the reign of Elizabeth, well called "spacious." With the loss of Calais in Mary's reign went the last physical link with the Continent, the last pretension to the Kingdom of France, save for the inscription which the Kings retained on their coins, in the same spirit as the Spaniards, to this day, describe Gibraltar as "in temporary occupation of the English," and send an officer once a year to inspect the fortress. Of all the old Duchy of Normandy, there remained to the line of William the Conqueror only the Channel Islands, the natural appanage of the race which had prevailed at sea. The fleet was no longer a ferry to the possessions of English sovereigns abroad, but a weapon consciously maintained to defend the shores of the kingdom and to protect its ever-growing trade overseas. English fishermen swarmed to the banks of Newfoundland, and, though inferior in numbers to the French, yet claimed the mastery and graciously extended to the others their protection. Frobisher voyaged twice to the North in search of the fabled Eldorado, which, had he been able to sail across a frozen continent, he might indeed have found on the Yukon. Sir Humphrey Gilbert essayed the first settlement on the shores of the North American Continent,



FIGHT WITH THE DUTCH OFF NORTH FORELAND, JUNE, 1666.



STATUE OF DRAKE AT PLYMOUTH.

only to perish gallantly at sea. Finally, Hawkyns and Drake now began their brilliant filibustering career, to be followed later by Raleigh. Gold was still the object of their quest. But, unlike the Spaniards, they sought it, not on the land, but by sea, and from the Spaniards themselves. "*Sic vos, non vobis!*" The Dons laboured, and the English entered into the fruit of their labour.

All this is a well-known story. Despite the start which the Spaniards and Portuguese had obtained, it was an Englishman who first circumnavigated the globe, for although Magellan's ship, the *Victoria*, accomplished the voyage, Magellan himself did not live to return. Drake's career of adventure began in 1567, when he commanded the *Judith* in the expedition which ended in Hawkyns' amazing exploit at Vera Cruz. After harrying the Don in the Spanish Main, Hawkyns cast anchor in the strongly defended harbour of that port, and, under its very guns, demanded of the Spaniards provisions and water. There were treasure ships in the harbour, and of these Hawkyns determined to possess himself. Thirteen Spanish ships of war approached, so the Englishman had to abandon his project. But he sent word to the governor that "it did not suit his purpose that the Spanish ships should enter the harbour," and for three whole days the Spanish Admiral remained outside. Then it was arranged that he should enter, and that Hawkyns should hold the island against which his ships were moored. The Spaniards, however, broke the agreement and attacked the English ships while Hawkyns and most of his men were ashore. After a fierce engagement against odds, two English ships succeeded in putting to sea, and Hawkyns and his surviving men rowed after them. The other three vessels were destroyed. Half-starved, Hawkyns, Drake and a few followers at length reached England.

Nothing could daunt Drake, however. Born in Devon and nurtured in Kent, the seafaring blood of Viking ancestors ran in his blood full tide. Two years

later, he had fitted out two small ships, the *Dragon* of seventy tons, and the *Swan* of twenty-five. He shipped seventy-three men and boys, with whom he set out to harry the Don. He fell in with another ship of fifty tons, whose crew raised his force to one hundred and twenty. He reached the Isthmus of Darien, intending to attack Nombre de Dios. But information that a train of mules laden with treasure was on its way to the sea induced him to alter his intention. He ambushed the train, took the treasure, buried it, and then, from the peak in Darien, he beheld the Pacific Ocean. His soul was fired by the prospect thus presented. He sought no more fighting, but returned to England and fitted out a new expedition of five ships. The largest was the *Pelican*, later called the *Golden Hind*, of 125 tons, which was Drake's flagship. He had one hundred and sixty gentlemen adventurers with him. He reached the Straits of Magellan on May 20th, 1578, got into fearful weather, and arrived at Valparaiso with his own ship only. Outside the port he came upon a great galleon, the crew of which, never dreaming that an Englishman was in the neighbourhood, greeted him with cheers. Drake ran alongside, and, hoisting the English flag, sprang into the chains sword in hand. The Spaniards recognised him. El Draque, the incarnation of the Evil One, was upon them. They screamed with terror and jumped overboard without so much as drawing their swords. Drake took treasure to the value of £80,000. But the comedy did not end there. The escaped sailors spread the panic to the city, and the English landed only to see the inhabitants, headed by the governor, streaming away to the mountains.

From Valparaiso, Drake sailed to Tarapaca. Here the comedy became broad farce. The English found piles of silver bars lying loose on the wharves, and their guardians fast asleep. They removed the whole lot without waking them, and then lay in ambush while another mule convoy approached. The muleteers unloaded their burdens and lay down for a siesta. The English had that lot too.

Then the *Golden Hind* sailed out of harbour and shaped her course for Lima. Here there were twelve great galleons in harbour with their crews ashore. But they were empty of treasure, so Drake contented himself with cutting their cables and sending them adrift while he started off after the *Cacafuegos*, a galleon which had started two days before, "her ribs abulge with bullion for the King of Spain's own treasury." Drake overhauled her, and the Spanish captain, never suspecting the presence of an Englishman in those waters, in which he felt lonely, shortened sail in order that the *Golden Hind* might come up with him. The galleon was taken almost without a fight. With his very ballast replaced by gold and silver, Drake sailed off across the Pacific in order to avoid a squadron which was now lying in wait for him near the Straits of Magellan. After a narrow escape from shipwreck off the Philippines, he arrived at Plymouth on September 25th, 1580, with spoil worth three millions sterling of our money. Mendoza, the Ambassador of the King of Spain, protested vehemently against Drake's insolence in daring to sail in the Spanish Main. Said Elizabeth in reply, "Tell your Royal Master that a title to the ocean cannot belong to any people or private persons, forasmuch as neither nature nor public use and custom permitteth any possession thereof." Thus Gloriana asserted the principle of the "Freedom of the Seas." The gauntlet was down. Philip slowly, lethargically, timidly, began to make him ready to take it up.

The voyage of the *Golden Hind* will stand out for all time as a model of the "joyous venture." According to the ideas of our time, of course it was piracy, naked and unabashed. But what Englishman is there so free from original sin that he can read the recital without glorying in the light-hearted daring of his countrymen? Besides, it must be remembered that, at this time, and for long afterwards, it was quite a common occurrence for two nations to be essentially at war while, for political reasons, their Governments remained nominally at peace. Elizabeth

herself was aiding the rebellious subjects of the King of Spain in the Low Countries. She had her reasons for maintaining the pretence of peace, and Philip had his. But the Spaniards were capturing and torturing English seamen whenever they could, as a penalty for infringing the monopoly granted by the Pope, and the wrath of the English was rising to the boiling point. Drake himself, God-fearing as he was dauntless, truest of patriots, though not insensible (any more than was Nelson) to the advantages of worldly gain, believed himself to be engaged in a holy war, and we may fairly adopt his view. The sensitive spot of the Spanish Empire was the sea communications by which the wealth on which Spain had come to depend reached her shores. To capture that wealth in transit was the surest means available to the English, who had no army which could hope to contend with the famous Spanish infantry, to cripple the resources of Philip, to ward off the menace from their own land, and to aid the people of the Low Countries who were struggling against the greatest captain of the age, the Duke of Alva. Elizabeth's real opinion is shown by the fact that she knighted Drake and ordered the *Golden Hind* to be preserved at Deptford as a memorial of the valour of her seamen. That covetousness had small share in prompting Drake's actions is shown by the fact that he kept no more than £10,000 of the spoil for himself and set aside a like sum for his crew. The rest was kept in the Tower until matters were settled with Spain, and eventually, no doubt, found its way into Elizabeth's Treasury.

Adventures now poured thick and fast upon "Frankie." Two or three years later he was off Vigo with a fleet fitted out by the City of London to effect the delivery of some British sailors who had been treacherously made captive by the Spaniards. The Queen told Drake that, if it suited her purpose, she should disown him.

"As you will, Madam," he replied. "Let me have a

free hand, and it may be an affair of privateers, and nothing to do with the Government of England. My plan is to find the crews that were caught and set them free—and get what else we can, Madam.”

“I am supposed to know nothing about that,” was the Queen’s cautious answer.

In the end, Drake did not succeed in rescuing the crews, nor did he acquire much booty. But he sacked San Domingo and burned the shipping there, adding to the terror of his name. By 1587, there was sterner work in hand. The news of the Armada had reached England, and Drake set forth to discover how much truth there was in it. He arrived off Cadiz, which was crowded with ships. A great galleon was moored across the entrance to the harbour, but he fired on her and sank her. The crews of the Spanish ships leaped overboard at the terror of his name. Drake sank no fewer than thirty-five, or, according to some accounts, eighty of Philip’s ships of war. He was about to repeat the exploit in the Tagus when imperative orders from the Queen called him home.

Philip had at last made up his mind to war. A stream of messengers from Rome urged him to action. The Crown of England was promised by the Pope to him who would invade the country and crush the heretic Queen. Philip, as eldest son of the Church, was unable to withstand the pressure. He relied on the aid of a Roman Catholic rising in England, a hope which was bitterly disappointed. The nation had been welded into one, as we have seen, in the five hundred years which had passed since the Norman Conquest. To preserve his island home inviolate was the first care of every Englishman. His Sovereign, though her descent derived from the Norman, had in her the blood of Cedric and of Arthur; she was the daughter of Henry, who had freed the realm from the usurped authority of Rome in temporal matters, a thing welcome even to those Englishmen who still looked upon the Pope as the spiritual Head of Christendom. Historians may paint Elizabeth

as an elderly coquette, faithless, fickle, cruel and miserly. But to her subjects, she was Gloriana, worshipped in verse and prose, appealing to their chivalry by her sex, and to their manhood by her lion heart. She intrigued; she starved her sailors both of food and ammunition. But to one and all who served her she was the embodiment of right and liberty, while Philip was the enemy of mankind. They knew the gloomy tyrant. He had been husband to an English Queen.

The Royal Navy was made ready for the fight. The Lord High Admiral, Howard, had his flag in the *Ark Royal*. Drake, as Vice-Admiral, had his in the *Revenge*. The first *Dreadnought* was in the fleet, and the first *Swiftsure*, *Triumph*, *Warspite* and *Bonaventure*; the first *Lion* and the first *Tiger*. Elizabeth was fond of coining strange names for her ships. Strangest of all, the *Elizabeth Jonas*, so called because, said the Queen, she trusted the Lord to deliver her out of her present peril as He delivered Jonas from the belly of the fish. There were, besides, a crowd of armed merchantmen.

Philip's plan for the invasion of England, or, perhaps, one should say the plan of Parma and Santa Cruz, was, in all essentials, that of Napoléon in 1803. The fleet, with six thousand sailors and seventeen thousand soldiers on board, was to sail from sundry Spanish ports and rendezvous off the Scilly Islands. Parma, with an army of 36,000 men, awaited it at Dunkirk. Could the Spaniards maintain the command of the Channel for twenty-four hours, the doom of England would be sealed. Parma, like Napoleon, waited. But everything went wrong with the undertaking. Santa Cruz died and the command was given to the Duke of Medina Sidonia, a man so incapable that even his wife laughed when she heard of his appointment, saying he would be better on a horse than in a ship. Rascally contractors supplied the fleet with stinking provisions and foul water; many men were sick and died from this cause. Finally, when at last the Armada put to

sea, it was caught in a tempest and driven into Corunna in a shattered condition.

What, meanwhile, were the English doing? Drake, from a bold buccaneer, now revealed himself as a naval strategist of the first order. His letters to the Queen and Walsingham lay down the strategy on which England has ever since relied for her safety. Writing to the Lords of the Council on March 30th, 1588, he says, "My very good lords, next under God's mighty protection, the advantage and gain of time and place will be the only and chief means to our good, wherein I must humbly beseech your good lordships to persevere as you have begun, for that, with fifty sail of shipping, we shall do more good upon their own coast than a great many more will do here at home, and the sooner we are gone, the better we shall be able to impeach them." He wrote in a similar sense to the Queen.

Elizabeth and her counsellors, however, would have none of it. Her Majesty was even incensed with Drake because he wasted good powder at gun-practice. She still professed that she did not wish to give offence to the King of Spain. A great deal has been said and written about the Queen's parsimony and about the lack of provisions and powder. There is no doubt that both were lamentably short. When the English set out to chase the Armada up Channel, they had only two days' supply of powder on board their ships. But there is this much to be said for Gloriana. The idea of making a long sojourn off the enemy's ports was new, just as the whole theory of sea-fighting evolved by Howard, Drake and Hawkyins was new, and born of their experiences when roving the Spanish Main. This had been denied by good authorities, who point out that, from the time of Hubert de Burgh, it had been the wont of the English to go forth and meet the enemy at sea, or attack him in his ports. Most true. But these were military expeditions on shipboard. The ships were regarded as transports, or, at most, as fields of battle on which soldiers fought according to the rules of land-

warfare. The cannon, when cannon began to be used, were meant to mow down the enemy's men-at-arms and to hew a way through his defences—like the preparatory bombardment of to-day—in order that the boarders might bring the affair to an issue in a short and sharp tussle. But that a fleet should keep the sea, beating on and off the enemy's ports; waiting for him to come out in order to destroy him by gun-fire at long bowls, was something new in kind, and not merely an extension of the old theory of warfare to more distant waters. Our own record as to ammunition supply in the present war is not beyond criticism, and the story goes that a certain general, in apportioning the amount of shell for a certain operation, was guided by the precedent of Inkerman. We may, therefore, judge the miscalculation of Elizabeth and her advisers lightly. But her seamen had no choice save to fight on the new model. The little English ships would have stood no chance against the mighty galleons of Spain, had it come to boarding. They fought as experience of the sea had taught them to fight, and against a landsman's navy, they proved themselves invincible, despite all the miscalculations and errors of the Queen's Government.

The evening of the day at the end of July, 1588, on which Drake boarded his flagship, after finishing the famous game of bowls on Plymouth Hoe, saw the English victory secure. A Spanish flagship was captured; two more great galleons were sunk. The English had suffered hardly a scratch. All through the week the Spaniards lumbered up the Channel with the English hanging on to them, but never giving them a chance to close. On the Sunday night following, the Armada was in Dunkirk Roads, and Howard loosed fireships against it. In terror, the Spaniards cut their cables. Seventy ships of war went North and took no further part in the fighting. The rest found themselves on the Goodwin Sands, where some went aground and all were hotly attacked, lying in a huddled

mass, by the English Fleet. They crashed together; they fired into each other, and sank their own ships. They were not seamen, and they did not understand the new form of sea-fighting by which the artillery of the ships decided the battle instead of merely preparing the way for the assault of the men-at-arms. But they fought to the bitter end, with a heroism worthy of the gallant Spanish infantry, of which the ship's complements were mainly composed. At last came dead silence after the roar of the fray. Both sides had expended their powder, and the shattered remnant of the Spanish Fleet took the opportunity to follow their seventy consorts to the northward. Sixty ships and ten thousand starved and scurvy-stricken men were all that found their way home North-about. The English lost no single ship, while of men but sixty-eight were killed or wounded. The victors gave the glory to God. "*Efflavit Deus, et dissipati sunt.*" The words stand to-day on the base of Drake's statue on Plymouth Hoe. It is the seaman's way. "These men see the works of the Lord and His wonders in the deep: For at His word the stormy wind ariseth which lifteth up the waves thereof." That sense of dependence on Providence is not the least of the sources of strength which attend sea power.

The ruin of the Armada ended the direct threat to England; but it by no means ended the war. The further events and their consequences, however, will be best dealt with hereafter. But there are a few points which must be noticed here. First of all, it should be realised that the fleet which won the victory was by no means wholly, or even mainly, composed of the Queen's ships. Elizabeth had increased her father's navy by comparatively few vessels. Of the forty-nine sail which followed Drake up Channel, only thirteen, according to some authorities, were Queen's ships of four hundred tons and above. Including cutters and pinnaces, there were no more than thirty-eight ships all told flying her Ensign. The rest of the fleet consisted of armed merchantmen and ships fitted out by

private adventurers. These were very sparsely manned, some of them having no more than thirty men all told. The seamen of Britain, therefore, were, of necessity, also the sea fighters. Good man as the Englishman was ashore, we had no standing army, no body of trained and disciplined infantry like the Spaniards. But our sailors had learned war on the Spanish Main. In the latter stages of the war, soldiers were embarked to make descents on the Spanish coast; but sea fighting and land fighting were kept distinct. Later again, in Cromwell's time, the New Model supplied soldiers for service afloat. After that, it became the recognised rule that sea fighting was the function of the "tarpaulin." The surviving exception is the Royal Regiment of Marines.

The absence of soldiers on ship-board dictated the tactics of the running fight, for the seamen had to fight the guns as well as to work the ship. No boarding parties could be spared, nor men to repel boarders. The handiness of the ships themselves contributed to dictate the advantage of the running fight. The Spanish formed their line in a crescent, in the hope that the English would run in between the horns, which would then envelop them and bring them to close action. But Drake's fast and weatherly ships frustrated this plan. They ran under the stern to fire and made off before the Spaniards could turn to bring their broadsides to bear; sometimes coming so close that the enemy could not depress his guns sufficiently to hit them, sometimes "playing long-bowls," which their better gunnery enabled them to do with effect and impunity.

When people talk grandiloquently about the English loving to close and disdaining to fight at long range, they ignore the whole trend of our naval history and miss the point which marks the special aptitude of our seamen: namely, that they have never for very long allowed themselves to be enslaved by a theory. They have adapted their means to their end. When Nelson went into action, he was wont to make the signal, "Engage the enemy more closely."

Drake, every whit as brave a man as he, played "long bowls." The object of all fighting is decisive victory. Nelson, whose ships were of equal or superior fighting weight to those of his opponents, but who was frequently outnumbered, saw that decisive victory could best be gained by doubling on a part of the enemy's line and trusting to the superior discipline and gunnery-training of his men. Drake, whose ships were of inferior fighting force, saw that he could best utilise that superior fighting skill, which was his as well as Nelson's, by lying off and engaging at a distance. Of what service would bull-dog bravery be, if the fleet on which the safety of England depended was wiped out? Each of these great seamen attained his end by adapting his means thereto. That the end was obtained is the only thing which matters. The lesson holds good for to-day.

In speaking of the Elizabethan navy, one talks of Drake as naturally as, two hundred years later, one talks of Nelson. There were other famous seamen in the days of each, and neither, as it happened, ever held the chief command. But their dazzling personalities eclipse all their worthy compeers. They had little in common save devotion to their country, courage and supreme insight and skill. But their names stand out in the eyes of their countrymen above the Howards, Rodneys, Howes and St. Vincents, and are only approached by those of Blake, Cromwell's great general at sea, and Hawke, the victor of Quiberon Bay.

Drake fully deserves all the fame which is his. He was the type of that full-blooded, sunny, chivalrous Elizabethan life which, in other spheres, gave us Sir Philip Sidney and Shakespeare and Spenser. There were meanness and cruelty and chicanery in the age as in every other; but the breath of the salt sea blew through the musty dungeons of the Middle Ages; eyes grown dim in the darkness rejoiced in the sunlight of the open day, and cramped muscles stretched themselves in an enlarged world. The roll of Drake's drum called England to her destiny.

CHAPTER VII

THE MASTERY TO BRITAIN

AFTER the Armada had been hounded by Howard and Drake through the Channel and scattered by the breath of God in its voyage north-about, the war against Philip changed its character. Elizabeth and her counsellors had not yet learned the full meaning and advantage of sea power. The conditions of defence were known; those of attack had not yet been sufficiently studied. The Queen was immersed in Continental politics and concerned for her position as the protector of Protestantism. Before the Armada, she had already sent an ill-equipped expedition under Leicester to the Low Countries to assist the revolted subjects of Philip. In 1589 she determined to give the Spanish king a Roland for his Oliver by invading his home territories. An expedition of two hundred sail and twenty-one thousand men was quickly fitted out at Plymouth under the command of Drake and Norris, and with it went one Don Antonio, a Churchman, who aspired to the crown of Portugal, and was expected to stir up a revolt among the Portuguese. The expedition sacked Corunna and then sailed for the Tagus, landing and marching through Torres Vedras to Lisbon. It met with some success in the fighting, but returned with disastrous loss from disease to England.

Two years later occurred the heroic incident of the *Revenge*: the fight of "the one and the fifty-three" off the Azores. It was one of those mad episodes in our

history which, like the Balaklava charge, are "magnificent, but not war." So long as we remember this fact and do not expect all British commanders to behave in a hare-brained fashion under all circumstances, such incidents have a value which is worth the gallant blood shed. They are a reminder to us and to the world that, in the veins of the "nation of shopkeepers" there runs not the cold blood of commerce alone, but a tide of fiery courage which no so-called "military nation" has ever surpassed.

Whether Sir Richard Grenville was merely in-subordinate to his Commander-in-Chief, or whether, as Tennyson tells us, he stayed with the consent of the latter to get his sick men on board and was then cut off, his exploit and his end warmed the courage of the men of his own day, and have warmed the courage of British seamen ever since. A country cannot afford to look coldly on such great fights against odds if it would see the martial spirit of its sons maintained. The fight of Drake's old flagship, however, was but an episode in one of the usual raids on Spanish communications, and had little real military significance, so far as the larger purposes of the war were concerned.

These raids continued for two years longer, when Elizabeth's attention was diverted to a new enterprise. She espoused the cause of Henry of Navarre, in her character of Protestant champion. English troops were sent to France and fought bravely, if without decisive effect, against the Cardinal of Bourbon and the Catholic League. Then, in 1593, Henry decided that "Paris was worth a Mass," and Elizabeth lost interest in him. Her main attention was once more given to the Spanish War. In the security given to her realm by her mastery of the sea, she could afford to indulge her feminine temperament, *varium et mutabile semper*, as other female sovereigns, beset with land frontiers—Maria Theresa for instance—could not.

In 1596, Hawkyns and Drake set out once more to

raid the Spanish Main. The expedition proved to be the last undertaken by either famous seaman. They were repulsed from Porto Rico, where Hawkins died. Drake pushed on to Nombre de Dios and landed men. They were, however, harassed by the Spaniards. Drake caught a fever which ended his glorious career. In the same year, hearing that Philip was once more assembling a fleet for the invasion of England, Elizabeth sent a powerful armament, consisting of a hundred and twenty ships with seven thousand soldiers and six thousand seamen, besides some Dutch auxiliaries, against Cadiz. The army was commanded by the Earl of Essex, the fleet by Lord Effingham, with Lord Thomas Howard and Sir Walter Raleigh among his subordinate commanders. Cadiz was captured and the Spanish fleet destroyed. Next year, a similar expedition was sent against Ferrol and Corunna, but the attempt to capture these two places was abandoned, the fleet proceeding to the Azores, where Raleigh captured Fayal.

In these two last expeditions of Elizabeth's reign, Drake's policy of "impeaching the enemy off his own shores" is allowed to prevail. After his death, Elizabeth does of her own accord what he could seldom wring consent from her to do. The true principle of the naval defence of this country is established, never again to be entirely dropped. And, with it, the seeds of that system of amphibious strategy which, up to the present, we have employed in all our great wars, are sown. That we have departed widely from it in the present struggle is a fact which there are many reasons to regret. The circumstances of August and September, 1914, however, left us no choice in the matter. Experience shows that our insular position does not exclude us from the European system and that we can never cut ourselves free entirely from Continental preoccupations which, from time to time, must necessitate intervention on the scale of a Continental land-Power. It must, however, always be a disadvantage for us to be so compelled.

Elizabeth left England supreme in war at sea. The decrepitude of the navy of Spain had been fully exposed; Spanish communications lay at the mercy of the English seamen. Our country had now a race of hardy sailors who had developed a method of fighting which was bred of the sea itself, and a numerous marine which made an end of the necessity to hire ships from Genoa, Holland or the Hansa, as had previously been the custom with English monarchs. But for purposes other than fighting, the sea power of England was yet in its infancy. There was little trade, properly so called, in the Atlantic, save the Newfoundland fisheries. The blame must rest on the Spanish system, not on the English; but the fact remains that the various expeditions fitted out by the Merchant or Gentlemen Adventurers had buccaneering for their object. Sea trade was confined principally to Antwerp and the North of Europe. The Turkey Company was founded in 1581, and the East India Company in 1600. But it was only shortly before the latter date that Englishmen made the voyage round the Cape of Good Hope to India which the Portuguese had made a hundred years before. Colonisation had proved, so far, a failure. Sir Humphrey Gilbert had taken possession of Newfoundland in the name of the Queen in 1583; but the claim was disputed then and many years later by the French. The attempt of his step-brother, Raleigh, to colonise Virginia came to nought. The sea spirit, however, had been aroused from top to bottom of the nation. That was the great gain of the Elizabethan age to English sea power. The full fruits were to be garnered later.

The two following reigns saw a change of spirit from that of the Tudors which was inimical to the growth of English, or, as we ought now to call it, British, sea power. James I, "the wisest fool in Christendom," as others called him, or "the Caledonian Solomon," which was the title preferred by himself, had no desire but to be known as "The Peacemaker." The high claims of kingship ever put

forward by the Stuarts made him seek more intimate relations with Continental dynasties. He was completely under the thumb of Gondomar, the astute ambassador of the Court of Spain, who dangled before him hopes of a marriage between "Baby Charles" and the Spanish Infanta. Gondomar at any rate achieved his purpose of bringing about a peace between England and Spain, which left the hands of his master free to prosecute the long war against the Dutch, to separate the maritime Powers from one another, and to intervene in the affairs of the German Empire with such effect that James's own son-in-law, the Elector Palatine, was driven into exile. Corruption crept into the administration of the Navy under James' pacifist rule, and the exertions of Henry Prince of Wales, seconded by the able ship-designer, Phineas Pett, who began his career at this time, availed little to check the abuses. Pirates swarmed round the coast, many of them the stout English seamen of the days of Elizabeth, who, finding neither employment nor pay in their motherland, took service with the Barbary States. James in vain offered pardon to all who would return to their allegiance. "I have no intention of obeying the orders of one king, when I am in a way a king myself," said the haughty pirate, Eston. James was fain to give leave to a Dutch squadron under Lambert to visit Irish harbours and root out the pirates who were sheltering there.

The sea-borne trade of the country not being as yet upon a sure footing, the peace with Spain caused mercantile shipping to languish. The Venetian Ambassador noted with astonishment that, at one juncture, only twenty merchantmen were to be found in the Port of London. The merchants suffered losses so heavy when they imported goods in English ships which received no protection that they actually welcomed their arrival in Dutch bottoms. The Hollanders then began to emulate the example of the Hansa and set up mercantile houses of their own in London. Trade languished because the Royal

Navy was too weak to defend it; the Royal Navy languished because it lacked the seamen who were its life-blood, and who were driven to seek service elsewhere. So the whole sea affair was moving in a vicious circle. But, at the root of all the mischief were corruption, maladministration and faulty policy. Neither James nor Charles could ever man a fleet completely during the occasional bursts of energy they displayed. Yet all the time it was noted by envious foreigners that the British warships were the best in the world, and that the merchantmen were built big and strong like warships. The seed was germinating; the leaven hid in the measure of meal was slowly but surely leavening the lump.

The early Stuarts, however, were not altogether indifferent to the Navy. That miserable creature, James I, was, of course, intent upon nothing but his disreputable pleasures and the pedantry which he mistook for wisdom. But his son, Prince Henry, was an enthusiastic "blue water" man, and Charles I, when he came to the throne, showed great if misguided zeal in naval affairs. Buckingham, too, according to his lights, and to serve his own ends, was not only a zealous, but also an intelligent, supporter of the Navy. The Grand Commission, appointed under James I and continued under his son, worked honestly, hard and successfully to reform abuses in the department of construction. It reduced the expenses of the Navy by one-half, while, at the same time, it increased both its strength and its efficiency. At the end of February, 1627, the year of the disastrous expedition to the Isle of Rhé, the Navy mustered seventy-five ships, besides others under repair, while the infant navy of France, which Richelieu was fostering, did not amount to more than thirty vessels and that of Holland to about the same. We had, in fact, the "Two Power Standard." In the following year Denbigh commanded a hundred and forty ships, many of them merchantmen, however, in the attempt to relieve La Rochelle. The "Ship-money" fleets were

stronger still, and, thanks to the genius of Phineas Pett, they were more powerful and better armed than those of any rival navy.

But the canker which eat the heart out of the Stuart Navy was implicit in the Stuart system. James and Charles were not more arbitrary and tyrannical than Henry and Elizabeth. Yet, whereas the two former could get from Parliament what supplies they pleased, the latter were continually at variance with the House of Commons, and the Navy was starved for lack of funds. The Parliamentary watchword, "Grievances precede supply," had its counterpart in the domain of foreign politics. In the view of the Stuart kings, the function of Parliament was simply to find the money necessary to carry out the policy dictated by the will of the monarch. The expenditure of the sums granted was part of the executive function which belonged exclusively to the Crown. The Tudor theory was little different; but it is practice, not theory, which counts in England, and their practice differed by the whole width of the heavens. The Tudors, with their true insight, with their reliance on state-craft as distinct from the king-craft of their successors, interpreted the wishes of the nation: even its prejudices and passions. They put themselves at its head, and they led it. Hence their wars were what are called—a detestable phrase—"popular" wars. They furthered the religious cause which the people had at heart; they gratified their desire for wealth. The Stuarts demanded money and ships for the furtherance of designs which were hateful to the mass of the nation; or, where the undertaking itself was popular, as, unquestionably, the expedition to Cadiz, the attack at the Isle of Rhé and the attempted relief of La Rochelle undoubtedly were, they entangled it with constitutional questions or entrusted the execution to favourites whom the nation, which had made Drake its darling, most justly regarded with the utmost distrust. The Fleet was allowed to become the symbol of personal rule.

That the greatest revolt of the English people against their Sovereign which our annals have ever known should have come to a head over the question of provision for the Navy is a peculiar irony of fate. There was nothing outrageous or monstrous about Charles I's demand for ship-money. The maritime counties had always been liable to make contribution, in ships, if not in money, for the protection of the coasts. London, as we have seen, was subject to a similar liability. It was only logical that this obligation should be extended to the inland shires at a time when the feudal provision for the defence of the realm had passed into desuetude and the episode of the Armada had opened the eyes of the people to the fact that their safety depended upon the Fleet. Whether John Hampden had fully grasped the significance of that fact when he, the owner of many manors, went to prison rather than contribute one pound eleven shillings and sixpence to maintain the Navy, is a debatable point. But it in no way touches his claim to be immortalised as a type of disinterested patriotism. One pound eleven and six was nothing to him. But that even the odd sixpence should be arbitrarily exacted was a very great matter indeed.

There is here a very important lesson as to the foundation upon which a healthy sea power rests. It cannot be made to serve the purposes of absolutism. A war-navy, created and maintained to support the policy of a monarch or of a military clique, though it may be powerful for a time, will not continue to maintain its position unless it has behind it the conviction of the people, of the trading and commercial classes in particular, that its existence and power are necessary to the furtherance of their prosperity and the maintenance of their security. The necessity for sea power demands a good deal of imagination from the people. In the reign of Elizabeth, when wealth was pouring into the country as a consequence of the war with Spain, and when the Armada was hourly expected in the Channel, the necessity was plain enough. When

the Navy was being used by the Stuarts to further the personal policy of James I, or to gratify the private animosities of Buckingham, while English trade was cut to pieces by pirates, Dunkirkers or Dutchmen, the advantages of sea power in the abstract did not appeal. That is to say, though the men of the time may not have formulated the doctrine in words, the function which the mass of the people looked to the Navy to perform was to secure the communications of the country and the free use of the sea.

There are not many tridents, but one. When, as at the period we are considering, the hand which has held it becomes nerveless or paralysed, or attempts its misuse, a stronger hand will be found ready to grasp it. The stronger hand, for the moment, was the hand of Holland. The rise of Dutch sea power has some peculiar features. It had its beginning in the herring-fisheries. The saying that "Amsterdam was built on the herring" has already been quoted. Its prowess in war was learned in the struggles of the "Beggars of the Sea" against Philip II. Almost driven from the land by the Spanish soldiery, the United Provinces maintained the struggle upon the sea, where they hampered the communications of the Spaniards and could reach the rather grudging hand which Elizabeth stretched out to aid them. But the Dutch people were, by nature, a nation of traders. Secure among their inundations, the Burghers of Holland drew from the seas, not only the means to carry on the bitter struggle for eighty years, but also to grow rich beyond all precedent. This was achieved very largely by carrying the wealth of the Indies to Spain itself, at the very time when the Dutch were in revolt against the sovereign of that country, who was also their own. The Dutch established themselves as traders in the Portuguese settlements in the East. They brought back the pepper, the sandal wood, the rich silks from India and the Moluccas. They took the goods of Northern Europe to Spain and Portugal, and they carried back in return the "pieces of eight," the product of the mines of Mexico,

and the gold of Peru. What the Elizabethan mariners acquired by violence the Dutch secured by trade, in virtue of the prerogative which was theirs as subjects of Philip, though they were a rebellious people. Therefore their sea power waxed while his waned, and thus they found the sinews to carry on the war against him. In such strange topsy-turveydom did the economic and political ideas of the sixteenth century land those who held them.

As the Dutch came to feel their strength, however, conquest supplemented trade. The Dutch East India Company was formed in 1602. A year later, Amboyna, the principal town in the Moluccas, fell to the Dutch, to be followed a year later by Malacca. Java was appropriated by the Company in 1610, and Ceylon taken from the Portuguese in 1658. In 1614 New Amsterdam, now New York, was founded, while between 1623 and 1630 the greater part of Brazil fell to Holland. Furthermore, the names of Tasmania, or Van Diemen's Land, and New Zealand, both of which places were discovered in 1642, point to the growing power of the Dutch upon the sea. But, extensive as the oversea empire of Holland became in this short space of time, the chief source of Dutch wealth is to be found in their position as "the wagoners of the world."

It is wonderful that a collision between the Dutch and the English was delayed as long as it was. There are complaints of the "insolence" of the Hollanders throughout the reigns of the first two Stuart kings, and the low esteem in which they held English sea power is plainly enough shown by their frequent incursions into English harbours to cut out Spanish ships or "Dunkirkers" which had taken refuge there. But the Dutch were shrewd enough to see that, until they were able to contest the mastery of the sea on something like equal terms with the English, their communications with the sources of wealth were entirely at the mercy of the latter. Until they had made an end of Spanish hostility, and until

they were assured of at least the sympathetic neutrality of France, they had everything to lose and nothing to gain by falling out with the Protestant Power over the way.


The first clash came, not with the Stuart monarchy, but with the Commonwealth, under the masterful hand of Cromwell. There had been a festering sore between the two nations for years on account of the murder of the English factors at Amboyna, for which no reparation had ever been made. The Dutch, on their part, were irritated and perturbed by the passing of the Navigation Act. But it is a matter of dispute to this day upon whom the responsibility rests for the actual outbreak. This is commonly the case with "inevitable" wars: those, that is, which occur because there is no room for both aspirants to walk side by side along their chosen path. Tromp, in command of a superior force, trailed his coat before Blake by refusing the customary salute to the English flag. Blake fired the first broadside. But it is evident that the Dutch Government did not, at that moment, wish to fight. They sought accommodation. Cromwell was anxious lest Holland should afford asylum to the Stuarts, and actually proposed a union between the two countries. He also insisted that the Dutch should pay to the flag of the Commonwealth the same respect which they had always paid to the flag of the Kings. There was stubborn fighting in the Channel and the North Sea between the fleets of the two nations, which were about equal in numbers. Tromp won one success and drove Blake up the Thames, after which he cruised in the Narrow Seas with a broom at the mast-head, a piece of bravado out of keeping with his character and that of his nation, and well calculated to provoke the English. But the war, as a whole, was completely unfavourable to the Dutch, who lost over twelve hundred warships and merchantmen in the course of it. This was a profound blow to them, since their position in the world depended entirely on the preservation of their character as safe "wagoners." The causes of the conflicts between



EDWARD LORD HAWKE,
Admiral of the Fleet.



ROBERT BLAKE,
General and Admiral of the Parliament Forces.



THE BATTLE OF QUIBERON BAY, NOVEMBER 20th, 1759.

the British and the Dutch are, after all, best summed up in the blunt, almost cynical speech attributed to Monk in the ensuing reign of Charles II: "What matters this or that reason? What we want is more of the trade which the Dutch now have!" That depended on our success in securing the position of waywarden of the highway of the nations, the sea.

The Cromwellian wars in which Blake commanded are noteworthy for the fact that engagements were fought in the Mediterranean against the Dutch, the heralds of a long series of fights between European nations in waters remote from their home bases; for the successful bombardment of Algiers—the only one until Lord Exmouth reduced the pirates' stronghold in 1816; the taking of Jamaica and Barbados by Penn, and the last great deed of Blake in the bombardment of Santa Cruz and the sinking of the Spanish fleet in harbour there in 1656. Blake died as his ship entered Plymouth Harbour on his return from this voyage. Although a soldier, bearing the rank of colonel, he had restored to the British Navy all the prestige it had possessed under Elizabeth and had lost in the years between 1604 and 1650. There is a passage in a letter addressed by him and Deane to the Speaker while they were awaiting the Dutch fleet which brings out in a noble light the spirit of duty animating the sailors of the Commonwealth.

"We dare not in this great business to promise anything for or to ourselves," they say, "because it is God alone who giveth courage and conduct with opportunity and success in the day of His Salvations; only we desire the Parliament to believe that we are deeply sensible of the extraordinary importance of the present service in hand, the high expectation raised of it, and the obligation of the great trust reposed in us." Expressed in Puritan form, we have in these words the abiding spirit of the Navy.

Whatever we may think of the ethic of the Crom-

wellian wars with the Dutch, they were, at any rate, national. Cromwell had the people at his back. There was no difficulty in getting ships, money and men. Blake summed up the Navy's point of view in a sentence: "It is not our business to meddle in politics," he said, "but to keep the foreigner from fooling us." The wars of the Restoration were different. Charles II, like his father, was soon in conflict with his Parliaments, though his rooted determination not to set out upon his travels again prevented him from openly flouting the representatives of his people. But money and men were once more scarce, and corruption again began to appear in the administration of the Navy. Save for the good work of the estimable Mr. Pepys and the sailor-like capacity of the Duke of York, the safety of the country might have been worse endangered than it was. Charles, however, though careless and pleasure-loving, had a very real idea of what was involved in the command of the sea. When it was suggested that the British fleet, fighting in alliance with that of France, should be placed under the command of a French officer, he told the Ambassador haughtily that "it was the custom of the English to command at sea," adding that, if he were to yield, his subjects would not obey him. Charles, in fact—though no doubt one object which he had in mind was to free himself from dependence on Parliament by receiving French subsidies—was playing a game of "diamond cut diamond" with Louis XIV. He used the French to weaken the Dutch by sea. Louis, on the other hand, sent his naval contingent with orders to take no strenuous part in the fighting, in order that the Dutch might weaken the English. But this is to anticipate naval events. In the first war the English engaged the Dutch alone, the French eventually joining the latter. The three nations, in fact, now entered upon the long contest for the mastery of the sea, in which the Dutch were destined to be eliminated first, while the struggle between the other two continued to the end of the Napoleonic era

before it was finally decided in favour of Britain. The geographical position of the countries concerned supplies the reason for the conflict. Holland was the man in possession; the other two fought for the pathway to her front door. Unfortunately for Holland, she had a back-door also, and the way to it was overland. The English, having obtained the mastery of her by sea, would have been only too pleased to aid her in defending the back-door against the French. They tried to do so, with varying success, during the next hundred and twenty years. But in the upshot the Dutch were drawn into the French orbit and were crushed, so far as their maritime power went, between the hammer and the anvil.

On June 3rd, 1665, the English and Dutch fleets met off Lowestoft. The Duke of York, who was in command of the English, put into practice his new system of tactics—that of fighting in a close line. The result was a magnificent victory. The French then joined the Dutch, and Monk, now in command, committed the blunder of dividing his fleet, with the consequence that he was defeated in the four days' battle off the North Foreland. There was no disgrace in the defeat, however. The English seamen won the respect of their foes. "You can kill these English; you cannot beat them," said a Dutch captain. On July 21st, the reverse was retrieved off the mouth of the Thames, where Monk gave de Ruyter a sound drubbing. Then followed the days of shame. Charles argued that, as the Dutch were dependent upon trade, there was no need to keep an expensive fleet of ships-of-the-line in commission. He laid up his fleet in ordinary, and de Ruyter came and burned it where it lay at its anchorage between Sheerness and Chatham.

The real importance of this episode has been much exaggerated. It was of the nature of a "tip-and-run raid." It had small effect on Britain's command of the sea. But it shook her prestige to its foundations, and it stands for all time a monument to the folly of thinking that naval warfare can be carried to a successful issue by mere com-

merce-raiding against an enemy who possesses a fleet of capital ships. The Peace of Breda followed, by which three West Indian islands, taken by Holland, were returned to Britain, Nova Scotia was restored to France, and the Navigation Acts were modified in favour of the Dutch.

That Act, which was one of the causes of the first Cromwellian war with the Dutch, decreed that foreign goods should only be brought to English ports in English ships, or ships of the country of their origin. It, of course, struck a deadly blow at the "wagoner" trade of the Dutch. The relief obtained by the Treaty of Breda did not long avail them, for, in 1672, the new Navigation Act of Charles II imposed regulations more stringent still, especially with regard to Colonial trade, which had all to be brought to London, and, of course, in British bottoms. The Navigation Acts were finally repealed in 1842-9, in the sacred name of Free Trade, although Adam Smith himself had defended them as the one legitimate form of protective legislation, in conformity with his principle that "defence is greater than opulence."

In the war of 1672-4, to which reference has before been made, in which Britain was allied with the French against the Dutch, tactical victory rested with the latter in all three of the pitched battles fought, namely Solebay, Schoneveld and The Texel. This was due in part to the deficiencies of Prince Rupert as a naval commander, and in part to the unwillingness of the French to risk their ships. "You fools!" said a Dutch commander to his men, when they expressed surprise at the small part D'Estrees bore in the fight, "You fools! The French have hired the English to fight for them, and they are here to see that they earn their wages!" It was a bitter sarcasm, the bitterer because it was exactly true. But sarcasm could not help Holland. She experienced in this war the weakness of her position, for she was attacked on land as well as by sea, and, though her sea power brought her through on the whole the victor, the damage to her trade was such that she never recovered

it. The Dutch, though in all the stout fighting of the last twenty-five years they had never suffered a decisive defeat at sea, had definitely lost the game. Britain withdrew from the struggle in 1679, and, during the next four years, reaped a rich harvest as a neutral, while the Dutch suffered disaster in the Mediterranean. English ships were, henceforward, preferred to Dutch, as they had proved themselves the safer carriers.

Great Britain had now laid the foundations of her over-sea Empire. On the mainland of North America, she held the New England States, the Carolinas, Maryland, Virginia, New York and New Jersey. Jamaica, Barbados and other islands in the Caribbean were hers, as well as Bermuda and Newfoundland, though her claim to the latter was still disputed by the French. In the East, Bombay had passed to Charles II in right of his wife, Catherine of Braganza. Supremacy at sea, therefore, had become vital, not only for the defence of the islands, but for safe intercourse between the King's possessions. Victory was assured to the English in the wars with the Dutch, not by any military superiority, but by natural, or geographical, causes. If the English ships were slightly more powerful than the Dutch, the fighting capacity of the sailors was as great on one side as on the other, and, on the whole, it must be conceded that, in the later wars, at any rate, the Dutch were the better led. Blake and Monk were great commanders, and James was at least respectable. But de Ruyter, the two Tromps and Evertsen were something more than equals of any but Blake. Under Cromwell, the discipline of the English was the better; but they lost this advantage under Charles II. The Government of Holland lacked unity of direction; that of Charles was corrupt. But Holland, liable to attack on the land side, and with the British Islands lying like a breakwater across her path to the ocean, had no chance to maintain herself against a Sea Power, her equal in might, stubbornness and almost in wealth, unless she could seize

a favourable opportunity to subdue it on land as well as on sea. Had she been able to invade with a sufficient army when de Ruyter lay at Sheerness, she might have altered the history of the world. But, even had her land forces been sufficient, the weakness of her land frontier and the presence of jealous enemies on the Continent would have forbidden the attempt. When the Dutch did invade, it was with the consent of the great majority of the English people. Dutch William came in peace. When he came, it was to become, like William the Conqueror, rather King of England than lord of his own continental dominions.

At the conclusion of the Dutch Wars, the first struggle against the first modern aspirant to universal sovereignty arose. Louis XIV was now on the Throne of France, and great Ministers, who saw better than he did himself the way to achieve his end, were striving to build up the sea power of France upon a solid basis. Richelieu first made the French formidable upon the water. But it is to Colbert that the credit must be given for working out a complete plan by which not only was the war-navy to be made strong enough to dominate the sea, but the colonies and maritime trade necessary to give sea power an assured foundation were to be established and fostered. Two things lay open—or seemed to lie open—to Louis at this time. He might seize the mastery of Europe, with its welter of discords, dynastic, religious and political; or he might aim at the dominion of the East and of the New World. The way to the first lay across the Rhine, the Meuse and the Scheldt; the way to the second lay across the Channel. If he achieved the second, what stood in his way from, hereafter, seizing the first also?

Leibnitz counselled him to possess himself of Egypt. France, he said, wanted peace in the West and war in the East. The Turkish power was, in reality, feeble, and he who possessed Egypt would possess also the islands and coasts of the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. It was Napoleon's policy a hundred years and more before Napoleon's time.

It could, at that juncture, have been much more easily carried into effect, for the position of France for achieving supremacy at sea was, on the whole, more favourable than that of England. The latter had, as yet, no foothold in the Mediterranean, and was, moreover, not yet deeply interested in India. France, on the contrary, looked on to the Atlantic from Brest and Bordeaux, and on to the Inland Sea from Toulon and Marseilles. By her position in the Channel Ports, she could hold a great part of the British Navy in home waters. She had, in Nova Scotia, a foothold on the North American Continent, while there was a good chance of the Spanish Crown falling to Louis, with the whole of the American dominions of Spain, and the vitally important Mediterranean positions of Gibraltar and the Balearic Islands. To secure this goodly heritage, he needed sea power, and this Colbert was ready to give him.

Colbert's plan, as described by himself, was as follows:—"To organise producers and merchants as a powerful army subjected to an active and intelligent guidance, so as to secure an industrial victory for France by order and unity of efforts, and to obtain the best products by imposing on all workmen the processes recognised as best by competent men. . . . To organise seamen and distant commerce in large bodies like the manufactures and internal commerce, and to give as support to the commercial power of France a navy established on a firm basis and of dimensions hitherto unknown."

It was an ambitious undertaking, and it almost succeeded. Colbert's work in the dockyards was so efficient that an English officer, prisoner at Brest, declared that ships were got ready for sea in half the time which was required in England. A ship of 100 guns had all her guns removed in five hours with the greatest ease and with less hazard than in England, where the same work would have taken twenty-four hours. Colbert enacted something like our Navigation Laws; he caused great bonded warehouses to be built, in the hope of thus securing the *entrepôt* trade

of the world; he reorganised the finances of France, and, for the purpose of interesting all classes of society in his schemes, he obtained a decree from Louis that the Nobility might engage in over-sea commerce without loss of status, so long as they abstained from retail trade. This was necessary because it was the ambition of merchants to secure patents of nobility. When these were obtained, they were compelled by the laws of their order to retire from business.

Such, in bare outline, was Colbert's plan—a plan which very nearly resembles that pursued in Germany since the accession of William II, to which the world owes those priceless possessions, the Ballins, the Helfferichs, and their like. It had one weakness. It rested on the capricious will of an absolute monarch. Louis was offered a choice, and he chose wrongly. The war, undertaken in 1672 in alliance with England against the Dutch, ruined Colbert's plans and broke his heart. In the six years' struggle, the equilibrium of the finances so carefully established for the furtherance of the greater aims was destroyed; the springs of commerce and of a peaceful shipping were exhausted. The military navy was maintained in efficiency for some years; then it too began to dwindle. Like the seed sown in stony places, "having no root in itself, it withered away." Louis was committed to those continental plans which brought his realm to the verge of ruin and established Great Britain instead of France as the mistress of the sea. Sea power is too slow in its operation for the would-be master of the world; its instruments too far removed from his hand. Its aims are the prosperity of the many rather than the exaltation of the one.

Yet we may doubt whether Louis XIV rather than Colbert was not the true interpreter of the genius of France. The sunny and pleasant land; the intense love of home; the thrifty nature of the people which rejects speculative enterprise in favour of the *bas de laine*, lead to the conclusion that Colbert's magnificent scheme would have been a plant of hothouse growth; that the history of France as

a world-Empire might not have differed greatly from that of Spain. But, the character of the people apart, and as a matter of pure policy, it is easy to see that Louis took the wrong course. The great struggle between Britain and France began when James II lost his throne and Dutch William succeeded. Louis supported the cause of the exiled King. The defeat of Torrington off Beachy Head, which took place twelve days before William's victory at the Boyne, plunged England into consternation which was only allayed by the firmness of the Queen and the favourable news from Ireland. The old English spirit of the Armada time then once more took fire. Russell, who succeeded Torrington in command of the Channel Guard, and who was known to have Jacobite sympathies, declared roundly that professional honour required him to fight as stoutly for the king he hated as for the king he loved, and his officers assented to this declaration. The hope that the fleet might rally to its old commander was utterly disappointed. Russell attacked Tourville off the Race of Alderney with a superior force, routed him and chased him into the harbour of La Hogue, where the British seamen in a boat attack destroyed a number of French ships at anchor. James II watched the fight from the battlements, exclaiming eagerly, and in his own despite, "They'll never beat my English."

The victory of La Hogue, secondary in importance as a naval encounter, had the effect of shattering the belief in the superiority of the French at sea, engendered by Tourville's success off Beachy Head, not less in the eyes of Louis himself than in the eyes of European nations. Spain joined in the war on the side of the allies, and the French King withdrew his grand fleets from the sea, electing to depend on a war against commerce. He hired out ships to privateers, and lent his best captains and crews. Jean Bart, Forbin and Duguay-Trouin, famous privateersmen, wrought enormous havoc on British and Dutch shipping; but the wealth of Britain and Holland was always increasing, nevertheless, and kept the League of Augsburg on foot

until the Treaty of Ryswick closed the war. France, on the other hand, despite her great internal resources, became more and more exhausted. "Nations, like men," says Mahan, "however strong, decay when cut off from the external activities which at once draw out and support their internal powers. A nation cannot live indefinitely off itself, and the easiest way in which it can communicate with other people and renew its own strength is upon the sea." The moral for to-day is obvious.

Six years after the Peace of Ryswick, the War of the Spanish Succession broke out. The contest was between Philip, grandson of *Le Roi Soleil*, and Charles, brother of the Emperor, for the Crown of Spain. The Sea Powers, Britain and Holland, were determined that the House of Bourbon should not wield the resources of the whole vast Empire of Spain in conjunction with the might and vigour of France. The titular sovereignty of decrepit Spain in the New World might be tolerated, for the wealth of the Indies was carried in British and Dutch bottoms, despite the nominal monopoly which the Kings of Spain still maintained. But such a foundation for French sea power could not be tolerated. Portugal, likewise, dreaded the nearness of France, and sought the protection of her old ally, England. The Empire, Britain and Holland were thus arrayed against Louis and that part of Spain which favoured the cause of Philip. William III, the strong ruler, the able commander, in whose person the British and Dutch realms had been united, was now dead, and Queen Anne sat on the Throne of Britain, herself ruled by the imperious Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough, whose husband, fortunately a man of shining military genius, took command of the British and Dutch forces upon the Continent. The policy of subsidies which Britain was to pursue for the next century was now adopted, and the wealth which command of the sea gave was poured into the coffers of the Germanic States to support the land war.

At sea, the allies at first contemplated action in the West Indies. But, on the Emperor putting forward Charles definitely as a candidate for the Throne of Spain, the plan was changed, and the naval forces were employed chiefly in the Mediterranean and off the coast of Portugal. Supported by British sea power, the Portuguese Government permitted Charles to land at Lisbon and undertake the conquest of Spain from that base. The great and abiding feature of the sea campaign was the capture of Gibraltar by Sir George Rooke. That event came about almost by inadvertence. Rooke had failed in an attempt on Cadiz, and, despite a brilliant affair in which he cut out the Spanish treasure galleons in Vigo Bay, he was ill-content to go back to England without more substantial success. The British Admiralty, then as ever afterwards, allowed a very free hand to its commanders afloat, so Rooke determined to attack the mighty fortress, which he first bombarded and then stormed with the boats of his fleet. Never did place of such importance fall with such ridiculous ease. The Count of Toulouse attempted to retrieve its loss, attacking Rooke off Malaga on his return. The battle was indecisive. But the British retained Gibraltar, and have retained it ever since, despite several attempts to induce Spain to receive it back again. Next to the taking of Gibraltar, the most important event at sea was the capture of Minorca, with its harbour, Port Mahon, which the British held for fifty years.

It is, however, the silent, unseen pressure exercised by sea power, so hard to estimate in words, which dominates the War of the Spanish Succession, as it dominates other struggles, both before and since. It contributed more to the final success of the allies than all the victories of Marlborough and Eugene. Life-blood flowed into Holland and Germany through the ports of Flanders; the breath of France was gradually choked out of her by the stranglehold which forbade her intercourse with the rest of the

world. In 1710, Louis was ready to offer almost abject terms of peace. The Allies, at the instigation of Great Britain, rejected them, thinking to achieve the complete overthrow of the French. Then, with the death of the Emperor and the accession of Charles to the Imperial Crown, the situation changed. Britain was no more ready to welcome an omnipotent Hapsburg than an omnipotent Bourbon. England and Holland withdrew from the war, and the Emperor had no choice but to make peace, for the life-blood of sea-borne wealth was cut off from him. Historians who habitually omit the factor of sea power from their appreciations are wont to contrast the terms which might have been imposed in 1710 with those, apparently less favourable, ultimately accepted in 1713. They comment freely on the tergiversations and intrigues of Whig and Tory, on the treachery of Marlborough and the displacement of his spouse in the royal favour by Mrs. Abigail Masham. But they obstinately miss the point that the terms of 1713 suited Britain, now the supreme Sea Power, far better than those offered at the earlier date. Our statesmen, whatever their demerits of wisdom and character, had now begun to realise, consciously and clearly, in which direction the destiny of the country lay.

By the Treaty of Utrecht, Great Britain gained a definite recognition of her claim to Newfoundland. Nova Scotia and the Hudson Bay Territory were ceded to her by France, Gibraltar and Minorca by Spain. Her position on the great sea-routes was thus infinitely strengthened. Holland gained possession of the Barrier Fortresses of Flanders with the exception of Lille. The respective acquisitions of the two Powers show the trend of events. The Dutch gained positions requisite for their defence on land, the British, outposts for their expansion by sea. After the Treaty of Utrecht, the last pretension of Holland to rival her neighbour at sea vanished.

But the advantages won by Britain are not to be

measured in terms of territory, important as these are. To quote Mahan again :—

“The sea power of England was not merely in the great navy with which we too commonly and exclusively associate it; France had had such a navy in 1688, and it had shrivelled like a dry leaf in the fire. Neither was it in a prosperous commerce alone; a few years after the date at which we have arrived, the commerce of France took on fair proportions, but the first blast of war swept it off the seas as the navy of Cromwell had once swept that of Holland. It was in the union of the two, carefully fostered, that England made the gain of sea power over and beyond all other States; and this gain is distinctly associated with, and dates from, the War of the Spanish Succession. Before that war, England was *one* of the Sea Powers; after it, she was *the* Sea Power, without any second. This power also she held alone, unshared by friend and unchecked by foe. She alone was rich, and in her command of the sea and her extensive shipping had the sources of wealth so much in her hands that there was no present fear of a rival on the ocean. Thus her gain of sea power and wealth were not only great, but solid, being entirely in her own hands; while the gains of other States were not merely inferior in degree, but weaker in kind, in that they depended more or less on the goodwill of other people.”

Thus ended the first great struggle of Great Britain to prevent a Colossus from striding over the globe. What follows from the outbreak of the War of Jenkins's Ear to Trafalgar forms, in its ultimate meaning, a continuous story: the story of one long struggle between sea power and land power for ascendancy. The maintenance of the balance of power on the Continent of Europe henceforward is a conscious policy, and it has been so ever since. The first victims of a Napoleon or a William II are, necessarily, the small and weak States which fringe the seaboard of

the Continent. To uphold the independence of these States, so that no great military Power shall obtain the advantage of their maritime position, is vital to British supremacy at sea. Thus the War of the Spanish Succession, in the logical sequence of events, led straight to the great struggle of to-day.

CHAPTER VIII

PRIDE AND A FALL.

THE Peace of Utrecht was shortly followed by two events which had a profound influence on the history of Europe for the next seventy years. Shakespeare has told us, through the mouth of Cæsar, that,

When beggars die there are no comets seen;
The heavens themselves blaze forth the death of princes

But it must be confessed that, often enough, changes in the occupancy of thrones is a matter of profound unimportance. Kings run their course. They do that which is right or evil in the sight of the Lord and sleep with their fathers. According to the power and authority of the individual, he leaves a greater or a less imprint on the course of events. But the tide of history sweeps on, and kings are more often corks on its bosom than breakwaters controlling or diverting its course.

This could fairly be said of the life of Queen Anne, though not of the event for which she is chiefly famous: her death. It could not be said either of the life or death of *Le Roi Soleil*, for both profoundly influenced events. Anne passed from this world in August, 1714, and Louis almost exactly a year later, both at a time when peace reigned between the nations over which they had ruled. Louis was succeeded by his grandson, a child of five, and the Regency was exercised by the Duc d'Orleans, who sacrificed the late king's policy of a close family union with Spain to his private enmity towards Philip V.

Orleans sought and obtained an English alliance, which he purchased with concessions to England, the most important of which, from the British point of view, was a guarantee of the Hanoverian Succession. Holland joined the alliance, and thus the peaceful occupancy of the throne of Great Britain was confirmed to George I, so far as the Powers of the Continent could guarantee it. Had the Jacobite rising in 1715 been supported* by the combined sea power of France and Holland, the return of the Stuarts might well have been accomplished.

George I was, of course, a Stuart, upon the distaff side. In all other respects he was just a dull German boor. Such Stuart qualities as he had were akin to those of James I, and not of the more engaging members of the House. His accession is chiefly important, so far as he, personally, is concerned, from the fact that he was Elector of Hanover as well as King of England, and that, unlike our previous royal importations, voluntary or constrained, he remained rather Elector of Hanover than King of Great Britain. He and his immediate successor, at any rate, strove to make the foreign policy of this country Hanoverian and Continental, rather than British and maritime. The country was involved in dynastic struggles abroad in which it must seem that it was but slightly concerned. The War of the Spanish Succession was also a dynastic struggle; but the prospect of a close connection between the Crowns of France and Spain, and the possible union of the extended Spanish Empire with the kingdom of France, was a matter which touched the welfare of Britain far more nearly than the accession of Maria Theresa to the Imperial Crown. The possession of the Low Countries by France was a matter of the first concern; that of Silesia by Frederick the Great of no concern at all, unless the statesmen of the time could project their vision into the yet far distant future—in which case they would have no doubt been less willing to serve the King of Prussia. It says much for these same statesmen, whom,

with a few exceptions, such as the great Chatham and Lord Hardwicke, we do not hold in very high esteem, that, while spending British blood and British treasure, the former sparingly, the latter lavishly, on the Continental necessities of the House of Hanover, they kept the destiny of this country as a Sea Power continually before their eyes, and made the Continental wars and alliances to subserve the true ends of British policy.

An example of this occurred two years after the death of Queen Anne. Spain had recovered a considerable measure of her former power under the administration of Cardinal Alberoni. But one of the fixed objectives of British policy was that Spain should not recover her former power. The end was justifiable enough, seeing that the Spanish system was still maintained in the Spanish possessions abroad. For the moment, the policy of Orleans kept the two branches of the House of Bourbon apart; but the danger of the union of the two Powers, which the War of the Spanish Succession had been fought to prevent, might recur at any time. It happened that, in pursuance of his German policy, George I was anxious to secure the Island of Sicily for the Emperor, giving the House of Savoy Sardinia in exchange, and compensating Spain in Parma and Tuscany. George went so far as to offer to restore Gibraltar, but the offer was not accepted. Alberoni would not consent to the arrangement upon which George had set his heart, and tried to occupy Sicily by force. Byng, afterwards Lord Torrington, the father of the ill-fated admiral of that name, fell upon the Spanish Fleet off Cape Passaro and completely destroyed it. It was of this battle that an English captain, Walton by name, wrote the oft-quoted despatch: "Sir, We have taken or destroyed all the Spanish ships upon this coast, the number as per margin." The morality of Torrington's attack need not be discussed. The incident is quoted to show how affairs purely continental in their origin were used to serve the maritime purposes of Britain, one of

which was to stereotype the naval weakness of Spain. If defence be thought necessary, it is to be found in the fact that the Law of Nations did not yet run on the sea, and that encounters on that element continued to be of frequent occurrence while nations remained formally at peace with each other.

The death of Alberoni shortly afterwards put an end to the immediate prospect of a Spanish revival. But, at the same time, the death of the Duc d'Orleans put an end to the friction between France and Spain. The old gentleman with the scythe used his implement with notable impartiality just then. France and Spain must be regarded as standing, at this time, and, indeed, up to the fall of Napoleon, in much the same relation to one another as Germany and Austria-Hungary do to each other to-day. That gives the key to British policy during the next hundred years. For the moment a troubled peace was preserved, which lasted till 1739. Cardinal Fleury, a pacific old man, assumed the conduct of affairs in France, while those of Britain were in the hands of Robert Walpole, no less a lover of peace than he.

Britain was now in possession of the thirteen colonies in North America, which were to constitute the nucleus of the United States; of Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, Jamaica and other West Indian Islands, while, in the East, she already held Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. In the Mediterranean, she had possession of the two strongholds of Gibraltar and Port Mahon. But, on the route to India, she had, at present, no half-way house, the Cape being in the hands of the Dutch. Neither East nor West, however, was her position undisputed. The French held the valley of the St. Lawrence, with Cape Breton Island at the mouth of the river, and they claimed all the back-country of North America behind the thirteen colonies, down to Louisiana, which was also in their possession. They had Guadeloupe, Martinique and half Hayti in the West Indies. Spain had the other half of Hayti, and Cuba and several

other islands, besides Florida, Mexico and the whole of South America, except Brazil. In the East, France had Chandernagore, Pondicherry and Mahé in India, besides the Isle of Bourbon and the Isle of France; these last two even more important than possessions on the mainland, as providing fleet bases in the Indian Ocean. France was decidedly more favourably situated for acquiring the Empire of India than Great Britain. The great Dupleix on the mainland, and La Bourdonnais in the islands were building up French power. Happily for our future, neither they nor their methods agreed. La Bourdonnais saw that, if the French were to hold India, it must be by sea power. His ideas were the counterpart of those held by Almeida, the Portuguese, and, it may be added, by the British also, who were to succeed eventually where he failed. Dupleix followed the policy of land dominion favoured by Albuquerque. Sea power was destined to thwart him in the end, and he returned to France, to die impoverished and disgraced, just as Clive was setting out upon his victorious career.

With three Powers competing for the dominion of the West and two for that of the East, there could be no lasting peace, especially in face of the prevailing ideas of the day on economics. Distant possessions were regarded as monopolies of the Mother Country. The attempt on the part of any other country to trade with them was a violation of right. The sea-routes which linked the Mother Country to them must therefore be protected, both by armed vessels and by bases where these could obtain shelter and refreshment. Islands especially were sought for this purpose. In the oversea possessions of the three nations there was an almost incessant state of war, and this state of war of necessity existed also on the routes leading thereto. While, therefore, the object of all the countries involved was the increase of commerce and the wealth which commerce brings by developing the resources of the new countries and turning them to their own

advantage; by increasing the number of ships and seamen who were the wagoners of the ocean highway, this spread of commerce and wealth brought not peace to the earth but a sword. The tangible, intelligible history of the world's expansion is the history of the activities of its war navies. In a later chapter it will be shown how, with the establishment of the undoubted supremacy of Great Britain on the seas, the outlook changed; how the highway was made safe to all nations alike, and how all, in the common interest, were invited to have a share in the good things offered by the earth and the fulness thereof. Another chapter of history is now being written. It is the chapter which tells of the latest, and we hope the last, attempt to secure monopoly of the earth's fulness by military power and universal dominion. When the inevitable "Finis" is written to that chapter, mankind, in brotherhood, may at last reap the fruit of all the toils and perils endured by seafaring men from the time of the Phœnicians to the present.

A separate word must here be said about the position of Great Britain in the Mediterranean at the period of our history now reached. The struggle for a share of the trade of the Spanish dominions in South America and the Caribbean is easily intelligible, and so is the ceaseless contest with the French on the mainland of America and of India and the consequential activities on the sea-routes leading to either. But it is less evident why, before the Suez Canal was made, our statesmen, granting that they had a clear idea of the interests of Great Britain as a maritime State, should have shown such insistent concern to achieve and maintain a predominant position in the Mediterranean. The trade with the Levant, it is true, was large and valuable. But its protection was not the real reason why, as in the instance recorded above, and more particularly later in Nelson's time, we should have concerned ourselves so deeply about the fate of Sicily, for instance. Toulon could be watched from Gibraltar and Port Mahon, both of which places were in our hands. Some further

reason is required to account for the deeply rooted instinct which caused us to cling so tenaciously to the Mediterranean position. The true answer sounds almost paradoxical. It was in the Mediterranean that we defended our age-long interest, the freedom of the Low Countries. The vital spot of mid-European strategy lies on the Middle Danube. It was there that the contest between the House of Hapsburg and the House of Bourbon must be fought out, and the easiest route for the French thereto lay through Italy, much of which at this time was a Bourbon possession. But Italy is a peninsula, and the route could never be safe for the French unless they possessed command of the sea. It was, then, to prevent the French from enjoying the command of the Mediterranean and thus securing their communications with the Middle Danube that, almost at any cost, we held on to a position so remote from our home bases. Here our objects were, in the main, political. Here we used sea power to thwart plans of universal domination. There have been many suggestions since that time that we should abandon the Mediterranean. With some naval writers, the idea has been almost an obsession. But a sounder instinct has always prevailed against their logic. In later days, since we became the masters of India and the importance of Egypt has been grasped, the reasons for holding on in the inland sea have, of course, become more obvious. The more credit to the statesmen of a former date that they should have obeyed the instinct at a time when it was little more than prophetic. Nor must the fact be overlooked that the instinct of those who have sought to grasp world-dominion has always led them to turn their eyes to the East. Egypt was the prize of Cambyses, of Alexander, of Antony and Octavianus. Liebnitz urged Louis XIV to seize it with a view to becoming the master of India; Napoleon's grandiose schemes all turned on eastern empire, and the pan-Germanic megalomania has led William II in the same direction. It has been a true instinct, therefore, which has led the

nation which depends on sea power and which, by and for the sake of sea power, has stubbornly resisted all attempts at world-dominion, to keep firmly in its hands the control of the pivotal region from which radiate the routes by which the would-be conqueror must go.

To return to the narrative of events. A policy of pin-pricks, pursued both by England and by Spain, led to open war in 1739. The English had acquired the right to send a ship a year to trade in Spanish America. They took full advantage of this privilege, loading the ship with Spanish produce on one side and unloading it into other ships on the other. This peculiar method had the connivance of the Spanish colonists themselves, as had the bold system of smuggling which was carried on. Only in this way could they acquire the wealth denied to them by the narrow and selfish policy of the Home Government. Spain, too weak to make a national question of the matter, attempted to deal with these irregularities locally, resorting to the capture of English ships by her *guarda-costas*, and, it is said, inflicting torture and mutilation on the captured English crews. One Jenkins, a merchant skipper, returned to England with a complaint that his ear had been cut off, and that he was told to take it to England and to tell his royal master that he would be treated the same way if he dared to voyage to the Spanish Main. An impudent, but perfectly safe threat. One can as well imagine George I in Elijah's chariot as on the Spanish Main. Jenkins attended at the bar of the House of Commons and showed the members what was alleged to be his ear. It was said afterwards that the ear was made of india-rubber. Asked what he did in the unpleasant circumstances which had overtaken him, he replied, "I commended my soul to God and my cause to my country." The words bear the stamp of an origin nearer Westminster than the Spanish Main; but they set England on fire. Walpole was unable to stand against the storm. Knowing that France would join Spain, covertly, if not openly, and that the Navy was in no

condition for war, he entertained the gloomiest forebodings. When peals of joy rang out from the steeples of London, he remarked, "They are ringing the bells now. Soon they will be wringing their hands." Thus began the War of Jenkins's Ear, soon to be merged into the greater struggle of the Austrian Succession.

In its earlier stages, the war was carried on in waters remote from Europe, in the Elizabethan spirit, but without the success which attended the Elizabethans. The Navy was ill-found and worse manned. The men died like flies in the West Indies. The islands, now a health resort, were then a veritable pest-house. At one period, it is on record that a hundred thousand British soldiers and sailors died of disease in a single year. Combined naval and military operations which were undertaken against the Spanish possessions met with a failure which brought about the fall of Walpole, who resigned office in 1742 and died three years later. That the peace-loving Minister had neglected the Navy, there is no doubt. But the total number of British ships available was respectable, and superior to that of France and Spain combined. The lack of men was very largely due to the fact that the majority of the prime seamen, of whom Great Britain now possessed large numbers, were absent on distant voyages. In this respect, the very increase of trade which the Navy existed to protect militated against the power of the Navy to carry out its primary duty. Another remarkable feature of the war was the position of the French, who remained at peace with Britain, but, under treaty, supplied the Spaniards with a contingent of ships. It was argued that the provision of this pledged help did not involve a state of war, and did not even justify the British in capturing French ships. French writers complain bitterly about such captures.

Vernon—old Grogam, from whose nickname the word "grog" is said to be derived—captured Porto Bello by a daring assault; but he failed in conjoint expeditions

against Cartagena and Santiago de Cuba, mainly owing to disagreements with the military commander. The one notable feat of the war was the voyage of Anson round the world in 1740, in the course of which he captured the Acapulco galleon off Manila, and returned with a million and a quarter of treasure. The exploit, in very many respects, recalls that of Drake. Like Drake, Anson lost all his ships but one, the *Centurion*, his flagship. Unlike Drake, however, who had a picked crew of gentlemen adventurers with him, Anson's men were the sweepings of the gaols and the hospitals, old, bad and decrepit. His voyage was thus a great feat, showing that the spirit of seamanship was alive in the British Navy, despite the evil influences of Court favouritism and corruption. It awoke all the old terror of the English name in the American and Eastern possessions of Spain.

In the year that Anson started on his voyage, the Emperor Charles VI died, and the War of the Austrian Succession began, France supporting the claim of the Elector of Bavaria against Maria Theresa, and Frederick the Great fighting against the latter for his own hand. The English supported the Empress with contingents of troops, in order to secure the Low Countries, but issued no declaration of war against France. The complicated welter of alliances and enmities is, however, no part of our subject. It is enough to record that the Spaniards made an attempt to support France against the Empress in Italy, and that, the consideration before referred to operating, the British Navy was employed in the Mediterranean to thwart them, and employed with success. The result was curious. The Spanish fleet, inferior to the British, was shut up for months in Toulon, still a neutral port, and was then escorted thence by a French squadron under Admiral de Court, which had orders not to fight unless it was attacked. In February, 1744, an indecisive engagement was fought outside Toulon, France and Britain being still nominally at peace, though the French had signed a

treaty binding themselves to declare war a few months previously.

The action did not redound to the credit of any of those engaged, with the solitary exception of Captain Edward Hawke, destined to become famous as the victor of Quiberon Bay. Matthews, the British admiral, with twenty-nine ships of the line, attacked the French and Spanish fleet of twenty-seven. The misconduct of his second in command and of most of his captains robbed Matthews of victory. He was tried and condemned by court-martial, on the curious ground that he had broken his own line of battle, the truth being that his captains had refused to follow his course. The second in command, who was Matthews's personal enemy, was also tried but acquitted, on the grounds that Matthews's signals were contradictory. Seeing that he had failed to come into action at all, it is plain that there was yet a long way to travel before we reach the spirit of Nelson's fighting instructions, "No captain can do very wrong who lays his ship alongside an enemy."

This reprehensible failure was partly redeemed, after the declaration of war by France, by two actions fought by Anson and Hawke respectively in the Atlantic. The latter officer won a decided victory, taking six ships out of a squadron of nine commanded by Admiral L'Entendùere, who sacrificed himself in order to protect his convoy of two hundred and fifty ships, with which he was bound for the West Indies. Hawke was himself too much shattered to attempt to capture the convoy, but he sent a fast sailing sloop to give warning of its approach to the admiral on the West Indies station, with the consequence that it was dispersed and the greater number of the ships taken. Thus the communications of the enemy were disturbed by sea, and the superiority of the British sea power asserted. To present the other side of the picture, the British Channel Guard foiled an attempt by Marshal Saxe to invade the country from Dunkirk, and, although

the Young Pretender landed in Scotland in 1745, he could bring but few men with him, and owed such success as his adventure won to the sympathy with his cause which was widespread in the northern kingdom. Had he been accompanied by ten, or even five thousand French veterans, the story might have been differently written. If the War of the Austrian Succession was not very glorious to Great Britain, her sea power at any rate achieved the main object of its existence. It maintained the use of the sea routes to herself and denied it to her enemies. The war navies of France and Spain were swept from the ocean, and their seaborne trade was shattered. It was, however, due to the weakness of her enemies rather than to her own strength that Great Britain came through unscathed. The Navy did not rise to the height of the expectations formed of it. Jealousies between it and the Army fettered its action. There was, however, a very significant outcome of sea power which holds a lesson for us to-day, and must now be mentioned.

The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which closed this war, settled none of the questions for which it had been fought. Especially, the western boundaries of the French and English in North America were still left indeterminate. The American Colonists, however, had taken Louisburg in the mouth of the St. Lawrence, and thus had got a sure lever for future pressure upon the French in Canada. But the English had lost Madras, and, in the Treaty, the American gain was bartered for the return of the English loss. Little as the Colonists liked the loss of their capture, they knew that they could always retake it, so long as Britain held command of the sea. On the other hand, the shock to the prestige of Dupleix in India when the natives saw his resounding victory rendered fruitless was something from which it could not recover. Such was the result of sea power acting on opposite sides of the world, but still all one. Naturally, however, there was discontent among the Colonists, and this is the first instance of a

difficulty which may be expected to recur when those who share the fighting have no voice in the policy which makes war or concludes peace. It is a question of urgent and growing importance to the Ocean Empire.

Besides the question of the North American boundary, that of the right of search in South American waters, the very starting point of the war with Spain, was also left unsettled. It is not, therefore, surprising to learn that, while Europe was nominally at peace, an irregular war continued between France and Britain in more remote parts of the world, or that Spain was ready to join, as far as her weakness would permit. Despite the recall of Dupleix, the struggle for primacy in India continued by means of alliances with native Princes who were continually at war with one another in the tottering Empire of the Great Mogul. The way of the sea being barred to French reinforcements, it was a matter of course that British power should wax and theirs wane, though it was long yet before the struggle was entirely abandoned. In the West, Boscawen actually stopped a squadron, in May, 1755, which was carrying reinforcements to the garrison of Canada, and, in the same year, Sir Edward Hawke was sent to cruise between Ushant and Finisterre, with orders to seize any French ships, line-of-battleships or other, that he might come across. The French made ostentatious preparations for the invasion of this country; but were all the while preparing a *coup* in the Mediterranean. A force under the Duc de Richelieu, supported by a fleet under La Gallissonière, suddenly made a descent on Minorca, and laid siege to Port Mahon.

This led to the fatal engagement for which Admiral John Byng was tried and shot. He had been hurried from Portsmouth on the first news of the French move with ten sail of the line, and picked up another three on the way. With this force he was about equal to La Gallissonière. The French were not seeking a decisive engagement, and tried to avoid close action, while damaging the

British ships aloft as much as possible. Byng could not get his whole force into action. It seems that the unfortunate man was oppressed by the sentence on Matthews for his action in the battle off Toulon, mentioned above. It will be remembered that he was condemned for breaking his own line of battle. The rearmost ships of Byng's fleet being late in coming into action, and two vessels, *Louisa* and *Trident*, owing to damage to their spars being behind him instead of ahead, he would not bear down alone and delay the French ships in order to bring them into action. "You see, Captain Gardiner," he said to his flag captain, "that the signal for the line is out, and that I am ahead of the ships *Louisa* and *Trident*. You would not have me, as Admiral of the Fleet, run down as if I were about to engage a single ship. It was Mr. Matthews's misfortune to be prejudiced by not carrying down his line together, which I shall endeavour to avoid." He avoided Mr. Matthews's "error" at the cost of his life. A Council of War decided not to fight again, but to return to Gibraltar. Port Mahon fell, and Byng was recalled to England, to be tried for his life. He was acquitted of cowardice and active misconduct, but was found guilty of not doing all he might have done to secure success. The only penalty decreed by the Articles of War for his offence was death, and, accordingly, death was the sentence. A particularly unscrupulous political intrigue was set on foot to prevent the king from exercising his prerogative of mercy, and Byng was shot, less "to encourage the rest," as Voltaire remarked, than to gratify the spite of his political enemies. Nevertheless, the effect of the execution was to give the officers of the Navy a better perspective of their duty, and, if hard measure was meted out to the man himself, it must be owned that, after the discreditable affair of Matthews, stern action was required to restore the spirit of the Navy. War was declared by France three days after the action off Minorca.

After this inauspicious beginning, the rest of the

war was almost wholly glorious to our arms. The year 1757 saw the victory of Plassey, and the foundation of the British Empire in India. The "wonderful year," 1759, saw the taking of Quebec, the battle of Minden, Boscawen's victory over De La Clue in Lagos Bay, and, finally, Hawke's great triumph at Quiberon. Clive's work in India was helped by the tenacity with which Admiral Pocock clung to the French squadron under Commadore d'Ache. Three desperate, though indecisive, battles were fought, and then the general superiority of British sea power told its tale. Despite the possession of the Isles of France and Bourbon, d'Ache could get no proper support or supplies for his ships, and, eventually, naval aid was withdrawn from the French, and the British were left to consolidate their position unmolested, save by such forces as the French had already in the Peninsula. Wolfe owed his success at Quebec largely to the fleet which accompanied him up the St. Lawrence, and enabled him to surprise the enemy at the Heights of Abraham, besides preventing reinforcements from reaching Montcalm. The land advance by way of Lake Champlain failed; that up the St. Lawrence, assisted by the Navy, succeeded. The capture of Canada is, perhaps, the best monument to the success of the peculiarly British strategy of the conjoint use of naval and military forces. On the Continent of Europe, where the French had been led into war with Prussia in an unwonted alliance with Austria, owing to the resentment of Madame de Pompadour at the sneers of Frederick, the arms of that monarch were sustained in his desperate struggle against French, Austrians and Russians by the subsidies which flowed from the overwhelming sea-borne wealth of Britain. Moreover, the strength of France was eventually diverted from the mid-European struggle to an attempt to invade this country through desperation at the ruin which was coming upon her. The two conflicts were rather parallel than identical. The British share in the land conflict was, once more, dictated by anxiety for

the Low Countries. Louis XV, like his grandfather, was in a cleft stick. He had to make up his mind whether he would be a "wet-bob" or a "dry-bob." He elected to be the latter, and then changed his mind, under pressure of circumstances, too late. A great armament was assembled at the mouth of the Loire, while fleets were collected at Brest and Toulon, which were intended to make junction and convoy the armies across—fifty thousand men for England, twelve thousand for Scotland. It was an earlier example of Napoleon's plan of 1803, and a late copy of Santa Cruz's scheme for the Armada.

The British seamen met the threat in the same manner as it was met at the later date. Hawke watched the squadron in Brest, Boscawen that at Toulon. It was not a "blockade," though it is often so described. The object was, not to shut the French in, but to bring them to action, if, or when, they should come out. It was a defensive measure which had offence for its ultimate object. And it was combined with direct action which was purely offensive, having for its object to force the hands of the French by continual irritation and to compel them to withdraw or withhold forces from the campaign against Frederick. The British waged a relentless war against French trade, made descents with conjoint naval and military forces on various points of the French coast, and, one by one, wrenched the colonies of France from her. The Toulon squadron attempted to get to sea while Boscawen was at Gibraltar carrying out repairs. It was driven into Lagos Bay and scattered or destroyed. Five ships alone managed to escape into Cadiz. The Brest fleet was ordered to put to sea and fight a fleet action with Hawke, in order to clear the way for the transports. Hawke was driven off his station into Torbay by a heavy westerly gale, which kept the French in port, but enabled them to receive as reinforcement a small squadron which was returning from the West Indies. When the wind shifted to easterly, M. de Conflans, who commanded the French,

put to sea and cruised to the southward. Hawke, released from Torbay, crowded all sail, and came up with him on November 20th. A gale was again blowing from west-north-west, and Conflans, who was in slightly inferior force, made for Quiberon Bay, thinking that Hawke would not dare to follow him on that iron-bound lee shore. He mistook the mettle of the man. Hawke was a consummate seaman, and he knew the coast. He ordered a general chase. The flying spray was seen dashing over the rocks, which showed black in the winter twilight through it. Hawke's master remonstrated with him on the rashness of the attempt to follow the French in. "You have done your duty in pointing out the danger," replied Hawke. "Now lay me alongside the enemy's flagship!" That could not be, for M. de Conflans led the flight. Hawke's van dashed in, hot on the track of the French rear. The thunder of guns mingled with the roar of the surf, and the flashes lit up the darkness which had by now fallen. The foam-covered rocks alone buoyed the fairway. A French 74, pressed by superior force, opened her lower-deck ports in order that she might reply more effectively to the hostile fire. The sea poured in, and she foundered. Two more struck their colours; several were wrecked. Fifteen made for the mouth of the Vilaine, got in over the bar, and were left there helpless for fifteen months. The flagship *Le Roi Soleil* found herself when morning broke in the middle of the British fleet. She was run ashore, where Hawke destroyed her. Five ships only succeeded in making their way to Rochefort. The Navy of Louis XV was out of action for the remainder of the war.

Such was this great victory, for boldness and skill perhaps greater even than Trafalgar, and matched only by the Nile. Henceforth Britain wrought her will on every sea. The threat of invasion was at an end. Spain joined in the war shortly afterwards, only to be rewarded by the loss of Havanah, which was captured by Pocock, and of the Philippine Islands. Immense sums in specie were also

taken, and Spain soon sued for a humiliating peace. The war was ended by the Treaty of Fontainebleau, signed on February 3rd, 1763. By it, France ceded all claim to Nova Scotia and Canada, the Valley of the Ohio, and all her territory on the eastern side of the Mississippi, except the town of New Orleans. Spain surrendered Florida in exchange for the return of Havanah. She was leniently dealt with otherwise, for she recovered the Philippines. In the West Indies, the islands of Guadaloupe and Martinique were returned to France, and her claim to Santa Lucia was allowed, while Britain kept St. Vincent, Tobago, Dominica and Grenada in the Lesser Antilles. The former possessions of the French in India were restored to them; but the right to fortify or keep troops in Bengal was surrendered. Britain recovered Minorca.

The losses of British trade during the Seven Years' War were great. The French took to privateering after 1759, and, in one year, captured fourteen hundred merchantmen out of a total of about eight thousand. The National Debt had risen to the sum of £122,000,000—an immense burden for that day, though one at which we may well look with envy now. But the new resources which India and the Colonies yielded amply compensated, and the Debt was really a source of wealth rather than of embarrassment. It meant a distribution of comfort among the middle-classes, and a consequent plenitude of employment for those dependent upon them. The military navy of France lost nearly half its strength in the war, while that of Britain was strengthened by the capture of fine ships of a better model than she herself, at this time, constructed. Moreover, the superiority of the British officers and seamen was enhanced by the policy of watching the enemy's ports. Facing all weathers, they became in an increasing degree hardy and resourceful, while the French, condemned to sojourn in port, rapidly deteriorated in efficiency, though not in courage. At no time in the world's history was the maritime superiority of any Power so firmly

established as was that of Britain at the close of the Seven Years' War. And, at the same time, the Continent was exhausted by the terrific struggle to subdue Frederick the Great, and fell into torpor, until the thunder-clap of the French Revolution aroused it. On this fact the foundation of our industrial prosperity was also laid.

It must be remembered that seaborne trade at this time did not involve the free coming and going of merchant ships into foreign ports freely open to them, as we understand it nowadays, when the right is subject only to the payment of dues required by municipal law. The mercantile system prevailed almost universally, and the privilege of entering foreign ports was only conceded as the outcome of negotiations between Governments. Colonial trade, in particular, was very closely preserved to the Mother Country. The products of the French Colonies might be conveyed only to France, and only in French ships. The French, however, being unable to carry on this trade themselves during the Seven Years' War, owing to the pressure of the British Navy, opened it to the Dutch. Great Britain replied with "The Rule of 1756," which is the basis of all our Orders in Council and Prize Court regulations. "The British Government gave orders that all neutral ships laden with cargoes from the Colonies of the enemy should be captured and brought before the Prize Courts. . . . This was done on the principle that during war the commercial dealings of neutrals ought to be kept within their accustomed limits, and that they have no right to enjoy a trade which is closed to them in time of peace, and thus help one belligerent by incorporating their merchantmen with his, thus identifying themselves with his interests" (G. W. T. Omond, "The Law of the Sea," A. C. Black, Ltd., pp. 7, 8). In essence, this meant that French colonial trade went to enrich Britain, even if the colonies did not themselves fall to her. The grinding power of supremacy at sea is thus shown, and one of the reasons also why trade flourished in war-time in the case of a mari-

time Power like Great Britain, which, with the mastery of the sea, held control of the sea-routes. She was, moreover, in a position to exact conditions favourable to her trade from neutrals. The Treaty with Portugal, negotiated by Paul Methuen in 1703, which reduced the duties on Portuguese wines to two-thirds, in exchange for the free importation of English woollen manufactures, and is thus, perhaps, responsible for half the gout in the country, is a case in point. It gave Great Britain a practical monopoly of the trade in Portugal, and sent the gold of Brazil to London by way of Lisbon. Politically, it made Portugal dependent for her defence on England, and made the defence of Portugal one of the first of British interests. Trade acquired as the result of general maritime superiority soon outbalanced all the damage done by enemy cruisers and privateers.

Two years after the signature of the Treaty of Fontainebleau, the North American Colonists began their struggle for independence by resistance to the Stamp Act. It is easy to be wise after the event, and to condemn, as the Whigs by whom history was commonly written up to the time of Macaulay, have unanimously condemned, the King and his successive Ministers for crass folly. Experiment had not yet shown, as it has, happily, since, that a commonwealth of nations, each enjoying the most complete rights of self-government, could yet remain a united if loosely compacted Empire. No better system of administering the government of Colonies had as yet been devised than that which Britain pursued up to 1765. The Colonists themselves made no move for greater liberty until the threat involved in the French possession of Canada and Louisiana and their claim to the country west of the Alleghanies had been removed in the Seven Years' War. Still, *sapiens qui prospicit!* There was a lesson which had to be learned, and our statesmen learned it too late. The European enemies of Great Britain were not slow to seize the opportunity to rub it in.

The fourteen years which elapsed between the Treaty of Fontainebleau and the adhesion of France to the cause of the revolted Colonists were spent by the French in a resolute attempt to build up their navy and to strengthen the family compact which united the Royal Houses of France and Spain. The efforts of Choiseul, the French Minister, were heartily backed by the people, who furnished the King with ships by voluntary subscription. A thorough scheme of training for French Naval officers was instituted, and the science of naval warfare was diligently studied. Nor was the British Navy allowed to decay at this time, as it had so often been before in time of peace. A regular standard of naval strength was maintained: namely, equality to the combined navies of the House of Bourbon. That standard prevailed, at least nominally, at the outbreak of the war. Nevertheless, Great Britain entered upon the struggle under circumstances very unfavourable to her. The merchant shipping of the North American Colonies amounted to very nearly half her own, and the reservoir of trained seamen which she had thus possessed was now cut off from her. In addition, she was committed to a war far from her own shores, while her principal enemies at sea were close to them, and, in the distant sphere, had, moreover, a great part of the resources of the Colonies to rely on. The prosecution of the land war against the revolted Colonists demanded the presence of great fleets upon their coasts to secure the communications of her armies. For the first time in her history she fought at a serious disadvantage in geographical position. As a further embarrassment, the Dutch, disloyal to their ancient treaties, resisted the application of the rule of 1756 to the point of declaring war. Antwerp and the Scheldt were at the disposal of the enemy. And Russia, Sweden, and Denmark joined in the armed neutrality, which aimed at asserting the right of neutrals to trade with belligerents in all articles save contraband of war, and denied the right of blockade. Since naval stores then chiefly came from the

Baltic, and these were denied to Great Britain, the armed neutrality scarcely differed from actual war.

Twice over great French and Spanish fleets were in the Channel, while a large army of invasion lay on the opposite shore. Three times Gibraltar was on the point of starvation when it was relieved, first by Darby, secondly by Rodney, and lastly by Howe. Two British armies were compelled to lay down their arms in America, chiefly owing to the local and temporary superiority of the enemy at sea. Yet, with it all, when peace came in 1783, the sea power of Britain was substantially unshaken. The American Colonies were gone, and a couple of West Indian islands, and Minorca. But all except the first could be recovered, provided that the real command of the sea were maintained, and that was still not in doubt. The sea-sense of the race was never better exemplified than in this struggle, which ought to have seen the end of Britain's greatness. The Royal Navy of France was never so formidable. But it completely failed against the inherited instinct which led men like Hood, Kempenfeldt and Rodney to do the right thing, even when in inferior force. Even in the East Indies, where Hughes, as a commander, was plainly overmatched by the real genius of the Bailli de Suffren, the latter never beat him decisively, and Britain retained her position, despite the struggle which she was forced to carry on at the same time against the formidable power of Mysore, under Hyder Ali. The French navy, as a military implement, was in a high state of perfection, and, if the principles of sea-fighting were the same as those of land-warfare, might have over-matched its opponent. But it lacked the true instinct for the sea; it was not backed by a strong maritime system, or a people whose destiny really lay upon the water. It failed to seize its opportunities, and, therefore, it failed to inflict any permanent injury on its great rival. This was seen plainly enough when the issue was next fought out, for, by then, the Revolution had shattered the old Royal Navy of France, and revolu-

tionary ardour could not replace discipline at sea as it did on shore.

The operations in the West Indies, which form the main naval interest in the War of American Independence, are anything but easy to follow. Hood and Byron, d'Estaing and de Grasse checked and counter-checked each other by strategic moves which rarely resulted in actual, and never in decisive, action. It is unnecessary to follow these in detail. So long as the land war on the American continent continued, British naval operations were hampered by the necessity of supporting the land forces and maintaining the communications of the different detachments with one another. But after the surrender of Cornwallis in Yorktown, the cause of the United States was won, and the struggle was between Great Britain on the one hand and the allied Bourbon Powers on the other. The capture of "sugar islands"; the re-establishment of France and Spain in their predominating position in the West Indies, became the objective. De Grasse left the *Chesapeake* to capture St. Kitts, followed by Hood with inferior force. Rodney was expected from England with reinforcements, and de Guichen from France. Rodney duly arrived; but de Guichen was brought to action by Kempenfeldt off Brest, and his fleet and convoy were beaten and dispersed. This was the turning point. Hood foiled de Grasse by a brilliant stroke of strategy, and, although he could not prevent the capture of St. Kitts, he joined Rodney with his fleet intact, and the combined force became superior to that under de Grasse. Nevertheless, the latter proceeded with his preparations for the reduction of Jamaica, collecting a great convoy with twenty thousand troops. The expected Spanish reinforcements, however, did not arrive, and, on April 12th, 1782, de Grasse was brought to action off The Saints by Rodney, and defeated, with the loss of five ships captured, including his own flagship, the *Ville de Paris*, the gift of the people of the French capital. Peace was signed in the

following January, and it left Great Britain still supreme at sea. She lost a couple of West Indian islands and Minorca. Spain regained Florida; but this was of more consequence to the United States than to Britain. Gibraltar was saved, and, in the East Indies, her position was untouched.

The British Government of the day is censured by Mahan for not concentrating its force on the decisive point, namely, off the enemy's ports. The criticism is, in the abstract, justified. But it omits to take account of the fact that, before the intervention of France and Spain—an intervention, however, which was admittedly likely—Great Britain was committed to a struggle with the Colonists which demanded the support of a large fleet on the scene of action. Naval co-operation on the further side of the Atlantic was essential, and, indeed, the Colonies were mainly lost because, in one or two instances, it failed to be effective. The division of the total naval strength of Britain was, therefore, inevitable. Subject to this limitation, the expedient of watching the enemy's ports was resorted to as far as possible, and, indeed, with such success that one-half of the French expedition detailed for the assistance of the Americans was locked up in Brest till the end of the war. This division of force compelled the abandonment of the Mediterranean. Port Mahon, left to itself, necessarily fell. But its voluntary abandonment would have relieved the British of little of their embarrassment. The obligation to relieve Gibraltar would have remained. The additional troops would have been useless for the defence, and would only have meant so many more mouths to feed. Again, it was imperative to maintain local naval forces in the East Indies. It is fairer to say that Great Britain, thrown by faulty policy into a false strategic position, held on tenaciously to all essential points, and that her unshaken grip upon the sea routes brought her safely through, despite the numerical inferiority to which she was reduced in almost every theatre of war.

The disadvantage of the strategical defensive forced upon us was corrected by a tactical offensive whenever possible. Keppel attacked the French fleet off Ushant at the very beginning of the war. The action failed of decisive result, owing to the misconduct of his captains, or some of them. Rodney twice attacked the Spaniards, in one instance under conditions which recall Quiberon Bay, and, on both occasions, inflicted a heavy defeat upon them. The victory of Kempenfeldt one of our very great seamen, whose premature fate in the *Royal George* is better known than his meritorious services at sea, over de Guichen off Brest has already been mentioned. Only two ships of the line out of seventeen and five merchantmen out of a hundred and fifty reached the West Indies. The distant issue was decided in European waters—a telling instance of the working of sea-power.

Great Britain emerged from a contest in which the whole world was engaged, actively or passively, against her, chastened but not killed. Everything which she had lost, save only the North American Colonies, was recoverable, as the not distant future was to show. The war of 1778-83 was, of course, one of the most momentous for the future of mankind that has ever been fought. The thirteen colonies, now become independent were freed from the restrictions of the Colonial system. The enormous expansion which the next hundred years were to witness in the United States had a most powerful influence on the freedom of trade and freedom of the seas which it was the work of Britain chiefly to foster after 1815. Nor is that all. By the independence of the United States, the hegemony of the New World passed to a nation speaking the English tongue and imbued with the ideals of Anglo-Saxon culture, freedom and law. The pride of Great Britain was rudely humbled; but the lesson taught her by the successful revolt of her Colonists bore fruit. And its fruit is nothing less than the Ocean Empire of which she is now the head—not the mistress, but *prima inter pares*.

CHAPTER IX

SEA POWER SAVES EUROPE

IN supporting the revolted Colonists, the House of Bourbon fought for their own hand, and sealed their own doom. The young and brilliant Lafayette, who, at the age of twenty, placed his sword at the service of the Americans, lived to propose to the National Assembly a Declaration of the Rights of Man founded upon the Declaration of Independence, and to command the National Guard in the Revolution of 1830. Great Britain was a reluctant opponent of the Revolution, with the principles, but not the excesses, of which a large number of British people were in sympathy. But when the revolutionists offered assistance to any nation desirous of freeing itself from monarchical rule, and proceeded to fit the Cap of Liberty on to the reluctant heads of the Dutch, then the old concern for the Low Countries and the mouths of the Scheldt was re-awakened. The murder of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette perhaps shocked the Court more than the people, though the godlessness and blasphemy of the Jacobins roused a sense of horror in the masses. The British people had liberty, but liberty of their own brand. They were not prepared to exchange it for that of revolutionary France. So Britain, the first Sea Power and the representative of constitutional freedom, made common cause with Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns. War was declared in 1793; the sword of Britain was not sheathed again, save for two short intervals, till Waterloo delivered "the Spoiler" into her hands in 1815.

The war divides itself naturally into three parts. The first, which may be called the Revolutionary period, is that in which Napoleon established and consolidated his power in France and on the Continent. This lasted from 1793 to the Peace of Amiens in 1801. The second period is that of the duel between France and Great Britain, from 1803 to the victory of Trafalgar, on October 21st, 1805. The third, from Trafalgar to Waterloo, is the period which covers the military effort of Great Britain in the Peninsula and Flanders, and the economic struggle consequent on the establishment of Napoleon's "Continental System."

A direct consequence of this was the War of 1812 with the United States. Many volumes have been written concerning this titanic period in the world's history, and to follow its infinite ramifications in a chapter would be an impossible task. No more can be attempted than to indicate the working of sea power and to show its decisive influence on the great conflict, exercised often most strongly when defeat seemed most certain. Napoleon, the soldier, had command of the whole resources of France. It has been said of him, with truth, that he lacked "*le sentiment exact des difficultés de la marine.*" This was shown most clearly in the period between 1803 and 1805, after which he abandoned his hopes of maritime supremacy, and devoted himself to the effort to "make the land conquer the sea." In that he failed utterly, as every other conqueror has failed; and he not only failed, but he was drawn into false strategical moves by land which eventually sapped the strength of France and caused his own downfall. Two names stand out predominantly during this period; those of Nelson and Napoleon. The record of the sailor is emblazoned with three great fights, in the third of which he fell: the Nile, Copenhagen, and Trafalgar. On the colours of the soldier shine the names of Rivoli, Lodi, Arcola, Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, Ulm, Wagram, to name only the most famous of his triumphs. But each of Nelson's battles was a deadly thrust, involving

the failure of one of Napoleon's grandiose plans. The soldier's triumphs, despite the military glory ensuing, were but ropes of sand.

In the first period of the war, the tasks which the Navy of Great Britain had to perform were, briefly, as follows:—To protect the country from invasion, always, and necessarily, the first preoccupation. This involved, not only the time-honoured watch on the French ports, especially Brest and Toulon, but also the no less customary measures to render a threat from the Low Countries harmless. We had the Dutch as allies at the beginning of the war. But the French overran the Austrian Netherlands, defeated a British army which was laying siege to Dunkirk, and overthrew the House of Orange, which was favourable to Britain. Thus the Dutch were thrown into the arms of the Revolution, and, without much stomach for it, joined the ranks of our enemies. The Dutch fleet was immediately blockaded in the Texel by Admiral Duncan, who brought it to action and completely defeated it, with the loss of nine ships of the line out of sixteen, on October 11th, 1797. An invading force intended for Ireland lay behind the shelter of the Dutch warships. But, after the disaster of Camperdown, the project was abandoned. Hoche's unsuccessful attempt had occurred the year before, and Humbert's followed the year after. The latter succeeded in landing a small body of troops, which was quickly forced to surrender. An attempt to send reinforcements to Humbert failed ignominiously, the flagship, *Hoche*, and three frigates being taken, and Wolfe Tone, the leader of the disaffected Irish, taken with them. The direct threat to the security of the British islands was thus, for the time being, brought to an end before the close of the century. The French continued to control the Dutch ports throughout the war. But Dutch sea power rose no more after Camperdown. The overseas possessions of Holland fell one by one into the hands of the British, though most of them were restored at

the end of the war, the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon, and Demerara being the most important of those retained.

In the conditions under which the war opened, assistance to the elements in France which resisted or revolted against the Revolution was obviously indicated as the second duty of the possessors of sea power. Such attempts were duly made, in La Vendée, in Provence, and in the West Indies, where Hayti, in particular, under the leadership of the negro, Toussaint L'Ouverture, was in revolt. Little came of these endeavours, however, and the only one possessing any interest is the occupation of Toulon, where the Mediterranean Fleet, under Lord Hood, supported the inhabitants who had raised the White Flag of the Bourbons. The shore works were seized and manned; but the counter-revolution failed at Marseilles and Lyons, and Toulon was besieged by the Revolutionary forces, whose artillery was directed by Napoleon Bonaparte, then a captain. The works proved untenable, and Hood retired, burning some and taking others of the French warships in the port. Thus early the future Emperor came into contact with sea power, and his first encounter ended favourably for him.

If, however, he imbibed any hopes from this incident in his later reflections, knowledge of the fate of France at this time should have checked them. The "stranglehold" of the British Navy, combined with the effects of internal disorder, was already telling. The wheat cargoes from Sicily and the Barbary States were cut off. The French were already in need of bread. It was to secure the safe arrival of a great convoy from America that the Admiral commanding at Brest, Villaret-Joyeuse, was ordered to sea, and thus the first great naval engagement of the war was brought on, namely, the battle which is known as The Glorious First of June. The fleets were in contact four days before the issue was finally joined, and each suffered some losses in the earlier encounters. Those

of the French were made good by the joining of a detached squadron under Nielly. On the morning of the First, Howe, the British Commander, had twenty-five of the line against twenty-six French. Four prizes were taken and several more ships were disabled. But Howe's fleet was too severely damaged to renew the action, and Villaret-Joyeuse drew off the rest of his fleet to Brest, where he met the convoy which his action had saved. But the battle proved the superiority of the British at sea. The escape of the convoy was, more or less, a fluke, and the grip of superior sea power was confirmed, not weakened, by the event. Our own communications, both with the Mediterranean and America, were better assured after the defeat of Villaret-Joyeuse.

The consequence is clearly seen in the inability of the French to re-equip their fleet. Naval stores from the Baltic could not be obtained. The British also commanded the resources of the Mediterranean. When the French Commander put to sea for a winter cruise early in 1795, he had to take with him ships whose masts and spars had been wounded in the First of June, there being no material to replace them. The cruise cost the French five ships of the line, though they never fell in with the British fleet. Nevertheless, owing to the policy of the Admiralty and of Lord Bridport, who had succeeded Howe in command of the Channel Fleet, which kept the British force in the harbours of the South Coast and left the French unwatched, a detachment was able to slip through to Toulon, which, for the time being, left the British Fleet under Hotham in a position of inferiority. A small action off the Ile Croix, in which Bridport took three French ships and let nine escape him, was the only incident worth noting in the Atlantic during the year 1795.

In the West Indies, meanwhile, islands had been changing and re-changing hands, with the result that, for all essential purposes, the two sides were practically as they were at the beginning of the war, the French retaining


Martinique and Guadeloupe, strategically the most important. The position had greatly changed to the disadvantage of Great Britain, since the United States became independent and were, therefore, no longer subject to her Colonial system. The French islands became not only nests of privateers, as they had always been, but great centres of trade, to which American produce was brought for shipment to France under convoy. The trade, being carried on in a number of small vessels, was not easily stopped. It was not till after Trafalgar, when the main fleets of France no longer kept the sea, that the islands fell into British hands and this source of support for the French was put an end to.

The first act of the great sea drama, however, was played out, for the most part, in the Mediterranean. Great Britain, as usual, was supporting the Land Powers with subsidies and the aid of her fleet wherever difficulties could be raised for the French on or in proximity to blue water. We have seen how she supported the insurrectionary party at Toulon. Hood retired from there to the Salins d'Hyères, where he kept watch on the French fleet, and did his best to harry the enemy's communications with Italy and the Barbary States, whence the South of France was mainly supplied with corn. A base, however, was needed. Gibraltar was too far off, and Port Mahon had been lost in the last war. The disaffection of the Corsicans with French rule offered the opportunity, and the British seized San Fiorenzo, Bastia, and Calvi. Nelson's name first becomes prominent in these operations. So based, the British were in a position to interfere with the communications of the French army in Italy along the Corniche Road, and to influence the small States of Italy, Naples, Genoa, and the rest in favour of Austria and the Alliance. The French were once more aiming at the control of the Middle Danube through Italy, for which purpose they required secure communications by sea. The joint enterprise, however, did not prosper, partly owing to the supineness of the


Austrian generals, and partly to the brilliant campaign of Napoleon, who entered Northern Italy by way of the Alps. Partly, also, it must be owned, owing to the incapacity of Hotham, who detached Nelson to the aid of the Austrians, but with insufficient force. Napoleon compelled the submission of Genoa, Parma, Tuscany, Naples, and the Papal States. It looked as if the Land had won the first round in the contest for mastery with the Sea.

Spain joined the French in 1796, with the result that the British Government ordered the evacuation of Corsica and Elba, which had been seized later, and the British fleet evacuated the Mediterranean, a course imposed on it by the disobedience to orders of Admiral Mann, who, on being driven from before Cadiz by the junction of the Spanish fleet with a French squadron which he was watching in that port, sailed for home instead of joining Sir John Jervis, who was now Commander-in-Chief. The disappearance of the British Flag, however, was not for long, for on the 14th of the following February Jervis won the great victory of St. Vincent. Nelson's share in the triumph is well-known. He there showed for the first time in a fleet action that swift tactical insight in which he excelled all other naval commanders of his own, or perhaps of any other time. His action in leaving the line without orders—the very fault for which Matthews had been condemned—was commented upon by Calder on board the flagship afterwards. "He certainly disobeyed orders," Jervis replied, "and if ever you are guilty of a like disobedience, I will forgive you, too." No one less likely than Calder to sin by too great initiative could possibly be imagined. The battle of St. Vincent showed the worthlessness of the Spanish navy, of which, however, Nelson was fully convinced beforehand. When he heard that the King of Spain had given five fine three-deckers to the French, "Not with their crews, I presume, for that would be the surest way to lose them again," was his pungent comment.

In the next year Nelson was back again in the Medi-



THE BATTLE OF THE NILE, AUGUST 1st, 1798.



THE BOMBARDMENT OF ALGIERS BY LORD EXMOUTH IN 1816.

terranean. Bonaparte was evidently planning some great enterprise, the nature of which was carefully concealed, even from his own people. All the signs pointed to an attempt to invade England or Ireland. But the British Government were not wholly misled, and, when the preparations could no longer be concealed, St. Vincent was ordered to send ten of the line, under the officer whom he should select, to observe and follow the movements of the expedition. He selected Nelson, who had just rejoined his fleet after recovery from the wound by which he lost his arm at the unsuccessful attempt on Vera Cruz. Napoleon seized Malta, and then sailed for Egypt, where he landed with thirty thousand men. The French were already in possession of Corfu, Cerigo, and Cephalonia, which they had acquired at the expense of Venice by the Treaty of Campo Formio. The Porte, for the present, made no attempt to defend its possession of Egypt, fearing the sea power of France, which then seemed predominant in the Mediterranean. Nelson chased to Alexandria, but got there before the French. In a fever of anxiety, he returned to Sicily, but could get no information of their whereabouts. Still convinced in his own mind that their destination was Egypt, he started off again, and discovered the French at anchor in Aboukir Bay. Nelson's fleet now consisted of thirteen ships, twelve of the line, and one of fifty guns, while the French had the same number under Admiral Brueys, with his flag in *L'Orient*. Two of Nelson's ships had, however, been away reconnoitring, thanks to his lack of frigates, and were late in getting into action. A third, the *Culloden*, under Troubridge, ran aground. The attack, therefore, opened with ten ships against the thirteen of the enemy. The French, however, were at anchor, and so badly were they placed that they were open to attack on both sides at once. Nelson observed that they lay at a single anchor, and his acute mind at once seized upon the opportunity offered. "Where there is room for a Frenchman to swing," he exclaimed, "there is room for an

Englishman to anchor," and he ordered, or allowed, Foley, in the *Goliath*, to lead into action on the inshore side. The British, in turn, anchored by the stern opposite the French van, and, having disposed of their immediate opponents, passed on to the centre and rear. The action raged furiously all night, the damage done being great on both sides, but far greater on that of the French. Towards midnight the flagship, *L'Orient*, blew up with a fearful explosion, the awe of which caused a suspension of the firing for nearly ten minutes. In the end, the French fleet was destroyed more thoroughly than any fleet in history has been before or since, with the single exception of the Russian at Tsu-shima. Two ships only, *Généreux* and *Guillaume Tell*, escaped, and both were captured in the following year.

The sea communications of Napoleon's army were thus destroyed. Napoleon himself met the disaster with characteristic spirit. "Seas which we do not command," he said, "separate us from home; but no seas divide us from Africa and Asia. We will found here an Empire." Events proved him wrong. Sea power commanded the only practicable route to Asia. The Porte, encouraged by the destruction of the French fleet, determined upon resistance. Following the old historic road of invasion, Napoleon reached Acre. There the British met him once more, in the shape of the seamen from Sir Sidney Smith's squadron. He could not take the place, with sea power at its back. Slaughtering his prisoners and poisoning his own wounded, he fell back to Egypt. Next year, in a daring manner, he made his escape to France. But the misfortunes of the army he left behind him were not at an end. A British expedition under Sir Ralph Abercrombie landed at Aboukir, defeated the French under General Menou, and forced a capitulation, under the terms of which the French army was allowed to re-embark for France. Malta was blockaded and fell on Sept. 5th, 1800.

Sea power had won the second round handsomely.

A French writer, Jurien, de la Gravière, says of the Battle of the Nile, "Our navy never recovered from this terrible blow to its consideration and its power. This was the combat which for two years delivered the Mediterranean to the English, and called thither the squadrons of Russia; which shut up our army in the midst of a rebellious population, and decided the Porte to declare against us; which put India out of the reach of our enterprise, and brought France within a hair's breadth of her ruin; for it rekindled the scarcely extinct war with Austria, and brought Suvarof and the Austro-Russians to our very frontiers." The trade of Britain advanced by leaps and bounds. The total of exports and imports, which had been £44,500,000 in 1792, rose to £73,000,000 in 1800. Such a result of seven years of war might well be described by Pitt as "a spectacle at once paradoxical, inexplicable, and astonishing." By her command of the sea, Great Britain centred the trade, finance and industry of the world upon her own shores. The seas were free to her alone, and to such neutrals as she chose to extend the freedom. The wealth of the tropical world and the great granaries from which the nations drew their supplies were hers also.

The military genius of Napoleon and the selfishness and short-sightedness of the monarchs of Central and Eastern Europe were, however, to postpone the golden dreams of a victorious peace for many years yet. The great captain, returned from Egypt, restored the affairs of France in the campaign of Marengo. The Northern States became restive under the British restrictions on trade. Prussia, as usual, pursued a selfish, treacherous, though short-sighted, policy. The half-mad Tsar, Paul, incensed by what he considered to be the faithlessness of Austria, listened to the machinations of Napoleon. The consequence was that Austria was forced to accept the disastrous Treaty of Lunéville, and that a fresh armed neutrality was formed in Northern Europe, by means of which Napoleon hoped to dispute once more the command of the sea with the help

of the united navies of Russia, Denmark and Sweden. Nelson was once more the stumbling-block in his path. There are few incidents in the history of their country on which the British people look back with more sincere regret than the Battle of Copenhagen. But regret springs solely from the sentiments of friendship and admiration they feel for the gallant Danes and from no doubts as to the justice or expediency of the course taken by the British Government. If Europe was to be saved from the threatened dominion of Napoleon, the smaller maritime States had to be taken out of his hand. However justified intrinsically the complaints of the Danes might have been, the greater issues at stake demanded that they should be laid on one side, forcibly if need be.

Copenhagen was considered by Nelson to be the greatest feat of his life, and, if we regard not only the skill and boldness of the attack, but also the generous and adroit diplomacy with which he won peace out of strife, there is little reason to dispute his conclusion. The incidents of the battle are so well known that they need no re-telling. The Danes, to this day, claim that they repulsed the attack, and we may be content to leave it at that, for we grudge such brave foemen nothing which may cause their honour to shine more brightly. The glory of the furious onslaught on ships and batteries is sufficient for our arms. Moreover, the result of the battle, and of the ensuing death of Tsar Paul, was to break up the northern coalition. Our object was attained. The danger passed away. If the Continent lay at Napoleon's feet, and seemed destined to be the appanage of the Imperial Crown he was now about to assume, the dominion of the seas and the tribute of the world beyond was now confirmed to Great Britain. So affairs stood when the short and troubled Peace of Amiens closed for a period the doors of the Temple of Janus.

That short peace was broken on May 16th, 1801, when Great Britain declared war in consequence of the

dispute about Malta. At once began that "sustained watch," of which Mahan speaks in his most famous passage. On the 17th, Cornwallis left Plymouth with ten sail of the line to resume the watch over Brest; on the 18th, Nelson hoisted his flag in the *Victory*, and sailed to take command of the Mediterranean Fleet.

Napoleon came to the water's edge wherever it was possible to him. He occupied Hanover, and also Cuxhaven on the Elbe. Great Britain replied by blockading the mouths of that river. If the ports of the Continent, so far as the First Consul controlled them, were closed to British trade, Great Britain replied by re-imposing in its most rigorous form the Order of 1756. As yet no one could foresee the end. The Continent remained at peace. Napoleon himself believed Great Britain to be incapable of waging war single-handed against him. Although the outbreak of war had come sooner than he desired, and before he had had time to rehabilitate his navy, yet the golden opportunity presented itself to crush his most relentless enemy. Audacious schemes formed themselves in his brain; yet not more audacious than the invasion of Egypt. Could he command the Channel for twenty-four hours, the hundred and thirty thousand men he had assembled at Boulogne, Ambleteuse, Wimereux and Étaples and trained with the minutest care might embark in their thousand flat-bottomed boats—and then, *Plus d'Angleterre!* To bring about the desired state of affairs, he made elaborate preparations for a renewed expedition to the East. Latouche Tréville, at that time in command of the Toulon fleet, was to feint to the eastward and then slip out through the Straits. Ganteaume, with twenty ships and five and twenty thousand troops, was to prepare ostentatiously for an attempt on Ireland, in order to keep Cornwallis close up to Brest. The Rochefort squadron was to join Latouche Tréville off Cadiz, and the combined fleet of sixteen of the line was to bear up for the Channel. This plan was afterwards modified, owing to the death of Latouche Tréville and the

succession of Villeneuve, whom Napoleon, with reason, distrusted, to the command.

British seamen never had a fear that the plan would succeed, whatever apprehensions may have been excited among the populace ashore. "As to the possibility of the enemy being able to pass through our blockading and protecting squadron, with all the secrecy and dexterity, and by those hidden means which some worthy people expect," said Pellew, afterwards Lord Exmouth, "I really, from anything I have seen in the course of my professional experience, am not much disposed to concur in it." The squadrons of Britain took the old central position, watching closely every port where the enemy had a detachment of his force: Brest, Rochefort and Toulon at first, and, when Spain joined France in 1804, Ferrol and Cadiz as well. Should any of the French get to sea, then the squadron watching the port from which they emerged fell back on the next on the way to Brest, or, if necessary, on the squadron watching Brest itself. Thus, whatever concentration Napoleon might achieve, his fleets must always be confronted with an equal concentration of the British. Moreover, there was kept a fleet in the North Sea, watching the Dutch and the Flemish ports, a squadron under Lord Keith in the Downs, and a reserve of five ships, fully manned, at Spithead. Blow east, blow west, a British fleet could get at the enemy and delay his plans until the larger detachments could arrive. The hardships and trials of the two years' watch, keeping the sea in all weathers, in accordance with the ideas of tough old St. Vincent, were enormous. "Admirals need not be made of iron," said Collingwood. But the fleets of Britain were never more perfectly manned than by the toughened and experienced seamen of this time. The French, for the most part confined to port, steadily deteriorated. Moreover, while both fleets were inactive, so far as fighting was concerned, all the advantages of command of the sea flowed to Britain. If the French battle fleets could not get out without fighting,

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neither could traders get in. France was cut off from the world across the seas. Even her coasters enjoyed no immunity. The world was behind Britain.

So complete was the confidence of the British Government in their command of the sea that they did not hesitate to send a military expedition to the Mediterranean behind the watching squadrons, to join the Russians in an attempt to drive the French from Southern Italy. It has even been asserted that this expedition, rather than the threat of invasion, prompted the elaborate strategical distribution of their squadrons. It was certainly an essential part of the gigantic European combination which Pitt designed and supported with money. Its departure almost coincided with Villeneuve's evasion of Nelson and voyage to the West Indies; its safe arrival in Sicily even more closely coincided with his return, and with the abandonment of Napoleon's plan of invasion in favour of an attack on Austria. Sea power in this way made itself felt on Continental politics, and a small body of British troops, disposed in the right place through its agency, once more exercised an influence altogether out of proportion to their numbers.

The culminating point of the great battle of wits was reached early in 1805, when Napoleon ordered Missiessy, with five sail of the line from Rochefort, and Villeneuve, with ten from Toulon, to rendezvous in the West Indies, in the hope of drawing after them such a British force that Ganteaume might break the blockade off Brest. Missiessy duly got away, followed by Cochrane and six of the line. But Villeneuve failed owing to boisterous weather, after having thrown Nelson, whose mind was obsessed with the vision of a renewed attack on Egypt, off the scent. The Emperor then modified his plan, and, in March, ordered a concentration of the fleets of Ganteaume, Villeneuve and Missiessy at Martinique. Ganteaume failed to get out, but Villeneuve sailed in the following month, just as Missiessy, having waited in vain, started homewards. Nelson, at first

deceived once more, got positive news that Villeneuve had passed the Straits of Gibraltar, and at once made preparation to fall back on Cornwallis, in pursuance of the general plan of campaign. But, receiving authoritative news that his enemy had been seen heading across the Atlantic, he immediately set out in pursuit, though the latter had thirty days' start of him. After a fruitless search among the islands, he learned that his opponent had sailed for Europe on June 9th. On receiving this news three days later, he at once sent off Captain Bettesworth in the brig *Curieux* to convey tidings to England, ordering him to keep a certain course which his instinct told him would bring him within sight of Villeneuve. He himself set out for the Straits on June 13th, and he actually arrived in European waters before the French squadron.

Bettesworth reached Plymouth on July 7th, and, by the 11th, the orders issued by Lord Barham, the wonderful veteran of eighty who was now First Lord of the Admiralty, had reached Cornwallis. The blockade of Rochefort was raised, and the five ships composing the squadron were sent to join Calder off Ferrol. The latter, now with fifteen ships under his command, was ordered to cruise one hundred miles west of Finisterre to intercept Villeneuve. The fleets met on the afternoon of July 22nd, and Calder captured two Spanish ships of the line, but did not press home his advantage, for which fault he was tried by court-martial, and sentenced to be severely reprimanded for the same fault as that for which Byng was shot. But the court-martial did not take place until Trafalgar had relieved the country from all anxiety. The check received, and the evidence that the British were ready for any emergency, were, however, sufficient to cause Villeneuve, never very firm of purpose, to abandon the intention of joining Ganteaume, and to drive him into Ferrol. He oscillated between that port and Cadiz, until Napoleon's angry order, and the news that Rosily was on his way to supersede him, drove him out to meet disaster on October 21st at Trafalgar.

Napoleon recognised that the game was up, and issued the orders which led to Ulm and Austerlitz.

The story of Trafalgar, so often told, need not be repeated here. Victory and a glorious death were the rewards which God gave to Nelson for a life devoted to duty and the service of his country. Had he not fought and fallen, the chaplet of immortal fame with which he is crowned in the eyes of his countrymen might never have been his. The human frailty which does but throw his glory into brighter relief might, when the stimulus of action had gone, have prevailed to bring his life to a sordid close. He passed from life to become the pattern and inspiration of every British boy who has in his veins the sea spirit by which Britain lives. The cockpit of the *Victory* became the holiest shrine of our race. But, great as were, materially and spiritually, the fruits of Trafalgar, every serious student of naval history now realises that the Great Deliverance was wrought before the guns spoke. And the fame of Nelson should not be allowed to eclipse, though it rightly overshadows, the merit of others who shared that weary and tenacious watch from 1803 to 1805. Cornwallis, Collingwood, Cochrane, Calder and Pellew all deserve their share, nor must the skill and energy with which Lord Barham met the crisis be left out of the account. Blunders there were inevitably, and an occasional failure, as in Calder's case, to make the most of opportunity. But the Trafalgar campaign, to include the whole period in that convenient description, shows that the whole Navy was permeated by a correct understanding of strategical conditions. The seamen never lost their grip of the essential point that the main force of the enemy was their true objective, and that, whatever combinations he might make, it was their business to meet him with superior force at the decisive point. All the dispositions of the Admiralty and the Admirals were directed towards that end, and, though, counting by numbers, the end was not attained, numbers were by no means all that mattered. Napoleon

himself did not regard the French as equal to the British, ship for ship, and his admirals showed again and again that they were of his opinion. The Spanish were greatly inferior to the French: so greatly that the Emperor, in making his calculations, invariably reckoned two Spaniards as one French.

The oft-quoted "Nelson touch" had for its purpose no more than the common aim of all commanders to isolate a portion of the enemy's fleet so that it could be dealt with before the rest could come to its assistance. This result was generally achieved by manœuvring for the weather gage, which, if secured, gave choice of the point of attack. But so much time was frequently lost in these manœuvres that the longest day did not suffice for a decisive action. Where Nelson improved upon the tactics of his predecessors was in making his order of sailing his order of battle. The equinox was well past; light airs prevailed. If he had first waited to form the line when he sighted the enemy at day-break, Trafalgar might have proved one of the ordinary indecisive battles. But Nelson had it firmly in his mind that what his country required was not an ordinary battle, with four or five of the enemy taken, but the complete annihilation of the combined fleet as a fighting force. It was therefore his plan to go down to the enemy in the ordinary cruising formation of double column of line-ahead, to break their formation in two places, to leave Collingwood to deal with their rear, thus isolated, while he held his own division free to manœuvre against any attempt of the van to come to its assistance. The plan involved the exposure of the leading ships of his columns to a concentrated fire without support—a fire to which, being head-on to the enemy, they could not effectively reply for a long time. Collingwood's flagship, the *Royal Sovereign*, was, indeed, for half an hour under the fire of five ships before her next astern got into action. She was, however, greatly ahead of station, having been freshly coppered, and therefore able to outsail her consorts. The

plan was audacious to the point of rashness. But Nelson knew the enemy he was fighting. He knew the inefficiency of the Spanish contingent, and he took the risk in order to obtain a more complete victory. In the result, twenty-two of the enemy were taken or destroyed out of thirty-three, and all but two of the remainder surrendered in Cadiz harbour three years later. The annihilation which Nelson sought was gained.

It is worth noting, perhaps, that Nelson reserved for himself at Trafalgar, on a larger scale, the part which he had played in the first fleet action in which he took part, that of St. Vincent. As he then flung himself across the path of the Spanish weather division in order to prevent it bearing down to the relief of the detached lee division, so at Trafalgar he purposed to engage the allied van to prevent it coming to the assistance of the threatened rear. To do this, he had to break through the enemy's centre, cutting off four ships between himself and Collingwood as he did so. The accident of the *Redoubtable* getting across his bows as he went through prevented the completion of the movement and brought about his death. But his purpose was achieved by the other ships of his division. The effect of his death on his fleet is quaintly told by a bluejacket of the *Royal Sovereign*, who wrote to his father after the action :—

"Our dear Admiral Nelson is killed, so we have paid pretty sharply for licking 'em. I never set eyes on him, for which I am both glad and sorry ; for, to be sure, I should have liked to have seen him—but then all the men in our ship who have seen him are such soft toads, they have done nothing but blast their eyes and cry ever since he was killed. God bless you ! Chaps that fought like the devil sit down and cry like a wench."

What manner of man must he have been whose death so affected the rough tarpaulins of 1805 ?

So ended the second act of the great drama of sea power. How much had been accomplished towards the

final victory, not even Ministers themselves in Britain realised. The land campaign had already opened disastrously for the Austrians. Mack with twenty thousand men surrendered at Ulm on the day before Trafalgar was fought. The Austrians and Russians were overthrown at Austerlitz on December 5th following. The news, it is said, killed Pitt. But Austerlitz was, none the less, the first-fruits of Trafalgar. France, her trade cut off, was in dire misery, which could only be relieved by victories on the Continent and the spoils of conquered nations. Napoleon was to know no respite during which he might consolidate his power. The European nations, besides the plentiful financial help which victorious and wealthy Britain could, and did, afford them with lavish hand, always found a fulcrum of resistance to the universal tyrant in her might upon the element where his genius for war could not rule. If the land was to conquer the sea, land and sea-forces must touch at some point. Since Napoleon could make no effective effort on the sea itself, that point must be on the coast—in the ports. Hence he was compelled to dissipate his strength in excentric efforts. He endeavoured to exclude British trade from the Continent by the decrees of Berlin and Milan. Yet British goods poured into the ports of Northern Europe, and Great Britain, retaliating with the Orders in Council, took toll of everything which went to feed and clothe the people of France, and the very armies of Napoleon himself. He tried to revive the project of 1801, and to combine the navies of the smaller Powers with the remnants of his own and that of Spain. Great Britain seized the Danish fleet in 1807. Portugal resisted the peremptory demands made upon her, both to lend the use of her fleet and to prohibit British trade. Napoleon sent Junot with an army corps to bring pressure upon her, and this was the first irritation which set up the "Spanish ulcer."

To grapple with the resistance of the little State, the staunch and age-long Ally of Great Britain, it was neces-

sary to Napoleon to have secure communications. These could not be had by sea, but only through Spain. If he could not control the sea, he was determined to control the coasts, which, apparently, he thought amounted to the same thing. He occupied Madrid, and, taking advantage of a quarrel between the King of Spain and his eldest son, he set his brother Joseph on the throne. The Portuguese Court fled to Brazil. But the British were now, since the danger of invasion had passed away, prepared to play a stronger part in the land campaign. An expedition was sent to Lisbon, under Sir Arthur Wellesley, which defeated Junot's army at Vimiero. Just previously, the Spanish *guerilleros* had compelled the surrender of a French army corps at Baylen, and, in the upshot, the whole French army in Portugal was forced to capitulate, and was sent back to France in British transports under the Convention of Cintra.

It was the worst blow the Emperor had ever suffered. The Power of the Sea had foiled him once more. The arm of Great Britain was stretched out to aid the Spanish irregulars in fighting against his despotism when none other but she could aid. The ally which had been subservient to him when under the Bourbon dynasty was now in revolt against his own brother. Sea power was once more exercised on behalf of liberty. Napoleon readily appreciated what this uprising of a minor State against his authority might mean. He recalled his first-line army from Germany, took command of it himself, re-occupied Madrid, and crushed the Spanish rising almost completely for the time. Then Sir John Moore, with some twenty thousand British troops, made an audacious movement against his communications with France. The Emperor's plans were entirely dislocated, and he himself, never caring to be associated with failure, returned to Paris under the plea of the threatening condition of affairs in mid-Europe. Soult marched against Moore, and cut him off from Lisbon, which was easy for him to do. But he could not cut him off from the sea.

Moore retreated northwards to Corunna, where, in a battle fought to cover the embarkation of his army, he lost his life. But the army escaped to fight again. The mighty Emperor's power ended at high-water mark.

Corunna was fought on January 9th, 1809. It was the year of Eckmuhl, Essling and Wagram. In less than twelve months more, Napoleon was to humiliate the proud Hapsburg by taking his daughter to his bed. But Essling was the most definite defeat he had yet experienced, Wagram was a pyrrhic victory, and the troops employed in the campaign were less the veterans of France than the levies of Saxony, Bavaria and Poland. The legions of Austerlitz, Jena and Friedland were, for the most part, in Spain, where they were exhausting their energies against the Spanish *guerilleros*, supported by thirty thousand elusive Britons. Nor was this all, or, perhaps, the worst. The national spirit was rising all over Europe, stimulated by the example of Spain. Schill, in North Germany, and Andreas Hofer, in the Tyrol, were in arms against the would-be tyrant of the world. North and south he was forced to excentric movement; wherever the resistance to him touched the sea it was sure of support from the ships of Britain. It is interesting to note that Heligoland came into our hands in 1807 as a depot whence trade with the Elbe could be carried on in defiance of Napoleon's Berlin Decree.

Napoleon's career had now certainly passed its high-water mark, whatever date may be properly assigned to that epoch. Perhaps he reached the pinnacle of his fame on the raft at Tilsit, where the young and impulsive Tsar, Alexander I, vowed friendship to him and Frederick William of Prussia was his dog? Austerlitz, Jena and Friedland lay immediately behind him—but so did Trafalgar. No, Tilsit was not his real zenith. It was the first glory of the after-glow. The sun of Austerlitz had set before its rising. He had the Continent at his feet before the Peace of Amiens. A just and equitable use of his military triumph could then have established the peace of Europe upon a firm founda-

tion. Peace at home might have set him upon the throne of an unexhausted and contented realm. But while the sea power remained unsubdued to his arms, peace was to him but gall and wormwood. His dreams of empire were unfulfilled. "*Capax imperii, nisi imperasset*" is more true of Napoleon than of the Cæsar against whom the crushing irony was first launched. To many that verdict may seem a paradox. But it is just.

Great Britain was now committed to Continental war with an army inadequate in numbers, but of tougher material than any other army in the field, a general of capacity only second to that of Napoleon himself, officers who were then to prove, for the first time in Europe, their power of training and leading brave men of another race, and the sea, her own undisputed highway, at the back of all her effort. Napoleon learned, as Philip II and Philip V had learned, each in turn, that Lisbon was nearer to London than to Madrid. Heavy as was the blow struck by Nelson at Trafalgar, there could be no greater mistake than to suppose that the navy of France was absolutely destroyed. The greatest of her fleets, that of Ganteaume in Brest, remained untouched. British seamen were still compelled, all through the ensuing years, to spend themselves in maintaining a sleepless watch on French ports. Actions between single ships, and even small squadrons, were frequent. Yet all this time communications were maintained between the Mother Country and the Peninsular army, a thousand miles distant along a line which passed by each of the enemy's chief military ports in turn. The safe withdrawal of Sir John Moore's army from Corunna was the first instance of the advantage conferred on a small land force by the adroit use of sea power. The years following show to those who have eyes to see that on the same basis the whole of Wellington's success in the Peninsula was built. His impregnable fortress of Torres Vedras was flanked by the sea and supplied from the sea. The French army, with

its communications stretched over the element its master was supposed to command, starved. Wellington's army lacked for nothing save that which the ineptitude of the authorities at home failed to supply. He advanced or he retreated, according to the effort which the Emperor was able, or was compelled, to put forth to check him. But whether he advanced or retreated, his army was always secure against disaster, and the drain of the "Spanish ulcer" upon his opponent's resources became greater and greater. At last, when the hour of final victory struck and he was able to move forward from the field of Vittoria to the Pyrenees, he let go his hold on Lisbon, shortened his line of communications by establishing his base at San Sebastian, and moved his small army forward to Toulouse and Bordeaux. It took six hundred thousand continental soldiers to wrest victory from Napoleon in the "Battle of the Nations" at Leipsic. Even that mighty effort might have been unsuccessful but for the handful with which Wellington was supporting the resistance of the Spanish nation and forcing his way up to southern France.

Sea power triumphant exerted its influence from the Vistula to the Douro; from the Elbe to the Bosphorus. Alexander I, sated with the acquisition of Finland, and exasperated by the rigours of the Continental system, became, first a lukewarm friend, and then, in 1812, an open foe. The elaborate plan of Napoleon to keep Turkey as "a mask" to cover his right flank failed, owing to the predominance of British influence in Constantinople. This influence predominated, partly owing to the impression made by Sir Sidney Smith's assistance in the defence of Acre, and partly owing to that made by Duckworth's passage of the Dardanelles in 1807. The huge disaster of the Russian campaign completed what the "Spanish ulcer" had begun, and it was the march of Tchitschakoff, released from the Turkish campaign, on Minsk which turned the retreat of the Grand Army into a *débâcle*. Germany rose in arms from end to end. The position of Marie Louise

as Empress was insufficient deterrent to keep Austria from joining the new coalition. The defection of the Bavarians at Lobau completed the desertion of the falling Emperor by his vassals and allies. He became for the first time the prisoner of Great Britain, and was sent to rule the island of Elba, guarded by the force which alone he had failed to overcome. After the Hundred Days, he returned to that captivity from which he was to escape no more :—

How far is St. Helena from the Capes of Trafalgar?

A longish way—a longish way—with ten year more to run.

It's South across the water underneath a setting star.

(What you cannot finish you must leave undone !)

There we may leave Napoleon. Sea power, resolutely and unflinchingly used, had fulfilled its task, though not without much harm being wrought to the nation which wielded it. For all her command of the sea, Great Britain was at one period brought to scarcity by the operation of the Continental system, and that although she was still to a great extent self-supporting, so far as the necessities of life were concerned. Worst of all, the methods she was compelled to adopt led to war with the great offshoot of her race across the Atlantic, and kept the sore created by the War of Independence open for many years. It is, perhaps, only within the last few happy months that Great Britain and the United States have at last been able to realise their common destiny in the service of the liberty of mankind. It is difficult for an Englishman to find justification for the action of the American Government in making a *casus belli* of commercial grievances at a time when every nerve was strained to grapple with the enemy of all liberty. But the dead may now bury its dead. It is a common belief that the British Navy showed some deterioration from the standard of Trafalgar days when the issue was joined with the Americans. There is some truth, but not much, in the belief. Between 1805 and 1812, there was much weary watch-

ing and but little fighting. Seamanship was more studied because, for the moment, more important than gunnery. If the enemy was met at all he was an enemy vastly deteriorated in efficiency. But the loss of frigates to the well-found and highly trained American ships really proves very little. The British Navy was still undergoing a most anxious time in European waters, with the communications of Wellington's army in its charge, and the great blockade to maintain. The ships and captains who could be spared were, for the most part, not among the best in the service. Losses were, in such circumstances, inevitable. But, despite the showy successes gained by the American frigates, the United States were strangled by the sea power of Britain, which upheld all the objects for which she fought. British statesmen had no desire to push matters with the United States to extremities, and an easy peace was concluded at Ghent.

The attempt to make the land conquer the sea failed utterly, even in the strong hands of Napoleon. It has never yet succeeded in history, and it is permissible to believe that it never will. Great Britain emerged from the struggle with her great Imperial future before her. How she used her opportunity it will be the purpose of the next chapter to outline.

CHAPTER X

THE RESTORER OF PATHS

THE Peace of 1815 left Great Britain with the following places in her hands, besides those she possessed before:—In Europe, Malta, the Ionian Islands and Heligoland; in Asia, Mauritius and Ceylon; in Africa, the Cape of Good Hope; and in the New World, the islands of Trinidad, Tobago and Santa Lucia, with the old Dutch colony of Demerara. She had, moreover, definitely made good her claim to Australia and had begun to settle it; she had "blazed the trail" across the North American Continent to Vancouver. Her territorial gains, therefore, were not small, and were even more important by reason of their position than of their extent. Almost absent-mindedly (though the statement is a rash one, in view of the highly developed sea-sense of which the statesmanship of Britain had given evidence), the British came to possess those "gates of the world," which were to acquire such great consequence in the coming age of steam. For the sake of clearness, the enumeration of the naval positions acquired between the close of the war against Napoleon and that against William II will be here continued.

New Zealand, which had been incorporated in the State of New South Wales in the early nineteenth century, was formally annexed to the British Crown by the Treaty of Waingari in 1840. The island of Singapore was acquired by purchase from the Sultan of Johore in 1824, and this was followed, little by little, by the development of the

Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay States. In 1839, a dispute with the Arab Sultan of Aden, who had taken prisoner and maltreated some British sailors, resulted in the annexation of that renowned "cinder heap," one of the most powerful naval fortresses in the world. Two years later, as the result of the first Chinese War, we took and held Hong Kong. The Mediterranean position of the Empire was strengthened by the occupation of Cyprus in 1878 and of Egypt in 1882. Towards the end of the century, the Soudan was recovered from barbarism, giving us the port of Suakim on the Red Sea, and large acquisitions were made in East Africa. In South Africa, Natal was made a British possession in 1843, while the enclave of Walfisch Bay was secured in 1878. To continue the list would be tedious. The development of submarine telegraphy, in which we naturally led the world, necessitated the acquisition of islands in every sea: places in themselves of little account, such as Easter Island. Strategical value, or the fear that they might pass into the hands of rivals, compelled us to "peg out a claim" to other places of actual or potential strength, such as Perim, Socotra, Wei-hai-wei and Koweit, on the Persian Gulf. Thus we have acquired "the gates of the world," with the single exception of Constantinople, the eventual possession of which is at present in doubt. We have given the Ionian Islands to Greece, and Heligoland to Germany, graceful concessions for which it seems unlikely that we shall receive any mundane reward.

With Gibraltar and Egypt in our hands, reinforced by Malta as a central pivot, we control the passage of the Mediterranean. Aden and Perim lock the door of the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, from the south and north respectively; Singapore controls the Straits of Malacca and the road to the Far East. The Cape of Good Hope is the "nodal point" on the long-sea route both to India and to Australasia. The Falkland Islands watch the passage round the Horn, while Jamaica is as well placed as Cuba

for controlling the exit of the Panama Canal. Finally, in the Straits of Dover we hold the key to the Channel, and from Scapa Flow, control the passage "north-about." The British Islands lie like a breakwater off the mainland of Central Europe. The hard facts of geography, and not British jealousy or ill-will, forbid the development of an oversea Empire of Germany, unless Great Britain can first be subdued. If the Germans cherished such ambitions, war was, from the first, inevitable. We could not clear ourselves out of the way, even if we would.

Strictly speaking, of course, a fortress or a naval station no more "controls" a sea-route than the stations on the Tube "go" east or west, as the placards quaintly announce. It is the fleet based on such places, or drawing its supplies from them, which controls the route; the fleet or the ships which at once guard the station and are sheltered or succoured by it. If such bases are to be adequate to their purpose, however, they must be sufficiently strong, in a military sense, to defend themselves against attack in the absence of the fleet on its lawful occasions; otherwise the fleet becomes a mere defence of the fortress and suffers all the disabilities of an army in having to guard its own lines of communications. Apart from the great military stations like Gibraltar, Aden, Simon's Bay, Colombo, Singapore and Hong Kong—and sometimes combined with them—we have acquired an unsurpassed chain of coaling stations and commercial ports all over the world, so that the world's traffic, with the exception of that of the United States and South American ports, mainly passes over routes in which all the stations are British. Hence it follows that the things requisite for ocean travel—coal, supplies, repairing yards and so forth—are mostly to be found in British ports. We have the largest mercantile marine as well as the strongest war-navy in the world, and, as we now know, in the age of steam as in the age of sail, our mercantile strength in time of peace has given our Navy strength in time of war.* This has been

largely due to the wise policy which has thrown open our ports to all and sundry to trade in and to use, for thereby other nations have been relieved of the necessity of developing resources of their own overseas, and the time of crisis found all the important links in the chain of communications in our hands.

In 1815, we were at the parting of the ways. We had emerged from a great struggle more powerful than any nation upon earth—more powerful, that is, in the wider politics of the world. It would have been an evil thing for humanity in general, and not least for ourselves if, having a giant's strength, we had used it as a giant. A Briton is entitled to say, without cant or hypocrisy, and with full acknowledgment of the blunders, failings and sins of this nation and its rulers, that, on the whole, this power has been used for the benefit of mankind, and in a large and unselfish spirit. A historian says of Britain in the years immediately following the downfall of Napoleon:—

“Never before had the whole moral of the nation been so modified in so short a space of time. . . . Nine years spent in waging a war of opinions and ideas, and twelve years more spent in fighting for existence and empire, had made Great Britain wary, resolute and far-sighted as she had never been before. . . . Faction had died down in a way which would have seemed incredible to an eighteenth century politician. . . . The improvement in politics was only a symptom of the general moral improvement of the nation. The war had sobered Britain. . . . If it taught the nation that civic virtue and conscientious will to work must be demanded from the leaders, it also required a better general level of life and duty from every man. This was strengthened by a strong religious revival. . . . For the first time since the old Parliamentary wars, men armed with a crusading spirit against a spiritual enemy, and the cry ‘For God and the King’ had a real meaning.”

The words might have been written of this our day, when the old spirit has so miraculously revived, showing

that, after a hundred years of ease and prosperity unknown before, the nation has bred true to type : as prone as ever to resist "spiritual wickedness in high places." Sea power is a force potent to promote right, if it be rightly used. After 1815 it was in our hands without a question. Was it rightly used? Has it contributed to the spread of freedom in the world and to the general good of mankind? There is abundant evidence that it has, and the best is the fact that despite the spread of commercialism, with its inherent selfishness, our old national ideals rang true as in the eighteenth century when they were challenged.

Let us put the matter to the test. Europe had exhausted itself in a war of ideas which had become a war of ambitions. Outside, the world was still full of violence and cruel habitations. The European, confident of superiority, and impelled by greed, used all other races as pawns in his game, or counters in his mart. No law ran on the sea but the law of the strongest. One of the clauses in the Treaty of Utrecht, the most profitable, in a material sense, and the most shameful in a moral, was the famous Assiento, which transferred to Great Britain the monopoly of the slave trade between Africa and the New World. The British people first showed their moral title to the sovereignty of the seas by the almost instantaneous revolt of the national conscience against the advantages so gained. Not that the profits were immediately forgone. Far from it. But, as early as 1772, Lord Mansfield gave a judgment in the case of the negro, Somerset, which practically decided that no man could be a slave on the soil of Great Britain herself. It was not, however, till 1807 that the slave trade was made illegal, thanks to the work of Clarkson, the elder Wilberforce and Zachary Macaulay. The British people, moreover, were not content with abolishing it, so far as regarded their own ships and possessions. The whole force of the British Navy was used to put it down, after the consent of other European Powers had been obtained to the declaration of illegality. Finally, slavery itself was

abolished in all British possessions. Up to quite recently we expended thousands of pounds and many lives in suppressing the traffic in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, at not a little risk to our political position there, in the face of German rivalry.

To cleanse the sea of piracy was a task which went hand in hand with the extirpation of the slaver. Piracy still abounded, not only in the distant seas, but in the Mediterranean, when Napoleon fell. There is nothing stranger in Nelson's career than his relations with the piratical States of Barbary, with the Bey of Tunis and the Dey of Algiers, with whom he treated almost on the footing of an equal, cajoling and coercing them to refrain from giving aid and comfort to the French. After 1815, the hour speedily struck which brought about the end of these nefarious monuments of Turkish misgovernment and weakness. In 1816, Great Britain demanded reparation from the Barbary States for injuries wrought on British subjects. All Christian slaves were to be given up, and guarantees given that no more would be taken. Tunis and Tripoli, conscious of weakness, yielded at once. But the Dey of Algiers was recalcitrant. The place was immensely strong, and the British Government were aghast when stout old Lord Exmouth, Pellew of the blockade of Cadiz, undertook to reduce it with five sail of the line. He was joined by some Dutch frigates, and sailed into the harbour on October 20th. The Dey returned no answer to his demand for restitution, and next day—the anniversary of Trafalgar—he opened fire. The action was a bloody one, costing considerable loss to the British; but the fortifications were shattered, the fleet destroyed, and the Dey conceded all Exmouth's terms. That Great Britain had no rapacious design is shown by the fact that the place was left in the hands of the native ruler, and so continued until the French took it in 1830.

Thirty years later, the British undertook the same work on behalf of humanity in the Eastern seas. An

Englishman, James Brooke, had become the Rajah of the State of Sarawak, in North-West Borneo. The seas around the coast were infested with Malay and Dyak pirates. Brooke was not strong enough by himself to subdue them, so Sir Harry Keppel was sent with the *Dido* and *Meander* to his assistance. The pirates of the Saribus and Sekaran, who were sea Dyaks led by Malays, and the Sooloo and Lanun Malays, made a stout resistance, but were overpowered. Piracy was wiped out in those seas as an institution, though it persisted sporadically among the Chinese for many years longer, and even still shows itself from time to time. The examples given are merely instances of the work the British Navy did to make the seas safe for traders of all nations, as a matter of course, simply because we were the first Sea Power and acknowledged the obligation which lay upon us. Of necessity, we served our own ends first. But we shared the advantage gained with every nation whose flag appeared at sea. •

Contrast the state of affairs which has prevailed at sea since 1815 with that which prevailed during all the preceding centuries. The sea was the possession of none; therefore no man gave the law. Private war was freely levied; trade was carried on only with the high hand, in the teeth of the attempts of one country or another to maintain a monopoly. Colonies were always regarded as the strict preserve of their Mother Country, and organised smuggling led to constant encounters between the smugglers and the preventive forces of the nation whose rights were assailed. There was always war on the seas, and the greater number of merchantmen either sailed armed or under convoy. Great Britain arose as the Restorer of the Path. Only a Power dominant as she had become could have done the work which she did. Only a Power imbued with big ideals would have used the power as she used it. The Freedom of the Seas, before the days of Great Britain's control, meant the freedom of the malefactor.

To use the term Free Trade is, unfortunately, to

raise visions of political controversy. But, in its essence, Free Trade means much more than the imposition of customs duties of a greater or less amount on imported goods. That is a matter of expediency. It is a policy which may be followed by one generation and revoked by the next without in the least disturbing the principle. Customs duties on cargoes may differentiate between the goods of one country and another, or between different kinds of goods. But while the ships of all countries are free to use the ports of all countries on equal terms, there is, in essence, free trade. That was the principle established by Great Britain, the owner of far the largest mercantile marine in the world. On it the maritime prosperity of the smaller countries such as Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Greece, is founded. By virtue of it, even more than by the retention of her East Indian possessions, some remnant of the maritime greatness of Holland remains. Indirectly, we have taxed ourselves to afford naval protection under which these countries have flourished and grown rich. This is not altruism. The policy suited us, and it remains, as ever, our interest to see that the border-States of Europe remain free and prosperous. But, after 1815, we threw over completely every principle on which the mercantile system was founded, and substituted for it a freedom which made the sea the true highway of the nations.

The theory on which this policy was founded has, doubtless been carried too far. We saw the world pouring into our ports and marts, its riches from every clime in the ships of all nations. Wherever a commodity could be produced best and cheapest, there we sought it; whatever ship could convey it most cheaply, that we employed to convey it. In return, we secured, for a time, at least, cheap production in our mining and manufactures, and we held the markets of the world. Although other nations were ahead of us in the development of the marine steam engine, yet our skill in shipbuilding and the proximity of coal and iron to our ports and estuaries kept us well ahead

in the race for primacy when iron and steel ships supplanted wooden. We turned out tonnage, not only for ourselves, but for our competitors. This is not the place to argue as to economic soundness of this policy. But it is permissible to point out that it was essentially a peace policy; that it took no account of efforts deliberately made to destroy our maritime supremacy by the adoption of plans similar to those of Colbert, nor did it allow for the fact, still more serious, that we might find ourselves involved in war with a Power capable of dealing severe blows at our commerce, while we were dependent on imports from abroad for the necessities of life. There have been numerous attempts since 1815 to draw up an international code to regulate the rights and duties of belligerents and neutrals during a period of sea warfare. In every one, the instructions of the British delegates have been framed on the assumption that we should be neutral, not belligerent. As the greatest oversea traders, we stood to lose most from the operations of belligerent Powers, if we were neutral, and sea-warfare was not restricted. As the greatest Sea Power, in a naval sense, we stood to lose most if it were, supposing us to be belligerent. The result of letting our agriculture decay, of becoming dependent on foreign ore, instead of working our own iron deposits, and of suffering bounty-fed sugar to kill the industry of our West India Islands, is now seen to have been disastrous in a national sense, however profitable it may have been in the economic sense to buy in the cheapest market.

None the less, the maritime policy of Great Britain during the last hundred years is one of which we may legitimately be proud, and which has won results unknown before in the history of the world. She did more, indeed, than open her ports and the ports of the Empire oversea; more, even, than suppress piracy in the interests of mankind and the slave trade in the name of humanity and the Gospel of Christ. Her ships of war, once the cannon was silent were sent into every sea, exploring, sounding,

surveying, charting, marking the spot for a lighthouse here and a beacon there. It is enough to mention two of these expeditions :—That of the *Beagle* in 1831, as a consequence of which Charles Darwin revolutionised, if he did not create, the science of biology, and that of the *Challenger*, in 1872-6, with the valuable knowledge gained of deep-sea soundings. Both the Arctic and the Antarctic regions were explored, and, though it did not fall to the lot of a Briton to discover either the North or the South Pole, yet such men as Franklin, Ross, McClintock, Nares, Scott and Shackleton were the pioneers who made the successes of Peary and Amundsen possible.

Britain went to war with Revolutionary France in 1792 on account of the Proclamation of the French rulers that the forces of the Revolution would be used to assist any nation which wished to free itself from monarchical government. The consequence of that policy was that France herself first passed under the military despotism of Napoleon, and that, when that despotism was destroyed, the greater part of the Continent of Europe found its neck beneath the yoke of the Holy Alliance, while, of the remainder, a large proportion remained enslaved to the Turk. It was left for sea power to be instrumental in the work of liberation. Most people are now prepared to admit, with Lord Salisbury, that we "backed the wrong horse" when we supported the Turk against the Russians in 1854 and again in 1877-8. We were moved by concern for the route to India, and by suspicion of the designs of Russia, founded in part on the so-called "Will of Peter the Great," and in part of the real aggressiveness of her action in Central Asia. Moreover, so long as Egypt remained in fact a part of the dominions of the Sultan, the passing of Constantinople into the hands of the Power which controlled the Black Sea was a very real danger. British interests, therefore, seemed to demand that the Empire of the Turk should be maintained, while British instinct cried out for the redemption of his persecuted subjects. These

cross-currents are apparent all through the history of our foreign relations from 1828 onwards, and they found their culmination in the great duel between Disraeli and Gladstone in 1877-80. In the upshot, we fell between two stools, preserving the Turk as a malevolent force in Europe, while earning his ill-will by intervention, covenanted or otherwise, on behalf of his subjects. Brimstone and treacle, while admirable as a domestic medicine, is rarely serviceable in business or politics.

Our first essay in liberation is full of interest to us to-day. In 1821 the Greeks rose in rebellion against their Turkish masters. The horrible cruelties of the Ottoman troops aroused the indignation of all Europe. The imagination of the British was especially stirred by the presence of Lord Byron as a volunteer, fighting in the Greek ranks. An international squadron of British, French and Russian ships was sent to Greek waters. It consisted of twenty-four vessels, of which seven were British ships of the line. The Turks and Egyptians had over forty vessels of war, besides transports. The Allied fleet had not intended action, but, when a shot was fired at the French flagship, the wrath of the sailors at the atrocities committed by the Turks and the bad faith shown could not be restrained. A four-hours' engagement resulted in the destruction of the combined Turkish and Egyptian fleets. The Independence of Greece was recognised, and Great Britain, France and Russia thus gained the title to be the protectors of that country, on which their action of to-day is based. The Battle of Navarino was fought almost on the same spot as Salamis and Lepanto. Ibrahim Pasha, son of Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, remained in the Morea a year longer, when he was forced to retire by a French force under General Maison. But the lesson of Navarino is practically that of Salamis: that no power can hold Helas which has lost command of the sea.

The power of Great Britain was destined to clash with Ibrahim Pasha again twelve years later, when the

Egyptian forces advanced through Syria to the conquest of the Turkish dominions in Asia Minor. It is possible that the ambitious Albanian—for such was the race of Mehemet Ali—might have seized the Imperial Throne of Constantinople and the Khalifate. But a combined squadron of British, Turkish and Austrian ships, under Sir R. Stopford, bombarded St. Jean d'Acre, and stayed the course of the Egyptians on the very spot where Sidney Smith had made Napoleon "miss his destiny." Since that time, British sea power has intervened in the affairs of Eastern Europe on many occasions, in Egypt, in Crete, and at other places, in a vain endeavour to save the Turk from himself. Successful or unsuccessful, the dispatch of a fleet has always been the readiest way of bringing pressure to bear, and Lord Salisbury, who never seemed thoroughly to understand the principles of sea power, took far too narrow a view of the possibilities when, in defending himself against the charge of inaction in the cause of the Armenians, he dismissed the matter with the remark that "You cannot send ironclads up Mount Ararat."

The campaign against Arabi Pasha and the revolted Egyptian army was remarkable from a naval point of view in several ways. In the first place, it afforded another instance of the commander of an army making use of the command of the sea to shift his base. Sir Garnet Wolseley thus avoided a difficult flank march in face of the lines of Kafr Dowar, and, by re-embarking his army and landing it on the bank of the Suez Canal at Ismailia, forced Arabi to evacuate his position and change front at Tel-el-Kebir. Sir Garnet now had the use of the Sweet Water Canal, and was able, after a night march, to attack the Egyptian lines at dawn. That evening, Drury Lowe's cavalry were in Cairo.

Apart from the military interest, the Egyptian affair, with its aftermath, the campaigns in the Soudan, are notable from the fact that they formed a part of the bloodless struggle between British and French sea power

which continued from the overthrow of Napoleon till it was happily terminated by the establishment of the *Entente Cordiale* and the growing evidence of German ambition.

The departure of the French fleet before the bombardment of Alexandria, which placed the administration of Egypt solely in the hands of Great Britain, and the Fashoda incident are recalled only to bring home the fact that superior sea power was able to work its will without the necessity for hostilities, but none the less decisively. Another instance is to be found in the story of the Italian struggle for freedom. Napoleon III, in 1859, made war against Austria, promising that he would not sheath his sword till Italy was free from the Alps to the Adriatic. After the two victories of Solferino and Magenta, however, the threatening attitude of Prussia and the North German Confederation, as well as the unwillingness of Roman Catholic France to countenance measures against the Papal States, impelled him to sign the Treaty of Villafranca. By this instrument he not only failed to redeem the promises he had made, but he spoiled Italy of Savoy and Nice, which were to have been his only if he fulfilled his promise. Had it not been for the backing which the British Ministry gave to the Italian claims, Tuscany, Parma, Modena, and a part of the States of the Church would have been lost to the kingdom of Piedmont. The Italians recognised that they owed more to the moral support of British sea power than they did to the material aid of France. Nor was that all they were to owe. When Garibaldi, having made himself master of Sicily, crossed to the mainland and drove the King of Naples into Gaeta, Napoleon III sent the French fleet thither to protect the latter. Lord John Russell protested effectually against the action of the French, and Garibaldi was left to continue his operations without interference. Here the Land Power, France, was stopped by a threat to its frontiers. The Sea Power, unfettered by any such fear, was successful without firing a shot.

In other directions also Great Britain was instru-

mental during this period in foiling the effort of the sovereigns of the Continent to rivet the principles of the Holy Alliance on the necks of European peoples. The independence and neutrality of Belgium were secured by treaty—so far as a “scrap of paper” could secure them; the independence of the Spanish settlements in South America, won in part by the efforts of Cochrane and other British sailors and soldiers, were secured against a movement on the part of Spain and France by the joint action of Great Britain and the United States. The national government of Spain herself was likewise supported against French aggression. It may be said, though with some caution, that the fruits of the French Revolution during this period were consolidated against reaction behind the ægis of the British Navy. The subject is too wide to follow out in detail here. But, from 1815 to 1871, the French nation was struggling uneasily against various forms of autocracy, whether imposed by the Legitimist monarchy of Louis XVIII and Charles X, by the Liberal monarchy of Louis Philippe, or the Cæsarism of Napoleon III. The French people were true to their ideals of liberty, but French wars were mainly dynastic, and the martial nation was easily roused by the cry, “*La Patrie en danger.*” France had yet to find herself—the France that we know to-day—and, in the meantime, the defence of the smaller nations, of the principle of national unity and of liberty of thought and life, was left to the silent influence of the British Navy. The history of Europe, and, indeed, of the world, for the past hundred years, can only be read rightly in the light of events from 1914 onwards.

In one direction, Great Britain was false to her ideals and her mission in the world. She allowed the Austro-Prussian attack on Denmark in 1864, and the annexation of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein to Prussia. This error gave Kiel to Germany, and laid the foundation on which the German Navy has been built. It was the direct

outcome of the Germanism which had been allowed to pervade the Courts of Europe.

The use of sea power during the Civil War in the United States is full of interest, but must be briefly touched on. The superiority of the North at sea brought about the exhaustion of the Confederacy by the stringency of the blockade, while the direct naval action of Farragut at Mobile and elsewhere practically cut the South in two. The blockade was only maintained by measures which strained the doctrines of international law, as then laid down, to the uttermost, and which caused serious friction between the Federal Government and this country. The United States, which had gone to war with us in 1812 owing to the high-handedness of our restrictions on trade, bettered our model in their own hour of necessity. We, on our part, have occasion to be grateful to them now for the precedents then created, severe as was the distress caused to this country by their application at the time. In particular, if the American Courts had not then evolved the doctrine of Continuous Voyage, which lays it down that a ship attempting to run a blockade is capturable, whatever her immediate destination, if it can be proved that her cargo is ultimately consigned to the enemy, we could exercise no control whatever over goods going to Germany by way of the Dutch or Scandinavian ports. There were many reasons for the sympathy, now almost inexplicable, which was widely felt for the South among the British people. But, on the whole, the cause of the North was felt to be that which embodied British ideals and British traditions, and Lancashire starved without a murmur in order that that cause might prevail. In this was the first glimmering of the dawn which now shines in the union of the English-speaking peoples to maintain the principles for which their common forefathers fought.

The latent sympathy came more fully to light when war broke out in 1898 between the United States and Spain, on account of the barbarities practised by the latter

against the Cuban insurgents, the embarrassments caused to American trade by the long-drawn-out revolution in that island, and, above all, by the sinking of the battleship *Maine* in Havanah Harbour. The naval incidents of that war supply useful comment on the true understanding of sea power. The Spaniards possessed a small squadron of three armoured cruisers and a couple of destroyers, available for service on the other side of the Atlantic. The American fleet was at least three or four times as strong, and included several first-class battleships. Yet the whole East Coast was thrown into a state of panic by the approach of Cervera's little force, and the naval dispositions of the authorities were seriously hampered by the popular outcry for local protection. Serious uneasiness prevailed concerning the fate of the battleship, *Oregon*, which was on the Pacific Coast at the outbreak of war, and which had to make the long voyage round the Horn unattended. The Spaniards were, of course, in possession of the harbours, not only of Cuba, but also of Porto Rico, and there was, consequently, a real uncertainty as to the destination of the squadron. The Americans, having no bases on the European side of the Atlantic, could not watch it before it set out, according to the British method. But, even so, it is quite obvious that concentration, not dissipation, of force was the sound strategy. Instead of ships being kept to do "sentry-go" off the America coast, the Spanish harbours should have been closely watched by the light forces, while the main fleet was kept concentrated at a central spot, ready to fall in force on the enemy when he appeared. As it was, the land expedition was kept waiting for weeks before embarkation, until Cervera was safely "bottled up" in the harbour of Santiago de Cuba. An advance against the land defences of the port at length drove him out on to the guns of Admiral Sampson's fleet, and his little squadron perished gallantly. A few months before, Admiral Dewey had destroyed a small squadron of antiquated ships in Manila Bay, and the Philippine Islands passed

finally from Spain. Thus ended the once mighty oversea Empire of the Dons. The futility of trying to hold distant possessions without the power to protect the communications with them was demonstrated once again.

The Spanish-American War, however, was chiefly noticeable as an example of the silent but far-reaching force of British sea power. Continental Europe, with a fellow feeling for a sister in distress, and always resentful of the Monroe Doctrine, which, in truth, the Americans themselves violated by the seizure of the Spanish possessions, was of a mind to interfere. But the necessary condition of intervention was the adhesion of Great Britain to the Continental scheme. With British sea power hostile, or even doubtful, the military nations were powerless. Great Britain made no sign of acquiescence, and the whole design fell to the ground. Nothing was done, or even said, overtly. But there was a significant incident in Manila Bay. A German squadron, which had followed Dewey from China, threatened to interfere with his operations. Sir Edward Chichester, who was in command of the British force on the spot, quietly anchored his ships between the Germans and the Americans. The hint was sufficient.

In the following year sea power asserted its noiseless influence even more decisively. When the Boer War broke out, European sympathy, for reasons we can understand and, for the most part, respect, was very strongly on the side of the little peoples. Negotiations took place between certain Powers for active interference on behalf of the Boers. But there were then no three fleets in Europe capable of meeting the British, and the negotiations broke down. We carried our armies and all their stores and munitions over 6,000 miles of sea, as if it had been along the high roads of our own country, and not all the ill-will in Europe could interfere with us. The German Emperor has taken credit for having personally vetoed a coalition against us. His claim may be justified. He was

not ready. Nor did he want others to share the spoil. But he improved the occasion afforded by the capture of the *Bundesrat*, a German vessel conveying arms to the Boers, by uttering the first of his famous trilogy of sayings, "We are in bitter need of a strong German navy." Of this more hereafter.

The Boer war revealed the existence of a new organic force in the world. Colonisation has always been an intrinsic part of sea power. But the colonies of other nations have been either subject and tributary to the Mother Country, or they have soon broken away from all connection with her. Many instances have been given in earlier chapters. Great Britain had a bitter experience of the consequences to be expected from straining the allegiance of a great off-shoot to the breaking point when the American settlers threw off her allegiance in the latter part of the eighteenth century. Many troubles were hers afterwards in Canada, in Australasia, and particularly in South Africa. The impossibility of controlling distant communities of her own race and ideas, without a share in those representative institutions so dear to the British heart; the equal impossibility of retaining them within the Empire if they should wish to sever themselves from it, were impressed upon British statesmen of the Victorian era. It was rather in weariness than with a true vision of the future that the white communities of Greater Britain were endowed with the rights of responsible government. The way was paved for their separation when they were strong enough to stand alone. They were made free to develop along their own lines. Nothing but "the golden link of the Crown" remained, to outward observance, to preserve their unity with the Mother Country. It was an experiment which no conscious Empire builder would have dared to try. But the invisible forces were to prove stronger than the visible. Common thought, common speech, common history and traditions are the first of these. Others are, credit and the Navy. To call a fleet of battle-

ships an "invisible force" seems, at first sight, absurd. But, in the literal sense, the Navy, except for a few ships, generally of inferior force, has been invisible to the peoples of the Dominions. It has acted from far away, and it unquestionably took the Canadian, Australian and New Zealander a long time to realise that, if the merchant ships coming into his ports, in a huge majority, wore the Red Ensign of Britain; if he was free to develop the riches of his land without keeping sword and buckler, as it were, at the end of the furrow, it was due to "those far-distant, storm-beaten ships," on which he never looked, and for which he was not asked to pay a single penny. The kings of the earth take tribute from their subjects; but his Motherland gives and does not take.

That the Imperial idea first awoke in the White Empire oversea through sea power admits of no doubt. In the early eighties of last century, the Australasian Dominions first agreed to make a voluntary contribution to the cost of the Navy in return for the permanent retention of some light cruisers upon the station. As a result of the enthusiasm stirred by the two Jubilees of Queen Victoria, the Cape presented the armoured cruiser *Good Hope* to the Navy, on the motion of a Dutchman, Jan Hofmeyr, while Natal made an annual gift of coal, and Newfoundland raised a Naval Reserve from among her fishermen. With the growth of the German menace and the rise of the navy of Japan, the movement took on wider dimensions. New Zealand gave a battle cruiser to the Navy, while the Commonwealth of Australia laid the foundations of a naval unit of its own. Canada proved her desire to join in the union for defence, but action was postponed owing to internal difficulties. Her Prime Minister, Sir Robert Borden, however, was the first to utter a demand for closer political union with the Mother Country and the Sister Dominions. "Call us to your councils" are words which will be heard more insistently when the struggle in which the Dominions have borne so noble a part has come to an end.

Military aid was first given in a British campaign by the New South Wales contingent, a small body of cavalry which joined the British force at Suakim in 1885. When the war with the Boer Republics broke out, offers of aid came, and were accepted, from all the White Dominions. What, to the monarchies of Europe, presented itself as a war of aggression and oppression was seen by the citizens of the free communities of our family, to be a war for freedom. Their sons came forward with an enthusiasm which no temporary reverses could check. The sea power of Britain collected them from all the ends of the earth. Nor was that all. The echo of the last shot had hardly died away before the South African peoples themselves were first entrusted with the rights of self-government, and were then united into one State in which Boer and Briton shared equal rights, the Dutch majority, under the leadership of the general who had led the Boer armies against us, wielding the government of the country behind the shield of the British Navy. Free development of their national life, a free share in all the benefits which the mighty maritime resources of Great Britain could give them, and free protection from all outside aggression were benefits apparent to the naturally shrewd mind of the Boer. On the other hand, all the experiences of our history and all the forces of the national character have gone to build up the Union of South Africa, and to bring about the almost miraculous result that two generals who, in 1900, were waging a not unsuccessful war against the British Empire, between 1914 and 1916 commanded British armies in two victorious campaigns.

Outside the White Dominions, the possessions of the Honourable East India Company grew into the Empire of India. What Alexander and all succeeding conquerors failed to do by way of the land, Great Britain accomplished by way of the sea. Our title to India has never been disputed since Napoleon fell; no Power has ever shaken our position. Foreign rival and native malcontent has learned

alike that England is nearer to India than Petrograd or Berlin; even than Merv or, to employ a paradox, Delhi itself. The foreign policy of Britain for the last hundred years has been based almost entirely upon considerations which touched the road to India. The benefits of our rule there to ourselves have often been questioned by the materialistic school of thought; the benefits of our rule to the native population have never been seriously called in question by anyone whose opinion counted. India has repaid the debt by the aid given by her fine regiments on the battlefields of Europe, Asia and Africa. The place of this great empire within the Empire, possessing, as it does, a civilisation and a culture of its own—perhaps one should rather say several varieties of civilisation and culture—and with a history extending beyond that of any of the Powers of Europe, is a question which will have to be settled after the war, and which may afford the most crucial test which the British race has ever undergone of that capacity for leadership which it has hitherto so strikingly exhibited.

With the peoples of India may be ranked the Malays, and such of the Arab and Chinese races as are under our rule. The gift of the battleship *Malaya* by the Rajas of the Federated Malay States proved that this maritime race of the East has a grasp of the essential meaning of sea power. These peoples are not to be ranked with "the heathen in his blindness." Of the so-called "savage" races of mankind, the Ocean Empire has many under its flag, the blacks of Africa, the Dyaks of Borneo, the Papuans and the inhabitants of countless islands. Starting with trading stations on the coasts, in the great majority of cases, and with a history of early contact of which we have little reason to be proud, all the good which is in the British nature has asserted itself in its further dealings with native races, and has exerted itself mainly by means of the long arm of the Navy. The overthrow of dark and bloody tyrannies, like those of the Khalifa in the Sudan and King Prembeh in West Africa, and the substitution of a just

rule for theirs, were works which we can fearlessly bring to the test of their fruits, without heeding the charges of rapacity and hypocrisy hurled at us by people whose record in dealing with the backward races of the world will not bear a similar test. It may be confidently asserted that, in all such cases, we have applied unflinchingly, so far as they are applicable, the principles on which our own laws and government are founded, even to the hurt of our own material interests.

Here, too, great questions face us in the future, especially in the lands where white settlers live in contact with native races. They are questions which will only be solved if we keep within us a very real and high sense of a Divine mission, laid upon the race by "Him Who set His Briton in blown seas and storming showers." This line of thought has been indicated before, but here it must be developed in greater detail, if the reader is to grasp the point of view from which the writer regards the Empire and the history which has gone to its making: if the high purpose for which sea power and the heritage it has brought has been entrusted to us by Him who sitteth above the water-floods is to be fully grasped. Romans, Saxons, Danes, Normans flowed into our islands ere the keepers of the gates came to understand the principles on which an island is made safe from conquest. Then the gates were shut, and, with many a struggle, the various races fused and became one people, with very definite characteristics, contributed by each of the elements. They fought among themselves for principles of liberty and law, and they evolved an ordered freedom, foundations of equity and justice, and a temperate polity which, if it is no more perfect than any other human contrivance, is yet far in advance of anything existing in the world, save that which is borrowed from itself. In the sphere of religion, no less than in that of law and politics, the Church of England, at once national and catholic, peculiar to ourselves, is an instrument unmatched for

spreading an ordered Christianity among the peoples who dwell under the flag of Britain. While the British temperament guarantees freedom for all forms of worship, the Church of England is ready with the organisation which supplies the ordinances of Christianity wherever Britons settle, or those who dwell in the shadow of death, fast-bound in misery and iron, crave for the light of the Gospel. All this was forged and formed behind the shield of sea power, and, by sea power, has been carried to the ends of the earth. The United States, no less than the Dominions of the British Crown, stand on the foundation of Magna Carta and the Petition of Right. Rudyard Kipling has summed up in four lines the ideal on which the Empire rests :—

“Keep ye the Law! Be swift to all obedience,
Cleanse the land from evil, drive the road and bridge the ford.
Render safe to each his own, that he reap where he hath sown.
By the peace among our peoples, let men know we serve the
Lord!”

Such an ideal of empire can never contemplate keeping any body of its subjects in a condition of permanent inferiority. We loosed the slave, and, thereby, we endowed the coloured skin with the same rights of humanity as the white. There is no need to press theory to its extreme. The love of logical symmetry, so destructive of success in the task of governing and humanising the backward peoples among other nations, has never been a distinguishing fault of the British character. Rough-and-ready solutions become the habit of those who occupy their business in great waters, and are the pioneers in strange lands: the adaptation of means to ends. But there are native races under our rule which are attaining to a high degree of education and a European standard of life. Already we open the doors of the arts and sciences freely to individuals among these. In process of time it must become a question of granting to whole races equal rights of citizenship. How is that question to be faced? The attitude of the white

inhabitants of the Dominions towards the Indians before the war was a matter of grave disquiet to those who thought seriously on Imperial questions. The events of the past three years have probably paved the way for a solution of that question. But how are we to prepare for the day when Basuto, Kaffir, and Zulu shall claim what the Maori already possesses, the full rights of British citizenship?

The answer depends on the view we take of the Empire. On the "hen-and-chicken" theory, no solution can be found. But if the advice of Sir Robert Borden be followed and the Dominions be called to our councils; if the inhabitants of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa come to regard themselves as parts of an organic whole, sharing with us the responsibility for the dark lands of the Empire; if, in short, the whole meaning of the Ocean Empire become plain, then a way may be found for the application of the British ideal, suitably modified, to the whole family of nations which dwells under the British flag. The solution is not to be looked for in a crude equality of conditions promiscuously applied. The white people of the Dominions have ample justification, social and economic, for their objections to unrestricted immigration. The mistakes of the French in dealing with Hayti and of the United States in dealing with the emancipated slaves must be avoided in the interest of white and coloured alike. No general solution of the thousand varying questions involved will be even suggested here. But it is strongly urged that the first step toward a solution is to be found in the conception of an organic realm, knit together by sea power, in which the blood-brotherhood of Britons shoulder a joint responsibility for the welfare of the coloured races which sea power has committed to their charge.

CHAPTER XI

THE CHALLENGE

THE introduction of steam and steel shipbuilding gave all nations a fair start in a renewed struggle for sea power. But the advantages, natural or acquired, of Great Britain soon enabled her to distance her competitors more signally than ever. These advantages consisted (1) in geographical position, (2) in the character of her people, (3) in the colonies and possessions she had acquired abroad, with their commodious ports, (4) the possession of the best kind of coal for maritime purposes, and the proximity of coal and iron deposits to her rivers and estuaries, and (5) her supremacy in manufactures, combined with the necessity of fetching both food and raw material from abroad for her industrial population, in exchange for the products of her looms and workshops. The Continent, beaten down by war, had to depend on her both as provider and carrier. The United States alone might have challenged her position successfully; but the United States was as yet undeveloped, and was compelled to be for many years a borrowing nation. The Civil War destroyed the American mercantile marine, and the great spurt of development which followed constrained the Americans to pay the interest of their loans to a large extent in the freights earned by British ships.

By a wise, if undesigned, policy, moreover, Great Britain, so far from being jealous of the maritime expansion of other nations, showed herself ready to build both warships and merchantmen to their order. Thus for years, she alone developed the new industry of steel shipbuilding

and was able to turn out tonnage at a figure which no other country approached for cheapness. On the Clyde, the Tyne, the Mersey, the Thames, and in many other places, great shipbuilding establishments appeared, which for sixty years at least no other nation attempted to rival. The craze for excessive cheapness brought drawbacks in maritime affairs as well as in others. The mercantile seamen were ill-paid and ill-fed, and an undue number of foreigners, both European and Lascar, were employed. There were serious fears, which the war has, happily, expelled to a large extent, that the old breed of seamen which had given to the British their supremacy at sea, might become extinct. On the other hand, no nation gave more heed to the safety of its sailors at sea, and, wherever the benefits of sea power are recognised the name of Samuel Plimsoll must be had in honour.

It was not, perhaps, unnatural that a service which had won so high a position by the efficiency of its *personnel* under the conditions of masts and sails should prove itself reluctant, as did the Royal Navy of Britain, to change its motive power for steam. Long after the maritime engine had superseded the wind as prime mover in all ships of war, masts and sails were retained in British ships lest the British bluejacket should lose his seamanlike qualities. Only within the last ten years has the engineer been accorded his rightful place among the officers of the ship. During the preceding period, the Navy was organised with little regard for strategical considerations. Its dispositions were, in the main, based upon the old rivalry with France, and its later duty of supplying the world's police of the seas. How a change was brought about, and the Navy made ready and disposed to meet a new challenge, will be told hereafter. One great and beneficial change, at any rate, marked the transition period. The men were enlisted for continuous service, and the calling of a man-of-warsman at last became a regular profession. The change was rendered necessary by the much greater specialisation

required and the increasing difference between men-of-war and merchantmen. Despite the lack of organisation and training in the Navy as an engine of war, however, sea power, in the wider meaning of the term, was never more completely exercised by any country than by Great Britain during the years of maritime peace and commercial expansion.

The steam-driven, armour-clad ship, with her turret guns and ram, owed her origin to the genius of the French, and, afterwards, of the Americans. The armoured batteries employed against Kinburn led to the construction of *La Gloire*, a wooden frigate with four inch iron plates on her sides, designed by Dupuy de Lome. We followed quickly with the *Warrior*, which was built of iron and plated. Then the deeds of the Confederate ram, *Merrimac*, and the Federal turret-ship, *Monitor*, in the American Civil War turned naval thought in a new direction as to tactics, or, rather, revived a very old school of tactics. Steam and the ram, it was argued, had restored the conditions of the oared galley. The tactics of Salamis, the Ægæan Islands and Lepanto were once more studied. When the Italian flagship, *Re d'Italia*, was sunk at the battle of Lissa by the impact of a wooden ship of greatly inferior force, these theories were greatly strengthened. The day of the line and of broadside fighting, it seemed, was at an end. Line abreast, and a *mêlée* in which the ram would decide the issue, after the enemy ship had been more or less wrecked by a heavy bow-fire, became the conception of a naval fight. Most nations set to work to build ships which should be as unlike ships as possible.

Had this view finally triumphed, the day of the soldier on ship-board might have returned, and the priceless heritage which we possess in our stored sea-sense might have been rendered of no avail. But the British Navy, though it, to some extent, bowed to the prevailing opinion, never entirely surrendered itself to it. The loss of the *Captain* was the first rude shock. It was realised that the

British must be a sea-keeping Navy, and that weatherliness was of primary importance. Then the coming of the automobile torpedo and the swift torpedo-boat showed that the defence of big ships against such attacks could not be entrusted entirely to the heavy guns. Finally, the catastrophe to the *Victoria* and, especially, the fact that the *Camperdown*, which rammed her, nearly shared her fate, proved that the ram is a two-edged weapon on which supreme reliance could not be placed. The pendulum swung in the other direction, and action in close formed line-ahead, with a tremendous volume of quick-fire to shatter the enemy's upper-works and destroy or demoralise his men, became the accepted theory of those who held to the battleship as the arbiter of battle.

At the same time, another school of thought, which described itself as the *jeune école*, was gaining weight in France, under the leadership of Admiral Aube. According to its adherents, the battleship had seen her day. Swarms of torpedo-boats would forbid the use of the sea to her, and a multitude of fast commerce-destroyers would cut the communications of the Power which rashly trusted to the command of the sea for its safety. The stored naval wisdom of the British Admiralty forbade assent to such views, plausible as they might seem. The development of the torpedo-boat destroyer showed the first hope to be illusory, while the second could only be realised if the ports were left clear of watching squadrons. Besides, whatever success might be achieved in denying the use of the sea to the enemy, the theory of the *jeune école* gave no promise of securing the use of the sea for itself. The British Admiralty only led the opinion of the world, holding that the strategy which had been proved and consecrated by naval history from the earliest times remained unaltered by mere mechanical developments. The French Navy alone, with its *flair* for new ideas and mechanical invention, was caught by the new conception, greatly to its temporary disadvantage. The effect produced

by the development of the submarine will be best discussed in another place.

Such, in brief, were the changes wrought on the fighting navies of the world upon the technical side by the introduction of steam propulsion, steel shipbuilding, armour plating, the shell gun, the automobile torpedo and other like developments. In maritime affairs generally, the effect of the changes was to render vessels independent of the winds, but dependent on fuel supply and on the ports where fuel could be obtained. The ocean routes became shorter, but at the same time, speaking generally, narrower. The carrying capacity of ships also increased enormously. Thus there came about, and especially since the introduction of wireless telegraphy, a greater concentration of traffic, which made ocean travel and conveyance more secure, at any rate in time of peace. Merchant ships came to be divided into "liners," or ships which voyage between fixed points, and "tramps" which roam the world, picking up cargo where it is to be found, or are hired on charter by merchants for particular purposes. Liners, of course, are the descendants of the old East Indiamen, and of the "English galleon" which sailed once a year from Venice.

Up to 1890, the world was content to increase its merchant traffic on the ocean without giving much heed to the foundations on which sea power rests, or the principles by which it is defended. The ancient rivalry between France and Britain prompted the maintenance of naval competition, mainly in types and theories, between the two countries. There were periodical "scares" in this country, notably at the time of the Penjeh crisis in 1885, which led to the series of articles called "The Truth about the Navy," promoted by Captain Fisher, now Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, and published in the *Pall Mall Gazette*, by Mr. W. T. Stead, which led to the Naval Defence Act of 1889. Italy laid the foundations of her navy, but on principles which offered no serious prospect of the adequate defence of her

peninsular position and extended coast-line. The United States began to build battleships, after a period of complete paralysis, but, in the main, rather because the American Government had money to spare than on any intelligible theory of defence. Minor States, such as the South American Republics, China and Japan (not yet a first class Power) ordered ships, Elswick cruisers, for the most part, which afforded the world almost the earliest examples of sea fighting in the days of steam and the torpedo. The failure of the French navy to accomplish anything visible to the naked eye in 1870 and of the Turks to contest the command of the Black Sea with Russia in 1877 caused sea power to be held in light estimation in comparison with land power, and the pervading influence of the British Navy in the Mediterranean during this period was missed, so far as the general public was concerned. To have a navy was regarded, one might say, rather as a sign of substance, like keeping a carriage. But as to the use to which that navy should be put, the prevailing ideas were of the mistiest.

In 1890, however, an event occurred which had the most powerful influence on the course of events. It was no more than the publication of a book, and a book, moreover, which contained little which was absolutely new. Captain A. T. Mahan, an officer of the American Navy, and professor at the Naval College of Annapolis, published the results of his reflections while he was preparing his lectures under the title of "The Influence of Sea Power upon History." He owed much of the germ of his argument to two English writers, Sir John Knox Laughton and Admiral Colomb. But the facts were so freshly and powerfully presented that he seemed the prophet of a new school. He showed that sea power consists not alone in the military navy, but in the whole maritime industries and aptitudes of a nation, based on geographical position, internal economic conditions, the national character, and the nature of the government. He went on to prove, by a wealth of example,

that sea power is silent and far-reaching in its operation, affecting the national well-being in peace and the national strength for war in many directions which do not appear from superficial study. His keen and penetrating analysis showed the action of this force in ways unsuspected by the reader of history as it is commonly written, from the Punic Wars down to the outbreak of the French Revolution. This book was followed by "The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire," "The Influence of Sea Power upon the War of 1812," "The Life of Nelson: the Embodiment of British Sea Power," and several others. Mahan died in the early part of 1915, just when his theories were being put to the sharp test of a well-nigh universal war, and before his own country had taken the step which he, of all men, would most heartily have approved, of lending her might to maintain the Freedom of the Seas. His work had an effect which he himself can hardly have foreseen.

Mahan's first object was to stir up public opinion in his own country to an effort to recover the maritime position which had been lost in consequence of the Civil War and the great internal development of the United States. So far as the war navy was concerned, he was successful. The war with Spain in 1898 emphasised and reinforced his teachings. But no eloquence of writing and argument could fight against the conditions which he himself laid down as essential to maritime, as opposed to merely naval, expansion, and, until the great war gave the United States the opportunity to recover that which they lost in war, he fought in vain against economic forces. How matters will be hereafter, it is too early to foresee.

How far Mahan was prophet and how far only herald is hard to determine. With the increasing contraction of the world, the appropriation of its waste space, the growth of its population, and the entry of new peoples into the comity of nations, it is probable that the wind was already blowing in the direction of maritime expansion and

new naval rivalries. In the case of Japan, for instance, an island State, the development of sea power was inevitable, once her self-imposed isolation came to an end. It is hardly likely that the Japanese were consciously moved by the teachings of Mahan. Indeed, their maritime expansion began before his day. But, in another direction, and that, for the moment, the most important of all, his influence was direct. Among the warmest admirers of his writings is the German Emperor, who found his vague aspirations crystallised on his pages. Wilhelm II came to the Imperial Throne two years before "The Influence of Sea Power upon History" appeared. As the grandson of Queen Victoria, he had paid many visits during his boyhood's years to England, and had spent considerable time in Portsmouth Dockyard and on board British ships. These early impressions left their mark upon him. He became an ardent admirer of the British Navy and a worshipper of Nelson. He worshipped also the deeds of his ancestor, Frederick the Great, and of his grandfather, the Old Kaiser of the Franco-German War. The opportunity to expand his realm on the Continent was exhausted. He looked East and he looked West. His Germans had left their country by the hundred thousand, and were settled under foreign flags. The growing manufactures, the product of German skill, science and industry, were carried in foreign ships. Germany appeared to be what List had called her, "the step-child of Providence." Reflecting on all this, the teaching of Mahan came to him as a gospel newly revealed, and the second word of his trilogy was spoken, "Our future lies upon the water." But the British Islands are an immovable barrier across the only path. While Britain remained supreme at sea, any empire which Germany could found across the ocean must be held in fee of her. Very well, then, "The trident must be in our fist." Here was the new vision of world power, ever present to the mind of the imperial dreamer, whether he were preaching his strange mixed doctrine of despotism

and mystic religion in Hamburg or Kiel, or seeing visions on the Mount of Olives, wrapped in the cloak of a Crusader. Perhaps he himself had no hatred for the people of his mother's land. But he and his school imbued his people with the latent hatred which has flamed up so fiercely. The overthrow of Great Britain became the goal of pan-Germanism. It was the only possible goal for which it was worth while to strive.

German maritime expansion was carried out on the lines laid down by Colbert in the France of the late seventeenth century, but much more persistently and scientifically applied. Bismarck started the Colonial Empire of Germany, with his tongue in his cheek. Wilhelm II made that rather unprofitable asset the starting point of his naval aims. Somewhat before his time, Germany having acquired a considerable grip on the commerce of the East, liners of the Norddeutscher Lloyd, resplendent with much gold and plate glass, were plying to China: subsidised vessels which attracted a certain amount of custom from English people anxious to get out or home more cheaply than was possible by P. and O. Those who preferred to combine more comfort and less glitter with a cheap fare, however, preferred the Messageries Maritimes. The Kaiser expanded the movement, with the aid of German shipowners and financiers, among whom the most conspicuous was the Jew, Herr Ballin, and soon great vessels of the Hamburg-Amerika line were steaming into Southampton Water, with their bands blaring "*Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles.*" A sensation was caused in Britain when one of these obtained the "blue riband of the Atlantic," and a rather senseless competition in speed, size and luxury ensued, which was chiefly useful as an advertisement of the German shipbuilding yards. A more serious matter, really, for our maritime position was the institution of subsidised lines running to East Africa and Australia. By 1914, Germany owned the second largest mercantile marine in the world, though her

steam tonnage was still only a fourth of that owned by the British Empire. What was formidable about German competition was the direction of all the resources of the State, both at home and abroad, to the one end. The ownership of the railways by the State, and the admirable system of internal waterways were powerful aids. Hamburg outstripped London and became the greatest *entrepôt* in the world. Moreover, with all the efforts made to strengthen the maritime position of Germany, agriculture was never allowed to languish, and the German people went into the war almost self-supporting, so far as food-stuffs are concerned.

A military navy was obviously necessary to support and defend this growing volume of sea-borne trade: at least, so the German people were told, when it was desired to obtain credits for naval expansion. They were not told, however, that a military navy could only protect trade adequately if it were supreme. The unthinking were easily caught and cozened into lending themselves to the ambitious schemes of the Emperor and his pan-German clique. The *Deutsche Flottenverein*, established on the lines of the English Navy League, and enjoying Royal and Imperial patronage, soon numbered millions of members. Whatever was intended, there was only one end possible. Prior to 1888, the German navy hardly had an existence. Ten years more passed before the country and the Reichstag could be brought to the proper frame of mind to contemplate naval expansion. But, in January, 1897, Admiral Tirpitz succeeded Admiral von Hollman as Secretary of the Imperial Navy Office. He proved himself a statesman as well as a remarkably able sailor. He adopted the usual German methods of Press-manipulation and cajoled the Reichstag into resigning all real power over the details of navy expenditure. In 1898, he was able to obtain the first of the famous German Navy Acts, that known as the Sexennate, which provided for the creation of a fleet of certain fixed proportions within a period of six

years. Battleships were to be automatically replaced at the end of twenty-five years from the voting of the first instalment for their construction, and large cruisers at the end of twenty years. These periods were reduced by a subsequent Act to twenty and fifteen years respectively. By this means it became possible to replace a miserable little coast-defence vessel, like the *Siegfried*, of about 4,000 tons, by a great *Dreadnought* of 22,000 tons, and a 3,000 ton light cruiser by a battle-cruiser like the *Hindenburg*. Even before the Act of 1898 came into full operation, it was replaced by the Act of 1900, which nearly doubled the proposed number of ships. The *Bundesrat* incident, mentioned above, was made the occasion for obtaining this extension. The famous preamble to the Statute of 1898 runs as follows:—

“To protect Germany’s sea-trade and colonies, in the existing circumstances there is only one means: Germany must have a battle-fleet so strong that, even for the adversary with the greatest sea power, a war against it would involve such dangers as to imperil his position in the world.

“For this purpose, it is not absolutely necessary that the German battle-fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest naval Power, because a great naval Power will not, as a rule, be in a position to concentrate all his striking forces against us. But even if it should succeed in meeting us with considerable superiority, the defeat of a strong German fleet would so substantially weaken the enemy that, in spite of a victory he might have obtained, his own position in the world would no longer be secured by an adequate fleet.”

The reasoning is identical with that of Nelson when he wrote, “I am no conjurer, but this I ventured without any fear, that, if Calder (with eighteen ships) got fairly alongside their twenty-eight sail, by the time the enemy had beaten our fleet soundly, they would do us no harm this year.” The argument is a perfectly sound one, as Nelson applied it; but von Tirpitz made the radical mistake

of supposing that the nation which has always realised the supreme importance of defeating decisively the immediate enemy could be diverted from that policy by the fear of ulterior consequences elsewhere. In the German view, the world is composed of nations who are always on the look-out to pounce on the weak, regardless of right or wrong, as opportunity offers, as wolves will tear to pieces a wounded member of the pack.

That there should be no mistake as to the meaning of this preamble, despite the almost decent restraint of its language, it was interpreted for the German people by Admiral von der Goltz. This officer frankly discussed the chance of a war with Great Britain, ending with the declaration that, with the additions proposed, the German fleet would be in a position to measure its strength with the ordinary British forces in Home waters, and adding, "It should not be forgotten that the question of numbers is far less important on sea than on land, Numerical inferiority can be compensated by efficiency, by excellency of material, by the efficiency and discipline of the men. Careful preparation, permitting rapid mobilisation, can ensure a momentary superiority." These words have a most important bearing on the sequel. The hope was no vain one, as matters stood in 1900.

The Reichstag compelled the dropping of five large and five small cruisers from von Tirpitz's programme of 1900, but these were restored in 1906. Two years later a further Act was passed, shortening the statutory age of ships, and, in 1912, the final Act, providing for three additional battleships, and increasing largely the force to be kept in permanent commission, in accordance with von der Goltz's demand for speedy mobilisation. In fourteen years, Germany sprang from the position of an insignificant naval Power, superior only to Austria-Hungary among the greater nations of Europe, to the second place in the world. Instead of a squadron of four coast defence vessels, incapable of keeping the sea for many days, she disposed

of four squadrons of eight battleships each, two of them composed of Dreadnoughts, with four older battleships in reserve; eight large armoured cruisers, of which five were battle cruisers, with two in reserve, and the nucleus of a strong squadron of cruisers for foreign service, of which the most noteworthy were the *Goeben*, *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*. Nor does the number of ships of which she disposed in 1914 give the full measure of her increase in naval strength. After many years' toil, the works at Wilhelmshaven, acquired from Oldenburg by Prussia in 1852, were completed, and her short cut from the Baltic to the North Sea secured by the widening and deepening of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, necessitated by the opening of the Dreadnought era. The Kaiser and his Ministers are, at least, entitled to this credit: that they have spared neither toil nor treasure in their attempt to secure the mastery of the world by land and sea.

During the years of German naval expansion, events of equal significance were taking place on the other side of the globe. The growth of the Japanese navy, as has been pointed out, is a perfectly natural one. The Japanese people have all the qualities, and their native land all the advantages and needs which make for sea power. Lying off the mainland of Asia, as the British Islands lie off the mainland of Europe, the geographical position of the Japanese Islands confers the same sort of control over the Pacific and Indian Oceans, so far as the mainland is concerned, as we exercise over the communications of Germany, Holland, Scandinavia and Northern Russia with the Atlantic and Mediterranean. There is, however, this important difference; that whereas the Continent of Europe is occupied by powerful organised States, standing, roughly, on the same level of civilisation and enterprise as we, Japan is confronted with the inchoate mass of China, the prey of European ambitions, and with the lower races of Korea and Manchuria. Under no circumstances should we seek possessions on the Continent of Europe. The

need to keep the conquering white race out of Eastern Asia, so far as she may, has compelled Japan to seek territory on the mainland. Japan emerged from a state of feudal isolation during the sixties of last century. The necessity for a navy was apparent to her statesmen, and she called upon Great Britain for aid. The late Sir Archibald Douglas was appointed head of the Naval Mission to Japan, and he was the father of the navy which fought the battles of the Yalu and Tsu-shima, while Admiral Togo, the victor in the latter engagement, received his education on board the *Worcester*, the training ship for cadets for the British mercantile marine.

The war with China, in 1894, was, essentially a war of prestige. China claimed a suzerainty over Korea which Japan would not admit. An attempt to send reinforcements by sea was met by the sinking of the transport conveying them by a torpedo fired from the *Naniwa*, under the command of Captain Togo, as he then was. A naval engagement was fought off the mouth of the Yalu River in Korea, in which the fast Japanese cruisers utterly defeated a Chinese force which included two battleships. The Chinese land forces in the Peninsula were no less decisively defeated at Ping-yang, and the Japanese then set themselves to reduce the two great naval strongholds of China, Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei. Their efforts were successful, and the remnant of the Chinese navy fell into their hands, but the intervention of Germany, France and Russia compelled them to restore Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei, the former of which was leased to Russia two years later. About the same time, Germany compelled the Chinese to lease them the settlement of Kiao-chau, in the Shan-tung Peninsula. It must be added that Great Britain acquired Wei-hai-wei as an offset to these concessions. But no attempt has ever been made to turn the place into a great naval fortress, as did the Russians at Port Arthur and the Germans at Kiao-chau.

Although the Chinese were defeated, Japan suffered

a blow to her prestige by the European intervention which followed her victory, which she could not endure patiently. Europe was treating China as an artichoke, to be eaten leaf by leaf. Besides the naval stations of Hong Kong and Wei-hai-wei, held by Great Britain, Port Arthur held by Russia, and Kiao-chau held by Germany, there were settlements and concessions at Shanghai, Hankow and other places, while Europeans were under the extra territorial jurisdiction of their Consular Courts. That would not have mattered had the Japanese had a similar standing; but not only had they no such standing, but Europeans in Japan itself enjoyed a similar right. The Japanese were thus placed in the category of uncivilised, or semi-civilised nations, along with China and Turkey. They owed their release from this humiliating position to the friendly sympathy of the Sea Power of the West, which elevated their Legation to the dignity of an Embassy, abandoned its Consular Courts, and eventually entered into formal alliance. Other nations were compelled to follow the example of Great Britain, so far as the first two matters were concerned, and Japan entered fully into the comity of Powers.

She had, none the less, to struggle for breathing-space, with the naval Powers of Europe hemming her in, if she was to attain to the position to which she aspired, and the Russian threat to Korea brought matters to a crisis. The war which followed presents many features of interest to the student of sea power. Japan possessed six first-class battleships, and as many armoured cruisers of a good type, which were reinforced at the beginning of the war by the *Kasuga* and *Nisshin*, vessels which had been built in Italy for the Argentine Republic. Russia had six battleships of approximately equal force to those of Japan in Port Arthur, with one armoured cruiser, while three armoured cruisers were at Vladivostok. The two Powers were about equal in light cruisers, and the Japanese superior in torpedo craft. But, whereas the force

enumerated composed the whole of Japan's naval strength, the Russians had four good battleships in the Baltic completed and another completing, as well as a considerable force of older battleships. They had been for some time drafting more ships to the Far East, and it was possible to foretell almost to a day when war would break out by watching the movements of Russian ships. In point of fact, when the seventh Russian battleship reached the Suez Canal, the Japanese opened hostilities by a surprise torpedo attack on Port Arthur. The *Kasuga* and *Nisshin*, at the same time, were just out of reach of molestation.

Russia depended on the long single line of the Trans-Siberian Railway for her communications. The Japanese had a short and rapid line by sea. Moreover, they held the central position, between the two parts of the Russian fleet in Port Arthur and Vladivostok. They sealed the former port in order to get their armies ashore, the one in Korea, the other on the neck of the Liao-tung Peninsula, at the head of which Port Arthur stands. They watched the Vladivostok ships with a division of armoured cruisers. Thus, secure on the sea, they threw themselves across the Russian communications with Port Arthur, and soon had the place besieged on the land side as well as blockaded by sea. They suffered some damage from the Vladivostok cruisers, which contrived to slip out in a fog, and sink the vessel which was carrying the siege-train for Port Arthur. But, except for this, the communications of the Japanese were not interfered with. But the Russians made the fatal mistake of treating their squadron as a part of the armament of the fortress. They lost one battleship by a mine explosion, but the Japanese lost two, and the latter had nothing in reserve, while the Russians had the whole Baltic Fleet. If their Admirals had remembered the saying of Nelson recorded above, and had engaged their enemy resolutely in a fleet action, it is more than likely that the Baltic Fleet would have restored the local command of the sea to Russia, and that Port

Arthur would have been saved. As it was, after one feeble effort to escape to Vladivostok on August 10th, 1904, in which they lost their battleship, the *Tsessarevitch*, which was interned at Shanghai for the rest of the war, the Russian fleet tamely awaited destruction in the harbour, and, when the place was surrendered early in January, 1905, fell into the hands of the Japanese.

By that time the Baltic Fleet, under Admiral Rojdestvensky, was on its way out. But the purpose of its mission was gone. It was the laughing-stock of the world; but the laughter was ill-timed. Rojdestvensky, a good officer, really performed a remarkable feat in getting his heterogeneous, ill-found, ill-manned fleet to the end of its long voyage in any sort of fighting trim. He had not a single base on the way, and had to coal in ill-protected roadsteads. Every place he passed sent news of his passing; the French, although in alliance with Russia, had "paired" with Great Britain, the Ally of Japan, to substitute benevolent neutrality for active participation in the struggle, and Rojdestvensky got sympathy, but little assistance, from the French possessions he passed on his way. Japanese cruisers shadowed him from Madagascar onwards, but the main fleet of his enemy awaited him in the Straits of Tsu-shima, in confidence that, from that central position, it would be able to intercept him, whether he took the direct route or attempted to reach Vladivostok by way of the Tsu-garu Strait between Nippon and Yezo. His ships, having left their auxiliaries off the Chinese coast, were weighed down by deck loads of coal and supplies till the upper edges of their armour belts were submerged. No fleet was ever in a worse condition to face a decisive action.

Togo, on the other hand, had only four battleships to oppose to an equal number of first-class vessels and several of more ancient date possessed by his enemy. Moreover, his guns were worn with his ceaseless service off Port Arthur, and he had no time to change them. But

his war-hardened crews and his nearness to his bases of supply gave him an immense advantage over his enemy. On the morning of May 28th, he received information of the approach of his enemy. In probably conscious imitation of Nelson's immortal signal before Trafalgar, he encouraged his men with the words, "The fate of the Empire depends on this day's event. Do your duty, every one of you." The sea was enveloped in a patchy fog, out of which the Japanese ships suddenly loomed across the bows of their enemy, before the latter could form his line of battle. Togo engaged the head of the enemy's line with his battleship division, to which the armoured cruisers *Kasuga* and *Nisshin* were attached, while Kamimura, with the rest of the armoured cruisers, attacked the rear. The Russian battleship *Oslyabia* was sunk almost at the first salvos. The rest of the fleet succeeded in forming some sort of line-ahead, but their formation was almost immediately broken up, and the rest of the battle, which lasted for the best part of two days, was a *mêlée*, in which the Japanese torpedo-flotillas played a deadly part. Togo was forced to close action by the inefficiency of his worn guns. He relied on the devastating effect of twelve-inch shells, charged with high explosive, on the crews and upper works of his opponents. He could not pierce the armour-belts of the Russian battleships. Those which were sunk by gun-fire owed their fate to their overloaded condition. The water pouring in above the protective deck caused them to capsize. The older ships proved themselves utterly incapable of resisting attack. In the end, one modern battleship, the *Orel*, was captured, together with two small coast-defence vessels, while the *Suvarof*, Rojdestvensky's flagship, *Borodino*, *Alexander III*, and *Oslyabia* were sunk, besides all the rest of the older battleships, the armoured cruisers, and all the protected cruisers but two. Rojdestvensky himself, wounded in the head and senseless, was removed from his doomed flagship on board a destroyer, and captured by

the Japanese on the second day. Tsu-shima was the most complete "wipe out" in the annals of fleet warfare, more complete even than the Nile. No Japanese ship was sunk, or even seriously injured, and the loss of the victors in men was astonishingly small.

British opinion was highly incensed at the time against the Russians on account of the stupid affair of the Dogger Bank, when British fishing boats were fired upon and sunk by the inexperienced and "jumpy" Russians, in the absurd belief that there was a Japanese torpedo-boat lurking among them in disguise. But the infinite pathos of Rojdestvensky's attempt and the high qualities of courage and endurance displayed by the Russians may now be better appreciated and acknowledged. Rojdestvensky saved the honour of the Russian flag at a tremendous cost. There was nothing else he could do. Had he made Vladivostok in safety there was no service to his country he could hope to perform. Port Arthur had fallen; the battle of Mukden had been fought and lost. The strength of Japan was unequal to the total overthrow of Russia; but the Court intriguers who had brought the war about had thrown and lost. Their blunders were irretrievable. Success or failure turned on the command of the sea, and sea power once again refused to lend itself to the purposes of dynastic and military aggression. Its use misunderstood and its elements mishandled, the navy of Russia, greatly superior by the book, was brought to ruin by the lesser, but efficiently handled, navy of Japan. The campaign, admirably conceived by the Japanese General Staff, naval and military, is a model of that type of "limited war" to which sea power so readily adapts itself. The objects of Japan were attained without her being constrained to the hopeless task of attempting to crush her giant adversary, and this happy result was due to her command of the sea.

Much friction arose between Great Britain and Russia, not only on account of the Dogger Bank incident,

but also on account of the conduct of the Russian auxiliary cruisers in capturing and searching British vessels. How far the Russians exceeded belligerent rights, as we should be inclined to claim them to-day, when we ourselves are belligerents, it would take too long to argue. Vessels were seized and searched for contraband far outside the zone of hostilities, with an entire absence of proof that any part of their cargo had an enemy destination, and to this our Government took a strong and successful objection. The Russians also set the fatal precedent of sinking ships on the plea of "military necessity"—that necessity consisting of inability to bring them into port—which was afterwards admitted by the Hague Conference, and thus gave the Germans a handle for their submarine campaign.

Small as was the effect of the Russian cruiser operations in the war with Japan, those operations gave clear evidence of the ability of marauding vessels to keep the sea for many weeks together, lost to the ken of humanity, and subsisting on coal taken either from captured ships or from colliers chartered for the purpose. Two vessels of the Russian Volunteer Fleet from the Black Sea, named for war purposes *Dneister* and *Rion*, were thus lost to sight for a long period. Meanwhile, the British protest against their action was allowed by the Russian Government, which sent orders for their recall. It was one thing, however, to send orders, and another thing to communicate with the ships. For this purpose, the Russian Government had to appeal for the good offices of the British, and the ships were eventually found, and their orders conveyed to them by British cruisers on the Cape Station. The reality of the British control of the seas could hardly have received plainer demonstration.

The Russo-Japanese War has been dealt with at some length because it is, in many respects, a turning-point in the history of sea power. The Russian navy was annihilated. The growing German navy, by no direct act of its own, now had command of the Baltic. German ambi-

tion, encouraged also by the apparent collapse of Russian military power on land, had now, as it considered, a free hand to deal with France. A period of provocation at once began, in Morocco and elsewhere, in the course of which France was subjected to dire humiliation. The balance was redressed by the formation of the *Entente Cordiale* between this country and her gallant neighbour, to which, by slow degrees, Russia became a partner. The grain of mustard seed had, indeed, been sown by the wise diplomacy of King Edward VII some years earlier; but the plant came to maturity between 1905 and 1911. The consequences on our naval policy were immediate. On the very day when the Russian fleet sank the fishing boats on the Dogger Bank, Admiral Sir John Fisher became First Sea Lord, with practically a free hand to carry out a gigantic programme of reform, which was to prepare the Navy for the great conflict with its new enemy. The period of tension which followed the Dogger Bank incident showed how faulty our naval dispositions were to meet a threat from the North Sea. Our principal fleet was in the Mediterranean; the Channel Fleet was at Gibraltar, and the defence of home waters rested upon the Home Fleet, a collection of antique vessels, used for port- and coast-guard ships, generally known irreverently as the "gobby fleet." If hostile action had been taken against Rojdestvensky before he passed Ushant, and had the French joined their allies, the British Navy would have been liable to be attacked in detail. The lesson was reinforced a few years later, when Germany suddenly presented to France what was almost an ultimatum, demanding the dismissal of M. Delcassé from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Channel Fleet was, once more, at Gibraltar, with the newly formed Atlantic Fleet. Both were ordered to stand fast, for fear the diplomatic situation should be unfavourably affected by a concentration in Home waters. The Home Fleet was then, perhaps, sufficiently strong to deal with the existing German navy. But if these things

were done in the green tree, what might not be done in the dry?

Sir John Fisher's schemes were based, in his own words, on the necessity for securing "the fighting efficiency of the Fleet, and its instant readiness for war." He recalled the six battleships from China, where, after the disappearance of Russian sea power, they were no longer needed for the time; he reduced the Mediterranean Fleet and the Channel Fleet each to six ships, and he utilised the vessels thus obtained to create the Atlantic Fleet, of six battleships, and to strengthen the Home Fleet with comparatively modern vessels. These latter were kept at the three great naval ports, manned with nucleus crews, and organised in divisions under the officers who would command them in war. The necessary men were obtained by recalling the small cruisers, sloops and gunboats kept on foreign stations, ships of little or no fighting power, which nevertheless absorbed about ten thousand seamen. This reform was hotly contested, on the ground that the number of battleships kept in full commission was somewhat reduced thereby. But, in point of fact, the nucleus crews provided were so large that, since they included all the skilled ratings, and were continually practised at sea, they were fit to fight even without their "balance crews," which, moreover, consisted of the men who were going through the schools, or were otherwise employed in their home ports. The net result was to render nugatory von Tirpitz's hope of being able to mobilise the German navy more rapidly than the British could be mobilised.

Sir John was, in reality, silently and adroitly, swinging round the British battle-front from South to East. The *Dreadnought*, the first of the all-big-gun class of battleship, was ordered in 1905 and pushed to completion in a year. The nation was astonished when instead of being placed in full commission in one of the sea-going fleets, she was attached to a new nucleus-crew unit, called the Nore Division of the Home Fleet. The new class of

battle-cruisers, *Invincible*, *Indomitable* and *Inflexible*, followed her there, and then, when the time was ripe, the Nore Division and the Channel and Atlantic Fleets became one fully commissioned force, the Home Fleet. This force was further strengthened as ships came to hand. The remaining battleships were withdrawn from the Mediterranean, the French undertaking the guardianship of our mutual interests in that sea, and, eventually, one single organisation of our battleship force emerged, known as the First and Second Fleets, each consisting of four complete squadrons of eight ships each, the first four in full commission, the second with nucleus crews of greater or less size. Each squadron had its attached cruiser squadron, the First consisting of battle-cruisers, and each its flotilla of torpedo-boat destroyers, with light cruisers as flotilla leaders. Besides this, the surplus torpedo-craft and the large submarine flotilla were organised under an Admiral of Patrol, to undertake the guardianship of the coast and thus leave the fleets a free hand. The gunnery of the Fleet was revolutionised according to the methods of Admiral Sir Percy Scott, while, by a new system of common entry and training, it was sought to amalgamate the officers of the military and engineering branches. A War Staff was appointed at the Admiralty, and a War College established at Portsmouth, for the study of naval strategy and tactics. For the first time since 1815 we had a scientifically thought-out system of naval defence, based on the occupation of a central position in Home waters over against the anticipated foe, but spreading into all the seas of the world. All the advantages of recent growth were taken into account: wireless telegraphy, the turbine, oil fuel. Ships were designed according to the strategical and tactical theories of their use which were worked out. Moreover, the war Navy and the mercantile marine were brought into closer relation with each other, mainly through the instrumentality of Lord Charles Beresford. A step which has proved fruitful of good in the time of testing.

The underlying principle of strategy in all these reforms was the old one: that the main force of Great Britain should face the main force of the enemy in overwhelming strength from a position which would give it the best chance of forcing an action should opportunity present itself. Behind this "sure shield," the activities of the country, whether military or commercial, could go on unchecked. A military force was postulated for home defence, capable of dealing with a raid of seventy thousand men, or, in the formula adopted, of such strength as to ensure that, if the enemy come, he must come in such force that he could not come at all. An Expeditionary Force of one hundred and sixty thousand men was provided for, which the naval people hoped would be used in conjunction with the Fleet, to threaten descents on the enemy's coast, and thus to immobilise a number of his troops out of all proportion to its own strength. The magnitude of the effort which Great Britain has been compelled to make by land, and which has upset all the considered strategy on which our plans were based, could not have been foreseen. But the Navy was prepared to guarantee the safe passage of the Expeditionary Force to the Continent of Europe, even before the fleet of the Power next to ourselves in strength had been met and defeated, and to maintain its communications. It has fully made good its word.

Sir John Fisher did not remain in office long enough to see his schemes come to full fruition. He reached the retirement age of an Admiral of the Fleet in 1910, and was raised to the peerage with the title of Lord Fisher of Kilverstone. In the words of Lord Brassey, he had done "the day's work of a giant." Naturally, some parts of his schemes raised bitter opposition; but they gave us the Navy with which we have successfully faced the German onslaught. That, however, is a subject which must be reserved for the next chapter.

In 1911 the Germans attempted to establish them-

selves on the western coast of Morocco, in a position which would have been eminently favourable for attacks upon our commerce. The gunboat *Panther* suddenly appeared off Agadir, and was later replaced by the light cruiser *Berlin*. The ensuing period was full of danger. But the firm attitude of Great Britain, whose interests were directly menaced, encouraged the French, on this occasion, to stand firm. The matter ended by a compromise, the French yielding a part of the French Congo in return for an abandonment of German pretensions in Morocco. It was a piece of successful blackmail on the part of the Germans; but the event showed that the Entente Powers were no longer in a mood to allow the bully of Europe to have his way, and the reorganised sea power of Great Britain forbade him to hope that he could reach the object of his desires. In the autumn of the same year the Italians attacked the Turkish possessions in Tripoli, while in 1912 the war between Turkey and the Balkan States took place. These events do not strictly belong to our subject, but they were each of them incidents which led directly to the great struggle which was to follow. The year 1913 was devoted by Germany to the increase of her land armaments, a threat to which the French immediately responded. Internal troubles both in France and Great Britain during the following year made the Germans believe that they saw their chance. The time was ripe for the blow in other ways also.

CHAPTER XII

THE VALLEY OF DECISION

WHENEVER a tyrant has come into conflict with sea power it has broken him. It is a force which tyrants have attempted to wield, but have consistently failed. It was so with Xerxes, with Philip II, with Louis XIV, with Napoleon. Xerxes chastising the Hellespont is an allegory the meaning of which is revealed in the history of mankind. The issue was raised afresh in 1914 by Wilhelm II of Germany and his ally of Austria. The arrogant revival of the doctrines of the Holy Alliance which was witnessed after Sadowa and Sedan had placed Prussia in a dominating military position was a gauntlet thrown down to the free nations of the world. A whole logic of tyranny, based on an insane pride of race, a lust for domination, a worship of armed might and a theory of the Divine Right of Kings was worked out by soldiers and professors and presented to the mystic dreamer who sat upon the Imperial Throne. The descendants of Luther took Nietzsche for their prophet. Christianity became, for them, a "slave religion"; its tenets of mercy and justice were deemed unworthy of a race of super-men; a reincarnation of Wotan was installed in the Eternal Throne as "the good old God" of the German tribes. Not consciously, of course, But the attributes of the God the Germans came to worship were those of Wotan rather than of the God of Love revealed in Jesus Christ.

The whole machinery of the State moved to one end. There is no denying the energy, capacity and mental power

the Germans put into their task of national and Imperial organisation from 1871 onwards. There is this much to be said for them: their Empire was no natural growth, but a piece of elaborate and skilful cabinet-making. By the sword it was won; by the sword alone it could be kept. Moreover, it was born late into the family of nations. The vacant spaces of the world were already allotted. Only the sword could carve a way to world-power, and to the sword must be added the trident, if Great Britain, which lay like a breakwater across the path to over-sea empire, was to be removed out of the way. To many nations the task might have seemed too great. They would have been content with the material fruits of their industry, and, armed for defence, would have abstained from provocation of their neighbours. But that was not the tradition which the Hohenzollerns had inherited from Frederick the Great. It was not the logical outcome of the teaching of Bismarck—who, be it said, was too great to be logical. A frenzied conceit, spread through all classes of the drilled and docile nation by the professors and school teachers, taught that the world needed, for its happiness, to be brought under the sway of German *Kultur*. Thus, while other peoples stood dismayed at German tastelessness and vulgarity, this besotted folk regarded itself as the guide predestined to lead the world in sweetness and light. The smaller nations had no right to a separate existence. For their own good it was requisite that they should come direct under the benevolent tyranny of Hohenzollern or Hapsburg, or should submit to the rule of a Teutonic princelet placed upon the Throne and upheld by an army trained by German officers on the German model.

Happily for European liberty, one poison counteracted another. Pan-Germanism, on the one hand, and Pan-Slavism on the other, prevented that League of Monarchs which would in very truth have riveted the principles of the Holy Alliance on the necks of all Continental peoples. We are so accustomed to think of Germany, Austria and

Italy as composing the Triple Alliance, that we forget the days of the Drei-Kaiserbund which threatened a revival of the "leagued oppression" which destroyed Polish independence. The work of the Imperial meeting at Skiernevice in the early eighties of last century never came to fruition, owing to the irreconcilable antagonism between the ambitions of the Slavs and the Germanic peoples in relation to Turkey and the Near East. Italy was forced into an unnatural alliance with the *Tedeschi*, whom, of all people, the Italians most heartily abhor, by the pressure on her northern frontiers. The advantage to Germany and Austria of her adhesion to the Central League consisted in the reinforcement which her navy gave to their sea power in the Mediterranean, and the route into Eastern France, turning the flank of the French positions, which the use of her territory would give. But the adhesion of Italy to the Central League in the event of war depended on one thing, as we shall see: on the attitude of Great Britain. With the exception of the future of Albania and Epirus, it is difficult to see a single point where the interests or sentiments of the Italian people were identical with those of the Germans and Austrians, and even in the excepted case, the identity was negative, not positive. The Italians desired that the Serbians should be kept out of Durazzo and San Giovanni di Medua, the Greeks out of Avlona. They certainly did not desire to see these ports pass to Austria.

In 1914, the German navy had risen to the position of second in the world. It was far from being in a position to challenge single-handed the naval might of Great Britain, for our strength in heavy ships was nearly two to one numerically, and probably a very great deal more than two to one in the other elements which make sea power. But, as we saw from the Preamble to the German Navy Act of 1900, the German Admiralty held the opinion that "it is not absolutely necessary that the German battle-fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest naval Power,

because a great naval Power will not be able, as a rule, to concentrate all its striking forces against us." The diplomacy of King Edward and the naval policy of Lord Fisher had rendered the hope underlying this sentence nugatory. Our battle-front had been swung round to face eastward, and our rear had been rendered safe by the new and friendly relations into which we had entered with France and, subsequently, with Russia. There remained two hopes for the Germans: First, that we should argue as they did, that the defeat of a strong German navy would so substantially weaken us that our own position in the world would no longer be secured by an adequate fleet, and that, therefore, we should hesitate to join in the struggle; and, secondly, that their anticipated superiority in training, in material, and, above all, in speed of mobilisation, might avail to give them an initial advantage which would counteract their total inferiority in strength. Both hopes were doomed to disappointment.

The first assumption is a characteristic manifestation of that cynical philosophy known to the school of Bismarck as "Realpolitik." That nothing ought to count in national policy except advantage; that truth, honour, faith, loyalty have no place in international relations; that the plighted word of king or people should hold good just so long as convenience prescribes and may be broken when circumstances alter: such are the principles underlying German statecraft, and such are the principles on which the Wilhelmstrasse seems to have believed, quite sincerely, that we should act. The bond we had signed and sealed, along with Prussia, to protect the neutrality of Belgium; our amity with France and Russia, were not expected to weigh with us against the chance which would come of fishing in troubled waters if we kept our sea power intact. The earth and everything in it would belong to us and Germany if we held aloof—until the time came for Germany to swallow our share as well as her own. Such was the thought underlying the dishonouring conditions of

neutrality offered by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to our Government. Such was the ethical outlook from which sprang his cry of mortification and anger that all this should be thrown away for the sake of "a scrap of paper." The British and the German minds; the point of view of militarism and sea power are, as the mathematicians say, asymptotic. If it be true that a gentleman is one who "swearth unto his neighbour and disappointeth him not, though it be to his own hindrance," then, in that memorable interview with Sir Edward Goschen, Bethmann-Hollweg wrote himself down a cad. And he spoke in the name of his nation.

Lest the charge of unctuous rectitude which some of our own countrymen level at us when our obligation to Belgium is put forward as our ground for war be brought against the foregoing passage, let it be frankly acknowledged that our interest jumped with our honour. Otherwise our pledge to Belgium would never have been given. We were about to fight once more the age-long issue which had brought us into the field every time it has been raised, from the Spanish Armada to the defeat of Napoleon. To maintain the independence of the small nations which fringe the coastline of Europe, and to prevent, so far as lies in our power, any one of the great military monarchies of the Continent from enlarging its access to blue water are objects for us no less vital than to preserve the balance of power and to check all attempts at universal dominion. Indeed, the three things all hang together. For this reason, we have always fought for the independence of the Low Countries. For this reason we have been the steadfast ally of Portugal. For this reason we, for years, as Lord Salisbury said, "backed the wrong horse" by defending the Turks against the Russians. Once we failed to be true to our policy, and our failure gave Kiel to Germany.

Only when the secrets of all hearts are revealed will the cross-currents which swayed the minds of men in the eventful days between the murder of the Archduke Franz

Ferdinand on June 28th and the outbreak of war be fully understood. Nothing is yet clear, save the dignified determination of France to stand by Russia, the heroic resolve of King Albert and his Belgians to resist aggression, and the calm resolution with which Great Britain stood to her word. The motives of the Russian people are clear enough in the light of subsequent events; but those of the Tsardom are less easy to unravel. As to Germany and Austria, arrogance, ambition and panic seem to have borne about equal parts. By the morning of August 4th, Germany knew that, if she persisted in her intention to attack France and to violate the neutrality of Belgium in order to do so, the sea power of Britain would be ranged against her. The German Higher Command could hardly be so obtuse as not to realise, at least partially, what that meant. But they still hoped to neutralise their disadvantage by rapid mobilisation and a dashing "hussar stroke" at the outset. They had seized an opportunity which presented itself at a favourable moment. The German navy is a conscript force. It has, for backbone, a large number of petty officers and leading hands who volunteer for continuous service and make a life profession of the navy. But of the rest one-third is changed every year, the change taking place in the early autumn. In the month of August, therefore, the German navy reaches its highest point of efficiency, the youngest members of its crews having had about a year's training, while the three-year men are still on board. In August, 1914, the High Sea Fleet had just returned from manœuvres when war broke out. The manœuvres themselves had followed immediately upon the junketings at Kiel to celebrate the re-opening of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal after the widening and deepening necessitated by the coming of the Dreadnought type of ship. Admiral Sir George Warrender and a division of the First Battle Squadron had been present, and the Kaiser had gone out of his way to show exceptional courtesy to him and to his accomplished wife.

As it happened, the circumstances were hardly less fortunate for the British Navy, since a test mobilisation of the Second, or nucleus crew, Fleet, which had been ordered months previously when there was no hint of trouble in the air, had just been brought to a successful conclusion. The events of the latter half of July will long live in the memory of those who took part in them. On the eighteenth, the long lines of ships, stretching from the entrance to Portsmouth Harbour across to the Island, lay in sunlight, with a stiff breeze which stretched the ensigns and admirals' flags as stiff as boards. The picket boats and pinnaces raced to and fro, tumbling and tossing over the gleaming waves, bringing parties of guests to the various ships. For the King was coming to inspect his fleets. In the interval of waiting, *Shamrock III* danced down the lines like some frail butterfly, on her way to challenge for the America Cup, and in tow of the *Erin*, destined to finish her journey, not in New York Harbour, but in the Adriatic. Over this world of light and gaiety came the first shadow of the storm. The King's visit was cancelled. He was engaged with the Party leaders in a last effort to avert civil war in Ireland. That even graver matters lay behind, few guessed.

Two days later he came. It was a grey, wet morning as the harbour tugs detailed to convey the spectators took up their position beyond the Horse Fort. The ships weighed anchor, and were led by the King in the *Victoria and Albert* out to sea. The yacht anchored hard by, and the guns of the great ships pealed forth their *Ave Cæsar!* as they steamed by. First battleships, Dreadnoughts and pre-Dreadnoughts; then battle-cruisers, armoured cruisers, cruisers, light cruisers; the destroyer flotillas: in endless stretch of pageantry they went by while the seaplanes wheeled and circled and dipped overhead. The mightiest Fleet ever assembled steamed out past the Nab on its last errand of peace. And there were in that array ships which should return no more at all. The war-cloud was, by then,

bigger than a man's hand, and in the minds of the spectators the thought was present that things might be as it proved they were destined to be.

On July 24th, after four days' exercise in the Channel, the First Fleet returned to Portland, and the squadrons of the Second Fleet to their home ports, where the reservists were dismissed to their homes. The First Fleet was to have given manœuvre leave to the crews by watches. But on July 26th the order was flashed down to it, "Stand fast!" The ships of the Second Fleet were ordered to remain in close proximity to their "balance crews," that is, to the men in the schools and harbour establishments detailed to bring them up to full complement. On July 29th the First Fleet moved from Portland, the bands playing "The Red, White and Blue," "Britons, Strike Home," "Hearts of Oak," and suchlike stirring airs of "Eighteen Hundred and War-time." The movement was quite unexpected, and only a small crowd had assembled on Portland Breakwater to cheer them as they put to sea. They "faded like a cloud in the silent summer heaven," and no one, the Germans least of all, knew their destination. But when that Fleet steamed out of Portland, the chance of a sudden blow on which the hope of Germany at sea was based, vanished. On August 2nd Mr. Churchill took the step which, whatever view is taken of his subsequent actions, earned him the undying gratitude of his country. He issued the order to mobilise the whole of our naval forces. The response bettered expectation. On the evening of August 3rd the Admiralty were able to announce that, "The mobilisation of the British Navy was completed in all respects at four o'clock this morning. This is due to the measures taken, and to the voluntary response of the reserve men in the absence of a Royal Proclamation, which has now been issued. The entire Navy is now on a war footing." The force so mobilised comprised the whole of the effective warships in the Navy List, and the trawler reserve, which had been organised

for mine-sweeping. Mercantile auxiliaries were taken up, and their guns mounted with extraordinary rapidity. Necessarily, many men of the Royal Naval Reserve, which consists of merchant seamen, were out of the country at the start. But the Fleet Reservists and the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve showed up in full numbers from the start. That the English had not lost the habit of the sea was soon apparent.

War was declared at 11 p.m. on August 4th. At 9 a.m. on August 5th, less than twelve hours later, the German mine-layer, *Königin Luise*, was sunk when laying mines off the coast of Suffolk. Numbers had already been laid, with the object of catching the British Fleet on its way to its war stations. But the British Fleet was already there. Other schemes of the Germans to hamper our mobilisation and to destroy our communications were nipped in the bud by the promptitude of the measures taken by the Admiralty. The faith of Admiral von der Goltz in German superiority of mobilisation was thus brought to nought. The mines laid by the *Königin Luise* unhappily caught the *Amphion*, the leader of the flotilla which sank the mine-layer; but they effected nothing else, beyond demonstrating to the world that Germany only signed the Article of the Hague Convention dealing with the laying of mines in order that she might snatch an advantage by disregarding it. The cruisers which had been built to prey upon our commerce were forced to remain in their home ports, save such as were already in distant waters. The ships of the German mercantile marine which were in Hamburg and Bremen were laid up where they were. Those which were in neutral ports dared not to put to sea, but interned themselves at once. Those already on the high seas scuttled like rabbits for the nearest neutral ports, among others the great liner *Kronprinzessin Cecilie*, which was on voyage home from the United States with a precious cargo of bullion. Within forty-eight hours the sea-borne trade of Germany had

ceased to be. In all our successful naval wars, we had never asserted our mastery of the ocean routes so speedily or so completely. The first half of the function of sea power was successfully carried out. We denied the use of the sea to the enemy, save by neutral ships. The second part was also carried out, though less completely. We secured the use of the sea to ourselves.

The immediate results of the entry of Great Britain into the war must now be discussed at some length. The more obvious effects are, of course, easily apparent. The way was made safe for the passage of the Expeditionary Force to France, and its immediate dispatch was permitted by the inviolability secured to our shores by the "instant readiness for war" of the Fleet. The seas were kept open for trade both to the French and ourselves, and the resources of the neutral world were thus made available to correct the initial unreadiness of the free Powers. The French were enabled to bring their over-sea armies for service in the Western battlefields. Moreover, we ourselves brought four good divisions of Regulars, the 26th, 27th, 28th and 29th, back from distant parts of the Empire, replacing them and the Indian Army, which was imperatively needed to strengthen the thin line in France and Flanders, with Territorial troops. And, in due course, Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders, the gallant volunteers of the marches of the Empire, were brought to stand side by side with the sons of the Mother Country. At the same time, many thousands of Germans and Austrians of military age were prevented from joining the armies of our foes. Excluding altogether the Army in France, which, of course, is there entirely owing to sea power, it would probably be within the mark to say that the same force has been worth not less than two million soldiers to the Allies. Nor is the total number of men furnished to our own armies and denied to those of our enemies the only thing to be considered. It is necessary not only to have soldiers, but to have them where they are

wanted. Whether the strategy which directed the Gallipoli, Mesopotamia, Salonika and Egyptian campaigns was sound or not, at any rate the armies required were conveyed to the chosen spots by virtue of sea power, and, by the same agency, have hitherto been maintained where they were required, or have been transferred to another battle-field and redistributed according to need. Egypt, as always in history, has furnished a striking instance of the superiority of sea communications over land communications. We used it as a central base, not only for the Army defending the Canal or designated for offensive operations in Palestine, but for troops whose eventual destination was France, Gallipoli, Salonika or Mesopotamia. The Turks, on the other hand, despite the ardent desire of their German masters to strike at what they term the backbone of the British Empire, have never been able to muster a force sufficiently large to cause us the smallest uneasiness. The sea-borne troops have numbered hundreds of thousands, the land-borne troops, tens of thousands.

Two other episodes may also be mentioned by way of illustration. The Serbian Army, scattered, weary, ragged and starving, straggled down to the coast through the Albanian mountains in the autumn of 1915. There they were met by French transports, were snatched away out of reach of their pursuing enemies, fed, re-equipped and re-organised in Corfu, and were then conveyed to Salonika where they have rescued Monastir from the hands of their inveterate foes. This was a feat in every way comparable with the rescue of Sir John Moore's army at Corunna. Again, thanks to the assistance of the Japanese, forty thousand Russian troops were brought round from Vladivostok to fight in France. The number seems insignificant in relation to the mighty hosts engaged on the Western front. But it is almost as great as Wellington's Peninsular army, greater than the number of British troops which fought at Waterloo, and not much less than the original force which Sir Redvers Buller took to South

Africa in 1899. It was thought an astonishing feat, of which the British Empire alone was capable, to convey that army six thousand miles. The Japanese conveyed the Russian force more than double that distance, covered, of course, by the British Navy, and, in particular, by the Grand Fleet, "hidden in the Northern mists." These things have been going on all through the war, unseen and in silence. But they are merely the more common-place workings of sea power.

If we look a little deeper, the results are even more momentous. Without the aid of Britain, the navies of France and Russia would have been outnumbered by those of Germany and Austria about two to one. At the beginning of the war, Russia had not a single Dreadnought ship in commission, the French but four. Germany and Austria-Hungary opposed to them no fewer than twenty-four battleships and battle-cruisers of the Dreadnought type. It is evident that the control of the Baltic would have been completely in the hands of the Germans, but for the fact that the presence of the Grand Fleet of Britain in the North Sea forbade them to concentrate their strength to the North. Had they been able to do so, a swift blow at Petrograd by sea might have settled the event in the Eastern theatre within a few months. Moreover, the coasts of Northern France would have lain open to attack by sea, and the French must have kept a large number of men of the fighting line to watch them. With Great Britain on her side, not only has France been able to concentrate the whole of her fighting strength against the German armies, but the Germans have felt themselves compelled to keep a large number of troops in the North to guard against a sudden descent upon their coasts. But there is more than this. The position of Italy in the Triple Alliance has already been discussed. If the shores of Italy had not been secured by a force more powerful than anything the Austro-Germans could bring against the combined naval strength of France and Italy, it would

have been impossible for the Italians to have resisted the pressure of the Teutons. They would have been forced into the war on the side of the Central Powers. That would have meant a way open for the invasion of France through Savoy, and the French positions on their eastern frontier taken in reverse. *Mutatis mutandis*, the situation of 1796-8 would have been very nearly reproduced, with still greater advantage on the side of the invader. But this time, the rôle of invader and invaded would have been reversed.

Nor is this all, important as the considerations just stated are. Turkey hesitated long before throwing in her lot with Germany and Austria. But for the unfortunate affair of the *Goeben*, she might have hesitated till the end. Bereft of sea power, the chances of war offered few attractions for her. The safe arrival of the *Goeben* at Constantinople, however, gave her a temporary command of the Black Sea, for the Russian Dreadnoughts were not ready. Had Great Britain not joined the Allies, there can be no sort of doubt that the chance of striking down Russia, her secular foe, would have brought her into the arena at once. Bulgaria, without any question, would immediately have followed her example. These things were all included in the calculations of the Central Powers. Russia has always found it a sufficiently difficult task to fight the Turks single-handed. With Austria and a part of the German armies on her hands, and with the Ottoman forces supplied by Germany and led by German officers, she must have been overwhelmed. Then, with Serbia crushed, Rumania, like Italy, forced to abide by the engagements into which she had entered, and Greece, under her ineffable King, siding enthusiastically with the strongest, the whole of the Teuton ambitions in the Near and Middle East would have been realised. Events have shown us plainly enough that the Central Powers had nothing to fear from the War on Two Fronts, unless the trident of Britain were thrown into the scale.

But the British declaration of war reversed the

situation. Instead of being two-fold stronger at sea, the Central Powers were now almost exactly two-fold weaker, so far as numbers were concerned. How much weaker in all other elements, it is impossible to compute. This gave the forces of liberty the precious gift of time to organise their resources, they being, in the very nature of the case, less prepared for the struggle than the forces of tyranny. In all history it has been so, and in all history it is fortunate for the cause of right and freedom that sea power does not flourish under systems which make for aggression and oppression. The Germans have come nearer to success than any such people have before. If the trident had been in their fist in 1914, or they could have succeeded in grasping it, the world would by now have been at their feet, despite all the armies of the Allies. The recent history of Turkey is illuminative on this point. The Ottoman Navy once ranked third in the world. It was still formidable as lately as 1877. But Abdul Hamid feared the fleet, and he deliberately let it sink into decay. The very engines of the warships were sold by the Minister of Marine for his private profit. So Turkey, with the most magnificent naval position in Europe in her hands, entered the final struggle for existence (which we may date from the Italian attack on Tripoli in 1911) without a navy. Had she been more powerful at sea than the Greeks in 1912, it is reasonable to suppose that Salonika and Dedeagatch would still have been in her possession, along with the islands of the Ægean, and that the Gallipoli expedition could never have taken place.

That famous adventure failed to attain its ultimate purpose, and has, in consequence, been somewhat hastily written down a disastrous failure. But, having regard to the circumstances and needs of the moment at which it was launched, that view is far too shallow. Had the Turks been able to bring their whole power to bear against the Russians at the time of Mackensen's famous "drive" through Galicia, especially had the accession of Bulgaria

to the Central League then permitted the use of Turkish and Bulgarian troops against the Serbians and thus against the Russian flank, it is difficult to see how the Allies could have avoided signing a calamitous peace. That the greater positive ends were not attained is lamentable. Had they been, it is probable that peace would also have come long before, and that it would have been equally calamitous to the Central Powers. Russian man-power and food-power would have been fully combined with Western munition-power, and the result must have been overwhelming. It is, of course, possible that some other and more practicable way might have been found of obtaining the same end. Alternative schemes were proposed; but, as one and all depended on the use of sea power, there is no need to discuss them in detail here.

A consequence of sea power, subtle and easy to be missed, must now be discussed. As time went on, the huge armies placed in the field by both sides extended in fortified lines the whole length of their natural frontiers. Thus the line on the Western Front extended from the Belgian coast to the borders of Switzerland; that on the Eastern Front from the Baltic, at first to the Rumanian frontier, and now to the Black Sea. The Italians extended from the Swiss Alps to the head of the Adriatic. In Asia, the Turkish line extended from the Black Sea down to well into Persia, with its right flank refused to cover Mesopotamia from a British advance. By land, therefore, the opportunity of a flank attack was everywhere denied to the combatants. All that any of them could hope to achieve was to create a flank by breaking through the enemy's lines by frontal attack. But command of the sea confers on its possessor the power of reaching round the flank of the enemy's line and thus turning it. If the Germans could acquire such command, they could turn the northern end of the Russian positions beyond Riga. A successful landing on the Belgian coast or in Schleswig would place the British in a similar position. But, apart

from such obvious strokes as these, the apprehension of which has an abiding influence on the course of the war, there are more distant opportunities which have had consequences, the full effect of which will only be seen when its complete history is written. Success in Gallipoli would have turned the flank of the Central Powers to some purpose. When its approaching failure became apparent, the Bulgarians were cajoled or bribed into the war, and, for the moment, the danger was averted. But the concentration of German aims was none the less dissipated, and the Franco-British force at Salonika occupied something of the same position that Wellington's army did in the lines of Torres Vedras. The actual turning-movement, however, was wider still. It began with the driving in of the Turkish right flank at Kut and Baghdad, aided by the British movement on Palestine. The end of these things is not yet; the military effect is not fully apparent. But this much can be said: that however valuable Turkish and Bulgarian aid may have been to the Germans, they would gladly have dispensed with it, if the dangers against which it was intended to guard could have been removed at the same time. The existence of these dangers was the result of the superiority at sea which we and our Allies possessed. Sea power has shown its old ability to force its energy into excentric movements, with consequent dissipation of his energy and resources. Turkey and Bulgaria have no resources of their own for the manufacture of guns and munitions. Germany and Austria must supply them. If, then, the superiority in artillery with which the Germans began the war on the Western Front had passed to the other side when the campaign of 1917 opened, the fact may be attributed, in part at least, to the fact that the brooding threat of sea power compelled the enemy to seek allies whose dependence on him for the equipment of war weakened his own power to compete with the output of material which the French and British could obtain from all parts of the world.

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The events of the war at sea may now be briefly recorded. As we have seen, the first function of sea power was speedily fulfilled. The Germans lost the use of the sea. If the Germans wished to regain it, there was only one way in which they could do so. Sir John Jellicoe and Sir David Beatty told them so as plainly as acts could speak. The Grand Fleet swept the North Sea, offering battle. When this had no effect, Sir David trailed his coat inside the Bight of Heligoland. Thus was brought on the dashing action of August 28th, 1914, in which the German cruisers *Mainz*, *Köln* and *Ariadne*, with several torpedo-boats, were sunk and the power of the battle-cruiser first demonstrated. The German heavy ships refused action and hid themselves in the mist. Germany, then and there, surrendered the command of the sea on the positive side. The natural consequence was that she was cut off, in a degree more or less complete, from over-sea supplies. Great Britain established what, for want of a better word, is called a blockade, which she tightened at will, the only restraint being consideration for the interests of neutrals. Measures were not formally adopted until the Germans announced their intention of sinking merchantmen approaching the shores of Great Britain by submarines, and until the German Government had assumed the control of the whole food supply of Germany. There is a distinction between the British blockade of Germany and the measures taken by Order in Council against Napoleon, which has been generally overlooked. Napoleon's expressed intention was to ruin Great Britain by shutting her goods out from the whole Continent. The British Government, on the other hand, was willing that not only British, but also neutral, goods should reach the Continent, provided they paid toll to Great Britain first. Thus the financial ability of the country to continue the war was maintained. But the Continent was made to feel the smart by exorbitant prices. As against Germany and her allies, the intention has been, on the other hand, to

cut off all possible sources of supply. The difference in method is explained by the difference in the character of the two wars. In the former, it was an affair of Governments and armies; in the latter, it has been an affair of whole nations, of the efforts of every man and every woman, in the fighting line or behind it. The quickest possible decision was, therefore, imperative.

The "strangle-hold" on Germany, however, took effect much more slowly than many people had believed would be the case. For this there are two main reasons. In the first place, Germany before the war was, to a very large extent, a self-supporting and exporting country, both in regard to food and to many raw materials, especially those which were required for the production of munitions of war. With her export trade cut off, the whole of the stocks of these raw materials was available for home consumption. As regards food supplies, with the exception of the cereals, previously imported in the main from Russia, the greater part of the imports were from Holland, Denmark, Switzerland: neutral countries lying along the German frontier. The circumstances were, in another respect, different from those which obtained during the Napoleonic Wars. Then, almost the whole of the Continent lay at the feet of the Emperor, and it was easy to treat goods going to any European port under his domination as enemy goods. But Holland and the Scandinavian countries were in every way entitled to the rights of neutrals. To interfere with the high hand with their right to trade with other neutral countries, especially with the United States, was a proceeding, not only at variance with all the principles for the sake of which Great Britain drew the sword, but also one fraught with the gravest peril to us. Gently as we dealt with neutrals, the sympathy of the smaller countries was not so universally with us as the merits of the quarrel and their own deadly peril from a German success appeared to make it probable that they would be.

It cannot be denied that the experiences of the war

have shown that the economic advantages of sea power had been exploited by this country to a degree which carried with it a grave political danger. This was particularly apparent after the Germans adopted "unrestricted submarine warfare" in February, 1917. Flagitious as was their defiance of all the laws of nations and of humanity, the British had only themselves to thank for it that, in the many years of peace, they had deliberately shut their eyes to the dangers of war. The years of peace may be many and those of war, mercifully, few. But a week of unsuccessful war may destroy for ever all the benefits accruing from generations of peace. Sea power is essentially pacific in its aims and workings. But behind those peaceful workings must always stand the ability to keep the paths of the sea open against any foe, whatever weapons he may use, and sufficient means of endurance to hold out until the effects of a temporary reverse or a delayed decision can be overcome. Otherwise the whole country is in the position of a maritime fortress, meant to support and succour the fleet, which, like Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese War, keeps the fleet tethered to itself and incapable of that offensive action which is its true function. Great Britain, suffering scarcity and fearing starvation while her fleet sealed the Germans into their ports, and while one-fifth of the globe, including many of its most fertile portions, was included within the British Empire, will stand for a warning to all time that, in the last analysis, man lives by Mother Earth, and that no cheapness of imported commodities can compensate for the ruin of a country's agriculture.

The Germans knew from the start that, while they themselves were not absolutely dependent on imported goods, at any rate for many months, the British were dependent at once on seaborne trade for the very necessities of life. While, therefore, they surrendered somewhat tamely their own use of the sea, they made a determined and well-organised effort to stop its use by us. They

operated in Home waters by scattering mines freely, and without warning to neutrals, in the paths of shipping, and, in a growing degree, by the use of submarines. In the distant seas they let loose a number of cruisers. The *Goeben*, battle-cruiser, and *Breslau*, light cruiser, were in the Mediterranean, while outside European waters were the two powerful armoured cruisers, *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, and several light cruisers, the most famous of which were the *Emden*, *Karlsruhe*, *Leipsic*, *Dresden*, *Königsberg*, and *Nürnberg*. In addition, there were three or four armed auxiliaries, which, in defiance of all agreements, transformed themselves into warships on the high seas. The supply of these ships was skilfully arranged for by means which are not yet known in detail, at any rate outside the Intelligence Department of the Admiralty. If war against commerce, most carefully organised in advance, could give the command of the seas, the Germans would have won it in August and September, 1914. The success of their plan was frustrated by their inability to get a sufficient number of cruisers out upon the trade routes, and that failure was due to the prompt mobilisation of the Grand Fleet and the impotence of the Germans to contest the major issue with it.

To deal first with the *Goeben*. The object of her presence in the Mediterranean was undoubtedly, in part at least, to interfere with the transport of the French African army to France. In that she and her lighter consort, the *Breslau*, should have had the assistance of the Austrian Fleet. But war between France and Austria was not declared till August 10th, nor between Great Britain and Austria till August 12th. The German ships bombarded Algiers and Boma during the first week of the war, and then betook themselves into the neutral port of Messina, which they were, of course, bound to leave at the expiration of twenty-four hours in accordance with the Neutrality Declaration of Italy. The British had four battle-cruisers in the Mediterranean, as well as some armoured cruisers

and light cruisers. For some accountable reason the battle-cruiser squadron was not concentrated against the Germans, but was kept watching the Austrian Fleet in the Adriatic. The task of watching the *Goeben* and *Breslau* was entrusted to the *Defence* and *Gloucester*, the former of which was greatly inferior in force to the *Goeben*, while the *Gloucester* was slightly superior to the *Breslau*. Wireless messages failed to bring the battle-cruisers to the assistance of the *Defence* in time; the Admiral whose flag was flying in that vessel had positive orders not to fight if in inferior force, and, after a plucky attempt to engage on the part of the little *Gloucester*, the two German ships escaped into the Dardanelles and up to Constantinople, carrying a whole bag of troubles with them. Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne, the Commander-in-Chief, came home, the chief command in the Mediterranean being handed over to the French Admiral, Boué de Lapeyrère, and the Admiralty "approved the measures taken by him in all respects." His second in command, Rear-Admiral E. C. T. Troubridge, was recalled for an inquiry to be made, was tried by court-martial, and was acquitted. As my Lords are in sole possession of all the facts of the case, it is impossible to dispute the ground on which their "satisfaction" with the conduct of the Commander-in-Chief was based. But the failure to make an end of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* was a costly one for this country and her Allies.


Equally unfortunate was the escape of the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* from Tsing-tao without being watched and followed by a superior force. These powerful ships vanished almost completely from sight for over two months, and the British light cruisers engaged in hunting down the commerce-raiders ran a continual risk of fetching up against them. Hunting commerce-raiders entails dissipation of force, and it was not the least able part of the German dispositions that they provided this strong, concentrated force to act as a perpetual menace to the scat-

tered ships of the Allies. Squadrons were formed as rapidly as possible for the purpose of putting an end to the menace, but unfortunately, as events were to prove, one at least of these squadrons was itself insufficiently powerful for the task. The one British battle-cruiser on the station, H.M.A.S. *Australia*, was for some time engaged in subduing German islands in the Pacific, for which task there was doubtless a sound political reason. The navy of Japan, which had declared war in September, joined in the hue-and-cry; but it was only in December that the two vessels were finally run to earth, and then only after they had inflicted a reverse on the British Navy of a particularly galling kind.


One of the squadrons organised to deal with the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* consisted of the *Good Hope*, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock, *Monmouth*, *Glasgow*, and *Otranto*, an auxiliary cruiser. The Admiralty, aware of the inferiority of this force to the Germans, sent out the old battleship *Canopus* to support Cradock, sending him instructions that he was not to fight unless she was in company, which was equivalent to an order not to fight at all. On November 1st Cradock encountered the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, which formed the German squadron under Admiral Graf von Spee, off Coronel, a port of Chili. The Germans were superior in gun-power, disposing of twelve 8·2-inch guns upon the broadside and six 6-inch, against two 9·2-inch in the *Good Hope* and seventeen 6-inch for the two British vessels combined. But the main-deck 6-inch of the *Good Hope* could not be fought in a seaway, and there was a heavy swell running. The German ships, moreover, were homogeneous, while the British were diverse. In speed the British had a small nominal advantage. This might have enabled Cradock to avoid action if that had been his mind. But it was insufficient to force action on the enemy until the conditions of light favoured him. When the British ships were silhouetted against the after-glow, and he

himself had become almost invisible against the land, von Spee accepted battle at twelve thousand yards. The action was quickly at an end. Both British ships caught fire after a few salvoes from the Germans, and, just before eight o'clock, the *Good Hope* blew up. The *Monmouth* continued the hopeless fight for a while longer, badly down by the bows, and then the *Glasgow*, which had parted company in face of the overwhelming odds, saw a number of flashes, which were doubtless the final attack upon the *Monmouth*. The rest is silence. Not a man of Cradock's gallant ships survived to tell the tale.

There has been much difference of opinion over the conduct of the British Admiral in accepting battle. That he disobeyed a direct order of the Admiralty is clear. That he was outmanœuvred in the engagement is equally clear. But what was the alternative? Von Spee might very well have escaped from observation in the night and have gone off to wreak mischief, perhaps, on the coast of British Columbia, which would have raised an outcry throughout the whole Empire. Cradock was where he was for the express purpose of stopping von Spee's career. It was practically certain that, wherever and whenever he fought him, he would have to do so without the aid of the *Canopus*. The sending of that ship to support fast cruisers was little better than a farce. To fall in with an enemy so nearly of equal strength and to part without an action would have been to fly in the face of British naval tradition. Cradock may very well have called to mind Nelson's words, and reasoned that by the time von Spee had beaten him soundly he would do us no more mischief that year. That, in the event, he failed to put the German squadron out of action was due to a tactical miscalculation. The words from the Book of Maccabees, inscribed upon his cenotaph, embody the verdict of his comrades upon this gallant and unfortunate seaman: "God forbid that I should do this thing and flee away from them; if our time be come, let us die manfully for our brethren, and let us not stain our honour."



A MODERN BATTLESHIP.



LORD FISHER.




Photo by

[Russell & Co., Southsea.

SIR JOHN JELlicoe

It was a consideration, no doubt present to Cradock's mind, that if von Spee were only injured comparatively lightly he had no port within many thousands of miles to which he could go for repairs. He could coal and receive supplies at a secret rendezvous; but if he had to seek dockyard repairs he could receive no assistance from neutrals. Even if his own ships' companies could do the work, his whereabouts in port would be immediately known. It was even an object worth considerable risk to compel him to empty his magazines. The British squadron, on the other hand, could rely on ports under its own flag in which it could obtain the necessary succour. In the sequel, the force brought to bear on von Spee was so superior that it is difficult to say that Cradock's action had any bearing on the result. But it is noteworthy that Admiral Sturdee's despatch speaks of the ammunition of the *Gneisenau* being exhausted before the end of the Battle of the Falkland Islands.

Lord Fisher returned to office as First Sea Lord the day before the action off Coronel was fought. Not a moment was lost by the vigorous old seaman, when the news came, in making his dispositions to avenge and repair the disaster. The parent of the battle-cruiser had the weapon ready to his hand, now to be used for the purpose he had designed her for. The *Invincible* and the *Inflexible* were ordered to the Pacific immediately, Admiral Sturdee being appointed to the command. To all representations as to the need for a refit the answer was returned, "Go, and go quickly." The squadron donned the cap of darkness and the shoes of swiftness. As it went the still, small voice of the wireless called to it all the ships which were cruising in the South Atlantic and Pacific. *Kent*, *Carnarvon*, *Cornwall*, *Glasgow*, and *Bristol* flocked from all quarters to the flag, with the *Canopus* and auxiliary cruiser *Macedonia*. The *Australia* raced across the Pacific along with the Japanese; but they were too late for a share in the grand event. On December 7th Admiral Sturdee

arrived at the Falkland Islands and there assembled his squadron.

Admiral Graf von Spee had taken similar action. He had called to him the *Nürnberg*, *Dresden*, and *Leipsic*, together with some colliers. It is thought that his destination was South Africa, where the German colonists were resisting Botha, and where there had lately been an outbreak of rebellion among the unreconciled element of the Dutch population. Had he arrived in those waters the mischief he would have done might have been incalculable. But his lucky star had set. He decided on his way to look in at the Falkland Islands and destroy the wireless station. On the morning of December 8th the *Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg* approached to reconnoitre. They found the *Canopus*, which opened fire upon them at 11,000 yards, and the *Kent* lying at the entrance to Port William as guard-ship. They stood in to engage, expecting, probably, an easy repetition of the Coronel victory. Then they saw the masts of the *Invincible* and *Inflexible*, recognised the trap into which they had fallen, and retreated at full speed to warn their consorts. The British fleet got under way, and a stern chase followed. The Germans scattered, but the *Kent*, *Cornwall*, and *Glasgow* accounted for the *Nürnberg* and *Leipsic*, while the battle-cruisers and *Carnarvon* went after the armoured ships. The *Dresden* alone of the German squadron escaped, to meet her fate a few months later off the Island of St. Juan Fernandez. The fight between the battle-cruisers and the armoured cruisers was a long-drawn-out business, for the former made no attempt to close, but made use of their superiority in gun-power and speed to destroy their opponents at a range at which they ran little risk of incurring severe injuries themselves. The tactical theory on which they were designed was brilliantly vindicated on this occasion. But it must be remembered that neither succour nor escape was possible to the Germans. Admiral Sturdee always retained the power to close if there was the smallest indication of a change of weather,

or if visibility should deteriorate from any cause. At 4.17 the *Scharnhorst* sank with all hands, the gallant von Spee, who had shown himself throughout an honourable enemy, going down with her. At six o'clock the *Gneisenau* followed her, having fought a single-handed battle for nearly two hours. Less than two hundred officers and men were saved. Two transports or colliers were destroyed by the *Bristol* and *Macedonia*.

The operations which ended in the destruction of Admiral von Spee's squadron remain the most brilliant and decisive of the war at sea. Full credit must be given to those who hunted the German squadron out of the seas where it would have found most opportunities of mischief, both by direct action and by forming a *point d'appui* for the light cruisers of the enemy. But above all else stands out the sureness of touch with which the veteran seaman, Lord Fisher, solved the problem of being in superior force at the decisive point. The actual meeting at the Falkland Islands has the dramatic touch about it which, according to disposition, we may call fortuitous or Providential. But the unerring reading of von Spee's mind, the instant decision and the sure adjustment of means to the end all lend to the British strategy a touch of genius. Sturdee's ships, dependent on coal supply for their motive power, were lost to sight for a month as completely as were Nelson's in the chase after Villeneuve. But whereas the Admiralty were as much in ignorance of the whereabouts of the latter as were the public, the secret, noiseless whispers of the wireless not only kept Whitehall fully informed of all that was passing, but also summoned all the British ships within the area to the fateful rendezvous. The Battle of the Falkland Islands put an end at once to all hope of German support which the disaffected within the Empire might have cherished, and set free the British Navy outside the Grand Fleet for any work it might be called upon to do. There was soon plenty ready to its hand.

The havoc wrought by German light cruisers on

British shipping in the first phase of the war was by no means negligible. The *Emden*, in particular, boldly and skilfully handled, not only sank seventeen vessels worth over two millions sterling, but even bombarded a part of Madras, and sank a small Russian cruiser and a French destroyer at Penang. On November 9th, however, she was caught by the Australian cruiser, *Sydney*, off Cocos Keeling Island and destroyed. The *Sydney*, with other light cruisers, was engaged in convoying Australasian troops—a touch-and-go business under the circumstances. The destruction of the famous raider was a very decided relief, especially as, about the same time, the *Königsberg*, which had sunk the small cruiser *Pegasus* off Zanzibar, was driven into the Rufigi River, and there held captive till she was destroyed some months later in a curious action in which a monitor and a seaplane bore part. The *Karlsruhe*, operating in the Atlantic, also destroyed seventeen ships, valued at a million and a half, before she met with a mysterious end. The *Nürnberg*, *Dresden* and *Leipzig* were less successful, the chief feat of the first-named being the cutting of the submarine cable at Fanning Island. Two auxiliary cruisers, however, the *Krönprinz Wilhelm* and *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, sank between them twenty-four ships, worth about a million and three-quarters. They both interned themselves when they had exhausted their means of obtaining supplies. But another, the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, was sunk in action by the *Highflyer* off the coast of Morocco, and the *Cap Trafalgar* was destroyed by the auxiliary cruiser, *Carmania*, after a spirited and well-fought action in which the victor very nearly shared the fate of her victim.

Since the *Dresden* was destroyed, the efforts of the Germans in the outer seas, so far as above-water craft are concerned, have been confined to raids by disguised vessels of uncertain type, one (or two) of which have been known by the name of *Mowe*. This vessel (or these vessels), most ably commanded by Count von und zu Dohna-Schlodien,

did heavy damage, and succeeded in getting at least one prize back into a German port. Another ship, the *Grief*, was discovered and sunk before she could get out to the trade routes. She succeeded in torpedoing her assailant, the auxiliary cruiser, *Alcantara*, before she succumbed. A sailing ship, to which the name *Seeadler* has been given, has also caused considerable havoc, chiefly by means of mines, as far east as Colombo. The deeds of all these vessels put together, however, by no means approach the loss we suffered from cruisers and privateers during our most victorious wars in the past, and even after our greatest successes. Further discussion on the war against commerce must, however, be postponed till a later chapter.

CHAPTER XIII

THE MAIN FLEETS

THE activities of British cruisers in all parts of the world were thus efficacious in clearing the seas of enemy surface-craft, in permitting the safe transport of many hundred thousands of troops, and in clearing the way for offensive operations both by land and sea. Their success in this depended on the soundness of the dispositions which held the main fleets in a clamp of steel and denied ingress and egress to and from the enemy's ports to vessels of all kinds. This was the root principle of the strategy inherited by us from the past: the modern application of Drake's plan of "impeaching" the enemy off his own ports. To observe the enemy fleet from a central position, whence any threatened point could be speedily reached and the foe be brought to action if he should expose himself, was once again the plan adopted by the Admiralty. Togo's strategy in the Russo-Japanese War had shown how that plan needed to be modified in the face of modern material. In the days of Cornwallis the heavy ships had nothing to fear but a lee shore and the land batteries of the defenders. They could only be attacked by their like, which was exactly the contingency which they hoped to bring about. They could, therefore, lie in as close proximity to the port they were appointed to watch as facilities for getting the requisite supplies permitted and the cunning of the Admiral's brain dictated.

The addition of the torpedo, carried in a swarm of light and fast craft operating on the surface, or in vessels

moving invisible beneath the waters, and the fact that a consumable store like coal or oil has taken the place of the wind, which is Nature's gift, compelled a modification of this simple plan. Togo kept his fleet at "a certain place" some sixty miles away from Port Arthur, keeping the fortress under observation by his light craft. The British Admiralty adopted a similar plan. The problem before them must now be briefly stated.

The British battle-fleet was confronted by a force numerically a little more than half as strong as itself in ships of the first line. But these were a well-organised fleet, provided with all the necessary subsidiary craft in adequate numbers, and aided by the possession of a means of aerial reconnaissance which the British were without, namely, the famous Zeppelin airships. Moreover, the base of the German Fleet was that expanse of intricate water, aptly described as the "wet triangle," over which the Island of Heligoland stands sentinel. The strategical importance of the island has, perhaps, been over-estimated; but it has a value as an advanced torpedo-base, and also as a rallying point for skirmishing craft, as was proved by the "Battle of the Bight," and for heavy ships driven back after an unsuccessful engagement. The mouths of the Elbe and Weser, with Jahde Bay, not only contain the strongly fortified naval ports of Wilhelmshaven, Cuxhaven, and Brunsbüttel, but also the entrance to the passage connecting the front door with the back, the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, which joins the North Sea ports to the great Baltic port and dockyard at Kiel.

The British Fleet, then, had to watch two exits: that from the "wet triangle" and that from the Baltic through the Skager Rak. It had also to face the possibility that, utilising its back-door, the German Fleet might go east to attack the Russians, whose naval force at the outbreak of war was in no wise equal to a single-handed contest with the Germans. Events might at any time have rendered it imperative for the British to enter the Baltic at

all costs and go to the succour of the Russians, threatened with a land and sea attack which, if successful, would bring the Germans within easy striking distance of Petrograd. Its own problems were, roughly, twofold. It had to cover the coast of Britain and the vast stretch of sea from the north of the British Islands to the edge of the Arctic Circle. The North Sea may be compared to a pyramid standing on its apex. The distance from Wilhelmshaven to Flamborough Head being about 300 sea-miles, and that from Dover to Calais 22 miles. If the Germans were to be prevented from enjoying the use of the sea, it is obvious that a position had to be found as a base for the British Fleet which would cover the route "North-about." This would necessarily leave the Germans nearer to the mouth of the Thames (to treat that as the vital spot) than the British Fleet. On the other hand, the journey to and from the English coast would be longer than that from the British base to the entrance to the "wet triangle." There was, therefore, a reasonable certainty that if the Germans undertook any serious enterprise to the southward they would be met and fought before they could return. The worst danger to be feared was that they would carry out what have come to be known, from a phrase of Admiral Jellicoe's, as "tip-and-run raids." A well-organised system of flotilla defence would minimise that danger. The place selected was a land-locked basin in the Orkneys, known as Scapa Flow. It is something over 500 miles from Wilhelmshaven and about 400 from the Skagerak. It is, therefore, well out of range of a night attack by torpedo-boats, and it covers the passage North-about. The battle-cruiser fleet was stationed in the Firth of Forth, being thus a hundred miles nearer the German bases and 150 miles nearer the mouth of the Thames. Translating distance into hours, and allowing for the superior speed of the battle-cruisers, it may be said to have been nine hours nearer to the former, and ten and a half nearer to the latter.

Regard the North Sea as the Channel, the stretch of

water from the Orkneys to the Arctic Circle as the Atlantic, and the Baltic as the Mediterranean, and the watch off the "wet triangle" does not differ fundamentally from the watch off Brest. We had, however, no base inside the Baltic from which to watch Kiel and prevent the enemy fleet from acting to the eastward as Nelson watched Toulon. The German Fleet, besides, was concentrated instead of being divided between several different ports with no communication with each other except by way of the open sea, and it had the power to strike either east or west without our having immediate knowledge of its intentions. But the principle is the same. It was the enemy fleet which was watched, and not the coast which was guarded.

The choice of Scapa Flow for the base of the battle-fleet has been much criticised; but, on the wider outlook, it was probably sound. At first sight, perhaps, it seems an inversion of common sense to put the fastest and least powerful ships in the closest proximity to the enemy ports, while retaining the slower and more powerful to deal with a possible attempt to break out to the north. But the fastest ships were best qualified to deal with the kind of raids which the Germans actually undertook, and they were best qualified also if the enemy should come out in force to the southward to overtake him and fight a delaying action until the battle-fleet could come up. On the other hand, if the Germans designed to get their cruisers out on to the high seas, they would probably employ their battle-ship strength in order to force a passage for them. Some such design seems to have, in fact, brought on the Battle of Jutland Bank.

Having failed in their first endeavour to reduce the British Fleet by "attrition," the Germans next attempted to disarrange our plans and to force us to dissipate our strength by a series of raids against our coast. The first of these, undertaken against Yarmouth, was a ludicrous failure. Five cruisers took part, but, so far as is known, the battle-cruisers were not out on this occasion. They

attacked the little gunboat *Halcyon*, which signalled to the nearest base, "Am engaging five German cruisers. Enemy retiring." They then opened a furious cannonade in the direction of Yarmouth. Most of their shells fell a mile short. In the faint light of dawn they were that much out in their reckoning. British forces were approaching, and they fled incontinently. On their way the rearmost cruiser dropped mines, which destroyed submarine D 5. But that loss was more than offset by the destruction of the armoured cruiser *Yorck*, which hit a mine and foundered just as she was entering Jahde Bay.

On December 16th a similar attempt was made against Scarborough, Whitby, and the Hartlepoons, which resulted in the death of over a hundred civilians, men, women, and children. Apparently the whole battle-cruiser force of the Germans took part in this. They were engaged by a flotilla of destroyers, which they blundered into in the mist, and also by a light battery at Hartlepool. Whether they suffered any material damage or not is not known, but a careful study of the German casualty lists revealed the fact that they had over two hundred killed and wounded. So the "baby-killers," as Mr. Churchill promptly dubbed them, had by no means the best of the deal. Only a thick fog which, unhappily, intervened saved them from the hand of Sir David Beatty and his "Cat" squadron. The German and British squadrons were actually within gunshot of each other. The occasion was marked by the publication of a clear and strong statement by the Admiralty, warning the population that coast towns could not be guaranteed immunity from such attacks; that their inhabitants must bear in mind that they had no military results; and that, while the Admiralty regretted the circumstances, they must not be allowed to modify the general naval policy which was being pursued. It is said that the *saeva indignatio* roused by this wanton destruction of defenceless life was worth an army corps to the New Armies. At any rate, the spirit displayed by the sufferers was beyond praise.

Sir David Beatty was compensated for his disappointment on January 24th, when the Germans, intent, presumably, on a similar exploit, were met by the British battle-cruiser squadron near the Dogger Bank. The enemy force consisted of three battle-cruisers, *Derfflinger*, *Seydlitz*, and *Moltke*, and the armoured cruiser *Blücher*, a ship of an inferior type, built by the Germans as a reply to the *Invincible* class, under a misapprehension of what their design was to be. She carried only 8.2-inch guns, and was a drag on the squadron. What had become of the fourth German battle-cruiser, *Von der Tann*, has never been revealed. It is thought that she was severely injured, probably by collision, on the occasion of the Christmas Day air raid on Cuxhaven. There is good reason for thinking that she took part in the Battle of Jutland Bank.

Beatty followed the enemy in general chase, his flagship, *Lion*, leading. Deliberate fire was opened at eighteen thousand yards, and the official report says, "We began hitting at seventeen thousand yards." The *Blücher*, which was the last of the German line, received the fire of each ship as she passed, was reduced to a sinking condition by gunfire, and eventually torpedoed by the *Arethusa*. The *Derfflinger* and *Seydlitz* also received severe damage, and were seen to be heavily on fire. But an unlucky shot disabled the *Lion*, which had to sheer out of line. Submarines were about and the position of the vessel was dangerous, but she was well screened by the destroyers, and escaped further injury. Beatty shifted his flag first to a destroyer and then to the *Princess Royal*. But the battle had gone roaring to the east, and before the resolute young Admiral could again take command the action had been broken off. The Germans claimed a victory; but as their claim was dependent on the utterly false assertion that they had sunk the *Lion* and *Tiger*, its baselessness was easily exposed.

The battle was one of the most picturesque in all naval history. The battle-cruisers flew through the water

at 28 or 29 knots, and the destroyers dashed hither and thither at even greater speed. A general chase under such circumstances needs the most exceptional quickness of mind on the part of the Admiral in command and of every captain in the fleet. Action was, apparently, broken off seventy miles from Heligoland, and it is not therefore surprising that many people should hold that a little more determination and readiness to take risks on the part of the second in command when Beatty was temporarily out of action would have brought about a more decisive result. Only those who are in possession of the secret information held by the Admiralty can express an opinion on that point. The battle-cruiser, at any rate, justified her existence, and the theories of those who insisted on the value of the heaviest guns and of superior speed were justified.

The heavy ships of the Germans made one more attempt to raid the coast, attacking Lowestoft and, again, Yarmouth at Easter, 1916. Little damage was done, but the battle-cruiser squadron failed to come up with them, and, under the Board of Admiralty which succeeded Mr. Winston Churchill and Lord Fisher, there was an unfortunate appearance of yielding something to this kind of terrorism. Certain alterations were made in the disposition of the Fleet. But this was not, in itself, so serious as the admission in a letter from the First Lord, Mr. Balfour, to the Mayors of the two towns that the Admiralty could now be brought to consider the question of local protection apart from the general strategy of the war at sea. On the other hand, there was some evidence that "tip-and-run raids" were not improving the *moral* of the German Navy. A German prisoner captured about this time is said to have replied to some comments on the poor shooting of the German battle-cruisers by naïvely remarking, "How can you expect us to shoot well when we may have the British Fleet upon us at any moment?" Whatever truth there may be in the story, it is certain that on more than one occasion the German gunners have shown a tendency to

go to pieces after the first few salvoes when the British return fire became hot. To fire on defenceless places and to turn tail directly there is a chance of meeting a foe who can hit back never can conduce to a high military spirit. The same inefficiency has been noticed in the U-boats when they meet an armed antagonist.

On May 31st, 1916, the main Fleets met for the first time. The German battle-cruisers had steamed north up the coast of Jutland to the neighbourhood of the Skager Rak. They chased off some of our light cruisers which were watching the exit from the Baltic, and these were followed by the light and battle-cruisers to the eastward. The British battle-fleet, with a battle-cruiser squadron under Admiral the Hon. Horace Hood, consisting of the *Inflexible*, *Indomitable*, and *Invincible* (flag), and an armoured cruiser squadron, consisting of the *Defence* (flag), *Black Prince*, *Warrior*, and *Duke of Edinburgh*, under Sir Robert Arbuthnot, was to the north. Eastward was Sir David Beatty, having under his command the battle-cruiser fleet, consisting of the *Lion* (flag), *Tiger*, *Princess Mary*, *Princess Royal* (flag), *New Zealand* (flag), and *Indefatigable*. He had also with him four ships of the *Queen Elizabeth* class, with some divisions of light cruisers and destroyers. The *Queen Elizabeth* herself and the *Australia* were absent.

The German battle-cruisers, chasing our light cruisers, found themselves in the presence of Beatty's force, and turned to run for it with the object of drawing him down on to the German battle-fleet, which was following in support from the southward. A running action ensued, in which the destroyers played a dashing part, attacking the big ships in broad daylight and fighting miniature fleet actions among themselves. Towards the middle of the afternoon the light cruisers, scouting ahead of the battle-cruisers, came within range of the German battle-fleet. The British sustained severe loss in the first part of the action, the *Queen Mary* and *Indefatigable* being

sunk. The *Queen Elizabeths* could not get near enough to play a decisive part. Now, however, both fleets went about, Beatty, in his turn, trying to draw the Germans on to the British battle-fleet, the approach of which had been signalled. The running fight between the battle-cruisers continued, while the *Queen Elizabeths* engaged the battle-ships at long range. The weather conditions, unfortunately, now became unfavourable, with patches of fog and low visibility. On ascertaining the approach of Admiral Jellicoe the Germans sheered off to the eastward, with the obvious intention of evading battle and returning home along the Danish coast. The movement was frustrated by a splendid act of self-sacrifice on the part of Admiral Hood. His battle-cruisers, steaming south-south-west, had come on ahead of the battle-fleet and appeared on the scene just as Beatty, on the outer edge of the circle, was losing his position abeam of the German battle-cruisers. Hood threw himself across the head of the enemy's line by a movement which recalls that of Nelson at St. Vincent, and endured in his flagship the concentrated fire of the battle-cruiser squadron and the leading German battleships. The fire of the *Invincible* was noticeably effective, but the odds were too heavy for her, and she blew up and foundered, carrying with her a heroic seaman who, in this one short fight, outshone the deeds of the famous sailors from whom he was descended. Only the Commander escaped.

The *Invincible* did not perish in vain. Time was gained; Beatty enveloped the head of the enemy line, and Jellicoe, now able to solve the difficulties of the situation and to form his line, bore down upon them. The British, however, had still to suffer severe loss before darkness closed in. Sir Robert Arbuthnot, a hard-bitten sailor of impetuous temperament, either by accident or design, thrust his squadron of armoured cruisers between the British and German battle-fleets at close range to the latter. His flagship, the *Defence*, was instantly sunk, and

he went down with her. The *Warrior* sank in tow shortly afterward, and the *Black Prince* was badly crippled, forced to leave the line, and torpedoed during the night. The *Marlborough*, a Dreadnought battleship, was also torpedoed, but was brought safely into port under her own steam.

By now, however, the Germans were a beaten fleet. All semblance of formation was lost. The ships scattered and made for their home ports as best they could, furiously assailed all through the night by the British light cruisers and destroyers. It is further evidence of the German tendency to go to pieces when the odds turn against them that, after Hood's attack had foiled their plan of escape, our light cruisers never hesitated to attack their battleships, and that they did so with impunity. The pursuit only ended with the morning, when the British found themselves in the neighbourhood of the German mine-fields, behind which the battered enemy had withdrawn. Jellicoe remained at hand, searching for stragglers all day, and then returned to his base, whence he reported himself again ready for action thirty-six hours later. It took the enemy months to repair the damage, so far as it was repairable.

The losses on the British side, which were chiefly incurred in the holding attacks necessary to bring the German main fleet to action, were three battle-cruisers, three armoured cruisers, and eight destroyers sunk. The Germans only admitted the loss of a pre-Dreadnought battleship of the *Deutschland* class, one battle-cruiser (*Lutzow*), three light cruisers, and a few torpedo-boats or destroyers. The British claim to have sunk two battleships of the *Kaiser* class (Dreadnoughts), one of the *Deutschland* class, one battle-cruiser, five light cruisers, six torpedo-boats, and a submarine. Sir John Jellicoe's despatch adds that one Dreadnought battleship, one battle-cruiser, and three torpedo-boats were so badly damaged that it is doubtful if they could reach port. One of these was presumably the battle-cruiser *Seydlitz*, which was put

ashore by the Germans in the Bight of Heligoland, but eventually salved and towed into Wilhelmshaven in a plight which makes it doubtful if she will see any more service. The British figure of German losses may fairly be taken as a minimum. As a rule, a routed fleet suffers more heavily in its flight than in the earlier part of the action, and, as the Germans were relentlessly pursued and attacked all through the night, it is hardly likely that they escaped further losses. But the darkness prevented the British from ascertaining these, and gave the Germans an opportunity to conceal them.

Take any test you please, and the Battle of Jutland Bank stands declared a British victory. Take losses of ships, the test which the public most readily applies. The Germans lost two Dreadnought battleships, the British none. A German squadron was spoiled thereby, and the huge preponderance possessed by the British increased. The Germans lost one battle-cruiser out of five, and the British three out of ten—no account is taken of ships completed since the outbreak of war—so that, while the margin of superiority is infinitesimally reduced, it is still sufficient. If the *Seydlitz* be really an irreparable wreck, the British preponderance—which stood at two to one before the battle—is actually increased. In light cruisers the Germans lost five, against which we may set the three armoured cruisers lost by the British, for these vessels are really of little more consequence. Only in destroyers was the British loss a serious matter from a military point of view. But destroyers must be sacrificed if destroyer work is to be done effectually, and there can be no question that the work of the flotillas, both offensive and defensive, more than repaid the loss they suffered.

Or take the objects for which the battle was fought. The ultimate object of any encounter between the fleets must be, for the Germans, to regain the free use of the sea in order to relieve their necessities at home and to enable them to deliver a blow at our heart; for the British, to

prevent the Germans from gaining that use of the sea. Decisive victory for either side means the destruction of the enemy fleet. Short of that, victory rests with the British, if they prevent their enemy from regaining the use of the sea. In the actual event the Germans probably had a more limited purpose. They may have desired to break a way for some of their cruisers to get out and harry the trade-routes, or they may have meant to compass the destruction of Admiral Beatty's battle-cruisers by drawing them on to the battle-fleet. They have never revealed what the "enterprise to the northward" was on which they professed to be engaged. But, whatever their purpose was, they indubitably failed to achieve it. No cruisers appeared on the high seas; the battle-cruiser fleet was not destroyed. And the Germans, whatever their object, certainly did *not* mean to return relatively weaker than they set out.

From another point of view the British victory is equally clear. The British remained in possession of the field of battle; the German formation was broken up, and their *moral*, at least temporarily, destroyed. That, perhaps, is the most important point of all. The case may be summed up in homely analogy. If a little boy engaged in robbing an orchard be chased thence by the owner with a big stick, the owner may remain in possession of the orchard, but the little boy may have the apples. The barren fact of victory rests with one side, the fruit with the other. But if the boy is compelled to leave the orchard without the apples, he can hardly claim victory on the ground that he is still able to sit down without undue discomfort. The German claim to victory in the Battle of Jutland can only be maintained on such a *posteriori* grounds.

On the other hand, the British victory was not so decisive as a people nourished on the traditions of the Nile and Trafalgar were inclined to expect. A considerable amount of criticism has arisen from that fact, and rather loose comparisons have been made with the victories of

Hawke and Nelson. In point of fact, these comparisons are misleading. At Quiberon Bay, Conflans did not retreat to his base at Brest, where he would have been under the shelter of the shore guns. He fled pell-mell into an undefended roadstead where the only dangers encountered in following him were the dangers of a lee shore, the darkness and the gale. Hawke, a consummate seaman, knew the coast as well as Conflans. He "took the foe for pilot" because the dangers were inznimate dangers, and at fixed points. The chances were equal for the two sides. To follow the Germans into their protected area was a very different matter. Moreover, magnificent as was the victory of Quiberon Bay, the loss of the enemy in action was actually small. Their fleet was annihilated because half the surviving vessels was mewed up in the Vilaine, where it had no facilities for repair or supplies. The German fleet, after its return to the Bight of Heligoland, had all the German bases at its back.

At the Nile the French fleet was, to all practical purposes, destroyed. But Nelson had full opportunity to weigh the position before he attacked, and he acted upon one of those brilliant intuitions of genius which show when safety lies in taking apparent risks. Brueys delivered himself into the hands of the British in a way which can only be called imbecile. The Germans acted throughout on a considered plan, the ultimate object of which was to draw Sir John Jellicoe on to do just that which he refused to do, and is blamed in some quarters for not doing. It is to be remembered, moreover, that, after the confused night action, he had no certain knowledge of the dispositions of the enemy fleet. The circumstances of Trafalgar were even more dissimilar. It is sufficient to point out that, in that case, Villeneuve was driven to sea by the express orders of Napoleon and by despair at the news that he had been relieved of his command for hesitation to obey. He came out with the purpose of fighting a decisive action, and he fought it stubbornly to the point of annihilation. The

Germans, as their movements showed, had no intention of fighting the entire Grand Fleet to a finish.

If we turn from these three crushing victories to others of fame in our annals, we shall find that the result of Jutland Bank compares very favourably with them, if we allow for certain facts. Wooden ships were rarely sunk in action. On the other hand, fighting at short range and even yard-arm to yard-arm, the slaughter was often so great as to demoralise the crews and bring about the surrender of the ship. In a modern action, fought at long range, with the crews in armoured positions, damage to material, causing fire and explosion which, possibly, end in the destruction of the ship, is the more frequent result. That the fighting spirit of a ship's company should be so demoralised by the fire of an opponent ten thousand yards away that she should surrender, unless cut off and surrounded, with her motive power disabled, is almost unthinkable. Even under the latter circumstances, the commanding officer would probably order the destruction of the ship. The whole standard, therefore, by which we judge actions like *The Saints*, or *the Glorious First of June* is altered. The criterion of surrender, which was the best evidence of the moral superiority established by the British in these actions is absent from Jutland Bank. The evidence of demoralisation is of a different kind, but it is clear enough, and it may be said, without any fear of exaggeration, that the victory won by Sir John Jellicoe and Sir David Beatty was at least as complete as those won by *Rodney* and *Howe*, or gained in many another battle which resulted in two or three prizes being taken, but, in many cases had important strategical results—*e.g.*, *Saumarez's* action with *Linois* off *Algeciras* in 1801.

Let it be granted, as everyone must grant, that the complete destruction of the enemy fleet is the best and surest way to gain control of the sea. Let it be granted also that, until the enemy fleet is destroyed, it is not strictly correct to speak of either combatant having

"command of the sea." Does that make the destruction of the enemy fleet an object to be pursued at any risk? With due deference to some distinguished naval officers who appear to think that it does, it is submitted that such was not the practice of the great masters of naval war. In May, 1805, Ganteaume, by Napoleon's instructions, left the inner anchorage of Brest and anchored outside the Goulet Passage under the protection of batteries mounting 150 heavy guns which had been erected for the purpose. Neither Cornwallis nor Gardner, who was in command during the absence of the former through illness, made any attempt to attack until August, when, hearing that Villeneuve was at sea, Ganteaume weighed and stood out as if to engage. When Cornwallis took up the challenge, he thought better of it and returned. Cornwallis followed him and engaged his rear, but, coming under the fire of the shore batteries, desisted from the attack. For batteries read minefields and submarines, and the policy pursued by Sir John Jellicoe is clearly identical with that of Cornwallis, a hard-fighting old seaman whom no one has ever accused of undue caution.

Nelson's conduct off Toulon was precisely of the same cautious kind. The story of the game of bluff played by him and Admiral Latouche-Tréville in 1804 makes amusing reading, but it is quite conclusive as to the principles which guided him. "My friend, M. Latouche, sometimes plays bo-peep in and out of Toulon, like a mouse at the edge of her hole," he writes, and, again: "Yesterday a rear-admiral and seven sail, including frigates, put their nose outside the harbour. If they go on playing this game, some day we shall lay salt upon their tails, and so end the campaign." He put Bickerton, with five sail, close to the harbour to draw the French out, a "method to make M. Latouche angry"; but he himself kept twenty leagues away. And he clinches the matter in the following passage: "I think their fleet will be ordered out to fight close to Toulon,

that they may get their crippled ships in again, and that we must then quit the coast to repair our damages and thus leave the coast clear; *but my mind is fixed not to fight them, unless with a westerly wind outside the Hyères and with an easterly wind to the westward of Sicily.*" Finally, M. Latouche did something characteristically German. He came out with his whole force as if to offer battle, but retired under the guns of Toulon on Nelson's approach. He then made a report that Nelson had run away from him, adding that he pursued till nightfall, and, next morning, could not see the enemy. Nelson's wrath knew no bounds. "You will have seen M. Latouche's letter, of how he chased me and I ran," he writes. "I keep it; and, by God, if I take him, he shall eat it!" But M. Latouche died shortly afterwards from another cause.

Minefields, destroyers and submarines are more formidable to a battle fleet than shore batteries. Yet we see that Cornwallis and Nelson steadfastly refused to be drawn into action under the shore guns, while Hawke readily accepted it when and where there were no batteries to be feared. To hold that battle is in itself the end at which a commander should aim is as unsound as to hold that war can be made without taking risks. Those who accuse Sir John Jellicoe of thinking of the safety of the Fleet rather than of victory are not only doing an injustice to an officer whose qualities of courage and resolution have been oftentimes tested, but are guilty of very shallow criticism. If the enemy's whole fleet consist of ten vessels, it is worth while to lose twenty in destroying the ten. But if there is a strong probability that a part at least of his force will escape, while the attacking fleet will lose so heavily that it will be left inferior to the survivors, then an attack shows not courage, but criminal folly. That such would be the result of engaging the Germans *à outrance* under conditions chosen by themselves is most probable. "That they may get their crippled ships in again, and that we must then quit the coast to repair our damages and thus leave

the coast clear," was as plainly the object of the Germans in offering battle in proximity to their ports as it was the object of M. Latouche. The prospect is not made more seductive by the fact that, under modern conditions, there might be no ships to repair.

The truth is that the critics think in the terms of time and space which belong to Nelson's day, not to our own. Nelson's position at twenty leagues from Toulon in his day, when all information had to be conveyed by frigate, and he was dependent on the wind to bear him to the decisive spot, was not so very far different from that of the Grand Fleet in relation to the German bases to-day, while his determination not to fight unless he could catch the enemy at a distance of ten to fifteen miles from Toulon is certainly not extravagantly translated into an intention not to begin an action within, let us say, a hundred to a hundred and fifty miles off the Bight of Heligoland.

Nelson's principle was only to fight under conditions which gave him an assurance of decisive victory. That is plain no less from the tactics of Trafalgar, where he did fight, than from those employed off Toulon, where he did not. The whole of the order of attack at Trafalgar was based on the idea of going down to the enemy in order of sailing, so as not to waste time in forming the line in light airs lest the day should prove too short for a decision. Nelson certainly never held the doctrine that a battle was an end in itself. On the return voyage from the West Indies, he was accustomed to say to his captains, speaking of the French fleet, "If we meet them, we shall find them not less than eighteen, I rather think twenty, sail of the line, and therefore do not be surprised if I do not fall on them immediately; we won't part without a battle. I will let them alone until we approach the shores of Europe, or they give me an advantage too tempting to be resisted." He was in inferior force, and he would not fight at a disadvantage, until all chance of reinforcements reaching him before the enemy made his own ports had vanished. Then

he would attack, and sacrifice his fleet, if necessary, because, by so doing, he would reduce the strength of the enemy relatively to the British. His was not the fleet upon which the all of his country depended. He relied on his fleet taking heavier toll than it paid, and knew that, by so much, he would relieve his comrades-in-arms. He kept the ulterior objects steadily in view. But he avoided the mistake, which is what Mahan really criticises in the French school of naval strategy, of forgetting that all ulterior objects are best served by the destruction of the enemy's fleet, if an opportunity offers sufficiently advantageous to give a reasonable certainty of success. Until it is proved that such an opportunity of destroying the German fleet has been offered and refused, one is justified in maintaining that the strategy of the Admiralty and of Sir John Jellicoe has been in accordance with the best doctrines of naval war as taught by its greatest professors.

After the Battle of Jutland Bank the Germans made no further attempt to meet the British Fleet in force, though, in an excursion, the details of which have never been made known, they succeeded in destroying two of our light cruisers by submarine attack. As, however, a Dreadnought battleship of theirs was twice torpedoed by one of our submarines, they suffered more heavily than they gained. On a later occasion also British submarines got torpedoes home on German battleships.

The High Sea Fleet, however, remains a menace, and is the chief reason why we are unable to take completely effective measures to prevent German submarines from reaching the trade-routes. The weapon employed for commerce destruction is new, and the method of its employment is an offence against God and man. But the old lessons which naval history has taught remain true: that the power to use the sea in war-time and the power to restrict the use of the sea alike depend on the existence of a fleet capable of fighting for supremacy. These matters, however, will be more fully discussed in the next chapter. It remains to

refer briefly to events in other seas in which fleets of heavy ships are employed.

Both the French and the Russians have very largely increased their number of capital ships since the war began. In the Black Sea the latter possess an undoubted supremacy of which it cannot be said they have made full use. Along the coast of Asia Minor their military operations were assisted by the fleet up to the fall of Trebizond, and it appeared likely that an adroit use of the tactics there employed might bring them to the head of the Bosphorus. This hope has not been fulfilled, and, furthermore, the Russians failed to make use of their maritime superiority to frustrate the German and Bulgarian crossings of the Danube near its mouth and the consequent outflanking of the Rumanian armies. It was a severe disappointment to every believer in sea power to notice the absolute neglect of the means of defence afforded by the waterway of the Danube. The Russian Revolution and the light it has thrown on the chaotic internal condition of the country, however, go far to explain the reason. It emphasises once more the fact that the sea will not serve a tyrant. This is no mere rhetorical phrase. Since the *Goeben* was disabled and one or more of their own battle-cruisers were finished, the Russians have had no main fleet to face in the Black Sea, yet their own greatly superior navy has remained impotent.

In the Baltic, as has been pointed out before, the situation is a curious one. By virtue of their back-door the Germans can, in theory, bring a vastly superior force to bear against the Russians. But the latter are, more or less, secure in the Gulf of Finland, and the Germans have not at present dared to risk decisive operations for fear of weakening their position in the North Sea. The Grand Fleet defends the gate of Petrograd. The Germans burned their fingers badly when they attempted conjoint operations against Riga in the summer of 1915, and, indeed, up to now, have met with nothing but misfortune in anything they have

attempted in the only sea which they can claim to control. On the other hand, the Russians have made no use of their opportunities for offensive action, if only on a small scale. Once again, the cause must be assigned to the internal condition of the country and the hostility and suspicions of Sweden which have hampered the Russian use of the sea from the first. It is perfectly true that the Russian battle fleet in the Baltic, like the German in the North Sea, is precluded from taking heavy risks for fear of "leaving the coast clear"; but our Ally is strong in torpedo-craft, and is better situated than any other member of the Alliance for forcing action on the Germans. The political consequences of successful activities would be such that a considerable amount of risk would be justified.

In the Adriatic, the only other important scene of naval activity, the French and Italians have been content to blockade the Austrian fleet, suffering considerable losses by submarine attack in the narrow waters. The attempt upon Cattaro in the earlier part of the war was feeble and irresolute, and the opportunity for more decisive action passed when the Montenegrins lost Mount Lovtcha, which commands the harbour. The geographical features of this sea have been explained in the chapter on the Mediterranean in the Middle Ages. Now, as then, the Italians, for this purpose the successors of the Venetians, are eager to obtain a foothold on its eastern shore. They have one, temporarily, at any rate, in Avlona, but political and national jealousies dominate the situation. If Trieste be taken, and the Istrian Peninsula fall into the hands of our Ally, the question of the Austrian fleet will be speedily solved. A successful advance of the Allies through Serbia, or the elimination of Bulgaria from the war, might also render the naval positions of the Austrians untenable.

The naval events of the war, in fact, have reinforced the lesson learned from the fate of Cervera's squadron in Santiago de Cuba and of the Russian fleet in Port Arthur, that a naval force which is unwilling to fight can only be

compelled to do so—or perish if it does not—by the conjoint use of sea and land forces. It is no new fact, but one which, in early history, is obscured because the line of distinction between land and sea forces is narrow, and because, before the days of long-range weapons, actions were often fought within the harbours themselves. Salamis was brought about thus, and so was the Siege of Sebastopol. In our great wars with the French we should have done the same thing had we possessed the necessary land force. As it was, our fleets had to wait and watch until other conditions, operating, perhaps, at a great distance, compelled the enemy to sea. The development of aerial warfare may, perhaps, bring about a change. But that has not yet gone far enough, and the hopes which some built on the submarine and its possible use as a ferret have not, up to the present, been justified. The main fleets, therefore, act by a process of silent constriction which is elusive, though all pervading. This influence, however, is not confined to the stronger. The weaker fleets also exercise it in their degree, and, in considering what is to follow, it is important to recognise the difference between a fleet which *will* not and a fleet which *can* not fight.

CHAPTER XIV

CONCLUSION

THE use of the submarine by the Germans has raised questions, moral, military and economic, to which varying answers have been, and will, for a long time, be given. Up to the summer of 1914 the underwater boat was going through a process of evolution as a military weapon which followed pretty closely that of the torpedo-boat and destroyer. Beginning as a mere engine of harbour defence, the weapon of the weaker Power, the submarine, thanks to engineering improvements, chiefly the perfecting of the heavy-oil engine, to optical science, and, above all, to the daring and skill of the young officers trained to use her, had become a sea- and even an ocean-going vessel of almost unlimited possibilities for offence and observation. British submarines, before and after the beginning of the war, made voyages to China, from Australia, and across the Atlantic. Within three hours after the beginning of hostilities they were, as Mr. Churchill informed the House of Commons, inside the Bight of Heligoland, watching the movements of the German fleet, and they were used to guard the passage of the Army to France. The feat of Commander Holbrook, V.C., in diving under the Turkish minefield in the Dardanelles and torpedoing the battleship *Messudyeh*, the actions of Commander Nasmyth in the Sea of Marmora, and many like exploits, seemed to confirm the hopes of those who believed that, in the submarine, we possessed a weapon which might

be effectively used to drive a reluctant fleet out of harbour to battle. On the other hand, the Germans taught us lessons of caution. A single submarine, as the Germans claimed, destroyed the three armoured cruisers, *Cressy*, *Hogue*, and *Aboukir*, by the use of a decoy; the *Pathfinder* and *Hermes* fell victims to the same agency, and the *Formidable* (battleship) was torpedoed and sunk by an attack at night, when it was believed that the submarine must be too blind to be effective.

On the other hand, the German harbours had proved impregnable to attack, and many attempts on our fleets at their bases were unsuccessful. Moreover, the main fleets, manœuvring at high speed and well screened by destroyers, moved about the seas with impunity, while the underwater craft proved more vulnerable to the assaults of light cruisers than their more enthusiastic advocates had foreseen. As a military weapon, in fact, they proved effective, but not decisive. An armed and organised fleet had little to fear from them.

But the successful attacks on the three cruisers and on the *Formidable* showed that, under certain conditions, they might be used with deadly effect in a war on commerce. Admiral Sir Percy Scott, writing to the *Times* a month or two before the war, pointed out the possibilities, and, though experience proved his theories wrong in many respects, especially as to the submarine compelling the withdrawal of the battle-squadrons from the seas, in others he proved an accurate seer of the things which were to come. The Germans were late beginners with the weapon which they afterwards claimed as particularly their own. It is one of the ironies of war that Admiral von Tirpitz, the father of submarine piracy—a term which will be justified presently—persistently deprecated the military value of the submarine until a comparatively short time before war broke out, with the consequence that Germany had only thirty completed boats in August, 1914.

The various attempts at codifying the law, or, rather,

the practice, of war at sea had left matters in a state of royal confusion. Without attempting a complete analysis, it may be said that enemy ships were liable to capture and neutral ships were not, save under conditions shortly to be named. Under the Declaration of Paris, to which this country was a party, free ships made free goods—that is to say, enemy goods, except contraband of war could not be captured in neutral ships—neutral goods in enemy ships were not liable to capture; privateering was abolished; blockade, to be binding upon neutrals, must be effective—that is to say, a ship attempting to enter a blockaded port must be in real danger of capture, and must not be made prize as a punitive measure subsequent to the running of her cargo. Moreover, it was agreed by sundry of The Hague Conventions that ships seized by vessels of war must be brought into the Prize Court for adjudication, and might only be sunk in the case of urgent military necessity, in which case their papers must be preserved and every provision made for the safety of their passengers and crews. If these conditions could not be complied with, the ships must be released.

The flaws in this rough and ready code of rules are easily apparent. One or two only, which are relevant to the purpose of this chapter, need be mentioned. The definition of "contraband" was left to the discretion of the belligerent Powers, with the exception that certain articles *ancipitis usus*, of which the chief are foodstuffs, were declared contraband conditionally on their being consigned to the Government of a belligerent for use by the armed forces. Again, no definition of "military necessity" was attempted, nor were any rules laid down as to what constituted adequate provision for the safety of passengers and crews in the case of ships destroyed. Furthermore, the definition of "effective blockade" was too loosely framed to cover the conditions which arose with the use of the submarine for this purpose.

The Germans hypocritically pretended that they

resorted to submarine war against merchantmen as a reprisal for the alleged illegal and inhuman action of Great Britain in cutting off imports of food, and thus, so it was alleged, starving German women and children. In point of fact—it is worth remembering—the Germans by their own act in declaring war on Russia cut themselves off from the main source of their imports of breadstuffs, and, by forcing Turkey into the war, cut us also off from the same source of supply. Their demand, therefore, was that we should allow them free access to markets of which they made a comparatively small use in time of peace, there to compete with us, who used them largely and whose need was the greater on account of the closing of the Dardanelles. However, that point need not be laboured. It is enough to recall that, while the German cruisers were still at large, they deliberately sank all the vessels laden with foodstuffs destined for this country which they could capture, including the *William P. Frye*, an American sailing ship bound from Seattle to Liverpool with a cargo of wheat. Moreover, our Order in Council was not issued until after the first submarine campaign had begun, and until the German Government had taken over the whole wheat supply of the country, thus acquiring the power to allot any proportion it thought good to the armies.

The first submarine campaign began in February, 1915. It was ostensibly aimed only at British ships approaching or leaving the shores of this country. Neutrals were warned that accidents might occur, and "accidents" did. The war was conducted with absolute ruthlessness, ships being torpedoed without warning, and the crews, in some instances, being shelled as they were leaving their vessels in their boats. The sinking of the *Lusitania*, with the consequent loss of 1,100 lives, and of the cross-Channel steamer, *Sussex*, were the incidents which made the greatest impression on the world, but they were, in fact, no more atrocious than many other acts done by the Germans. The campaign in this form, however, was a total failure. The

boats used for the purpose were small and designed for military purposes; they were extremely vulnerable; the restrictions imposed to avoid offence to neutrals, and, especially to the United States, hampered their use, and the British counter-measures rapidly became effective. By the late summer or early autumn of 1915, the war on merchantmen had ceased to be a matter of serious concern.

The sense of victory and security engendered in the British people, and, unfortunately, in the British Admiralty, was, however, entirely illusory. The Germans were following a deep-laid plan. While Count von Reventlow and others were abusing Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg for laying aside the sharpest weapon of Germany; while von Tirpitz was forced into retirement, and while the Chancellor, on his side, was protesting that lack of success and not lack of will had forced the termination of the U-boat warfare, the Germans were building boats by the score of a newer, bigger and stronger type, training crews, laying plans, experimenting, preparing the ground for the playing of their highest trump—the knave. At the end of 1916, after much preliminary blowing of trumpets, a so-called “peace-offer” was issued. It amounted to no more than an invitation to a conference, at which Germany would state her terms. It was preluded by an offensive claim to victory. The Allies, wisely or unwisely—it depends on the point of view—replied by a statement of their aims. Immediately the prepared outcry arose in Germany and the countries of her Allies. “England” had spurned the hand offered to her and had proclaimed her intention to destroy Germany. On her head, then, rested the guilt of the continued bloodshed; Germany would now use her sharpest weapons. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, with a cynicism worthy of his “scrap of paper” outburst and his admission of the wrong done to Belgium when the German Armies set themselves to “hack their way through” her territories, declared that he had only been waiting for a favourable opportunity to open “unrestricted U-boat warfare.” The

time had now come; Germany was ready, both with men and material; the food-supply of the whole world was short, and, if the United States saw fit to resent German measures, their intervention would come too late to affect the issue. The prophets of Germany declared that the U-boats were in a position to sink a million tons of shipping a month, and that Great Britain would be forced to sue for peace in three.

The measures proclaimed were a challenge to the whole world. Every ship of whatever nationality which approached a cordon drawn round practically the whole of Europe would be sunk at sight. Hospital ships were included among the intended victims, on the flimsy pretence that the British employed them for the conveyance of troops and stores. The proclamation was attended by every sort of insult to neutrals, such as the insolent permission given to the Dutch to send a weekly paddle-steamer to Southwold and to the Americans to send one ship a week, painted in a prescribed and ridiculous way, to Falmouth. Moreover, the Chancellor, having protested up to the last that the Germans meant to adhere to their agreement with the United States, arrived at after the sinking of the *Sussex*, that they would not destroy passenger steamers without warning, told the American Ambassador only six hours before the "unrestricted warfare" was to be put into effect of the intentions of Germany, with the calm intimation that the German word held good just so long as it suited Germany, and no longer. The result was an immediate material success for the Germans, and a crushing moral defeat. Ships went down like leaves in autumn. Hospital ships, Belgian relief ships, under German safe conduct, anything and everything. Neutrals hesitated to sail. The whole trade of the world was thrown out of gear. But the United States ranged themselves on the side of the Allies, and, from China to Peru, the neutral States showed their detestation of the crime either by declaring war or by breaking off relations with the German Government. Only

the little sea-bordered States of Northern Europe, too near to Germany and too weak to resent her iniquity, bowed the head and suffered. The immediate addition to the forces of the Alliance in the field was not great. So far, the German calculation was correct. But the addition to the unseen forces which work silently through sea power was enormous. Every embarrassment felt by Great Britain in her blockade policy was swept away. She became to the whole world what she had never been before in all her wars, the champion of its rights instead of the tyrant of the seas. For it has always been the weakness of Britain that, while she was fighting for liberty against land-tyranny, she has always been compelled by her war-measures to appear as the antagonist of neutral right, or, at any rate, of neutral interest.

After a first gasp of surprise the British people steadied themselves to meet the new situation. Never did they prove more gloriously their right to be considered the first maritime nation in the world. Not a merchant seaman flinched from his duty. Not a British ship the less sailed from or to her ports. Neutrals might hesitate, and justifiably. The mercantile marine of Britain carried on. The Admiralty, newly formed just before the unrestricted warfare began, with Sir Edward Carson as First Lord and Sir John Jellicoe, recalled for the purpose from the command of the Grand Fleet, as First Sea Lord, were placed in the most embarrassing position. Their predecessors had failed to foresee the German plan. The advice of the Navy had not been sought in forming the general war-plans of the Allies, and the nation was committed to distant enterprises, demanding the protection of long lines of communications which could not be secured without complete command of the sea. The sinking of hospital ships and raids from Zeebrugge on the coast of Kent caused a continual demand for protection which threatened to denude the Grand Fleet of its necessary complement of destroyers and light craft, and, perhaps, to render it impotent. A catter of interested

criticism arose; but the nation, as a whole, would have none of it. It quickly recognised that no magical device was to be expected which would finish the submarine at a blow, and it made up its mind that "it's dogged that does it." By the end of May, four months after the unrestricted U-boat warfare had begun, and a month after the date at which, according to the German calculation, we were to have been on our knees, the Prime Minister was able to inform the House of Commons that our resources were sufficient to pull us through. By September it was confidently announced that the U-boat campaign was defeated.

War in itself is an exhibition by man of the elemental instincts which belong to the animal in him. The profession of arms is noble only because man, by his reason, realises the dangers to which war exposes him, and faces them with a steadfast mind at the call of faith or justice or freedom. It is an offering of self for a cause. The cause may be a bad one, but that is not for the sailor or soldier to judge. The motives on which he acts are loyalty, faithfulness, duty. It is for others to bear the responsibility of the rights and wrongs of the quarrel. Thence comes the paradox that war, in itself bestial, calls forth the highest qualities of which man is capable. But the glory is in dying, not in killing. The warrior who kills the unresisting is on a level with the cutthroat. Progressive consciousness of this has led to the gradual evolution of a whole code of restraints, wholly illogical it may be, but firmly rooted in the better nature of man, by which the naked horrors of war have been mitigated. Those who cease to resist are spared; the aged and the young are unmolested; women are inviolate. Even private property is respected. Nay, more; restraint is placed even upon the weapons which may be used against the armed forces of the enemy. At least, all these things were regarded as established until the German tribes arose to make war on a world devoted to peace at the bidding of a knot of half-

crazy soldiers and statesmen surrounding a potentate drunk with flattery. Then the astonished world learned that logic and science could bring men back to the worst and most brutal savagery of their primeval instincts, unchecked, unsoftened, and unsweetened either by the boasted progress of humanity or the revelation of Divine Love which the Germans nominally accept as their religious creed.

Necessity, we know, has been described as "the tyrant's plea." The tyrants of Potsdam have used it to the full. Could they have pleaded truthfully, as they have pleaded mendaciously, "We are fighting for the life of our country against a world banded against us in a monstrous act of aggression," some justification of their violent infractions of international right might have been admitted. But the German faith is that whoever resists the ambitions of Germany, no matter to what degree these conflict with the rights and interests of her neighbours, is thereby guilty of an "attack" upon her. Preventive war is then a "necessity." The violation of her neighbour's territory is also a "necessity," in order that the preventive war may be carried to a successful conclusion. The ruthless shooting of those who resist and the laying waste of their cities is also a "necessity." And all is tricked out in the garb of mercy. We are assured that "frightfulness" is reluctantly adopted as a means of shortening the war and bringing the blessings of German *Kultur* to the nations of the earth. It is egotism exalted to the seventh heaven. It is also the deliberate denial of right to all nations but the German. Not even the allies of Germany are excepted, for the reward offered to them for their comradeship in arms is, in the case of victory, to live under the German yoke, and, in the case of defeat, to pay the price thereof: "*Oesterreich müssen blut.*"

Now this is the very antithesis of all that sea power stands for. These chapters have been written in vain if it has not been made clear that, from Xerxes to Napoleon, the breed of men who have used the sea have stubbornly

upheld the right of men and nations to live their lives as they chose, to worship God according to their consciences, to enjoy intellectual freedom under the form of government best suited to themselves. No gifts which the best and wisest despot could bring, of material prosperity, of ordered and sheltered existence, could compensate for the loss of freedom of soul, the unfettered choice of paths which alone forms character. God Himself damned Germanism when He gave free will to man.

Secure in their island, when once the secret of sea power had been learned, the British people have fought out the matter of freedom among themselves. They have curbed the power of kings and priests and nobles. They have learned that each in turn may become a barrier against the tyranny of the other; that all, in their ordered degree, are a bulwark against the hasty passions of the mob, as the groynes on the coast against the violence of the storm. They learned, slowly perhaps, the lesson of tolerance, the worth of compromise, the worthlessness of logic divorced from actuality. To live and let live became their ideal. And with the widening of the world, the opening of the sea, they spread that ideal over the globe. Did tyranny, political, ecclesiastical, or economic, at any time threaten to prevail in Britain, there were lands beyond the seas to which those Britons who would not suffer it could pass. There they widened the bounds of their liberty, and thence the tide flowed back again, bringing new freshness to the Motherland. Others went but for a time, as sailors, as merchants, as administrators. But all alike have contributed to keep the national life sane. "Insular" we may be. No man is more prone to poke fun at the foreigner than is the Briton, or to pity him for the misfortune of his birth. But the Briton does not display the irritation of the German when, for instance, an Englishman takes off his coat to play lawn-tennis. He has a salt of humour which forbids him to believe that all races of

mankind would be the better if they could be melted down and cast into a mould of his pattern.

Contrast the history of Germany. Divided, distracted, desolated by war, foreign and civil, the German tribes have slowly crystallised round the military kingdom of Prussia. The threat from without has always checked political development within. Security has demanded unquestioning submission to the will of the ruler and the classes around him. That all Germans should be cast in one mould and obedient to a single mind has appeared the first condition of existence. Generations of weakness and enslavement to petty potentates or prelates paved the way for the domination of Prussia over the lesser States. Moreover, having no national life of her own, Germany for centuries supplied the mercenaries of Europe, from the Lanz-knechts of the Middle Ages to the Hessians and Hanoverians who left so evil a reputation in America and Ireland. Recollection of this, perhaps, accounts for the abhorrence in which the term "mercenary" is regarded in Germany to-day. Whether derived from them or not, the brutality of German militarism is worthy of their traditions. From all this there was no escape for the German over-sea. If he left his native shore it was in a foreign ship, to dwell among foreigners, to listen to a foreign tongue, to live under foreign laws and amid foreign customs and habits of thought. He could contribute nothing to the evolution of ideas which were essentially German, as could the Briton who dwelt in the United States, Canada, or Australia, to ideas which are essentially British. He could not get out of the reach of the long arm of the tyranny under which he lived at home save by forfeiting much of that which made him German. *Se soumettre ou se démettre* was his painful choice. Intoxication with victory completed the work of turning the German people into an instrument ready to the hand of the megalomaniacs who dreamed of world-dominion. Victory, be it said, not only on the field of battle, but in science, in

commerce, and in organisation. "We Germans are the salt of the earth" was a phrase quite natural on the lips of the monarch of this self-centred people.

Only such a people could be brought to submit to the long years of grinding discipline and sacrifice which had to be lived while their leaders were maturing their plans of conquest. The Briton, with no bitter memories of an invaded and ravaged land, with his belief, tested by centuries of immunity, in the security of his island home, with the seas and all that lies beyond open to him, would never for an instant have endured what the German has endured for forty-five years in the belief that what was prepared for aggression was necessary for defence. The application is not particular, but general. It shows why a sea power is incapable of planning and attempting the subjugation of other nations; why freedom does indeed flourish behind the trident and not the sword.

This analysis brings us to the underlying factors of the submarine war. It lays bare the deeply-hidden springs of the conflict between Britain and Germany, between the "elephant and the whale," to quote Bismarck. The submarine war is the attempt on the part of the Prussians to bring military tyranny to bear upon the seas and to carry it to the uttermost parts of the earth where sea power has planted freedom. Napoleon failed at the water's edge. Prussia is making a desperate attempt to succeed in the dark places under the waters. This makes the defeat of the Prussian plan a question not only between Great Britain and her present foe, but between freedom and tyranny in all parts of the world. For a German success means that the whole world is to bow the head to the German plea of "necessity," which means submission to the arbitrary will of Germany on pain of the complete destruction of all intercourse between nations, of all freedom to conduct the ordinary affairs of men, but by the Prussian leave.

The Germans claim that they are fighting for the

Freedom of the Seas. It is an effective phrase. It has already been shown that Great Britain, as the fruit of her maritime triumphs down to 1815, and by the work of her Navy in the years of peace that followed, secured that freedom for all the nations of the world. The Germans, however, attach a different meaning to the phrase. They design to overthrow the barrier which sea power has placed between tyranny and freedom. When Mendoza complained to Elizabeth of the insolence of Drake in daring to sail in the Spanish Main, that high-spirited Princess replied, "Tell your royal Master that a title to the ocean cannot belong to any people or private persons, forasmuch as neither nature nor public use and custom permitteth any possession thereof." Philip claimed the monopoly of the Spanish Main as a way by which the long arm of his tyranny could reach his subjects in Spanish America. The German claim is really identical. They do not claim possession of the ocean, it is true, though their contention that the Baltic should be regarded as *mare clausum* shows that they do not, in their hearts, accept Elizabeth's repudiation of private possession. But they claim that, in time of war, the sea should be altogether ruled out of the theatre of operations. They claim not only that merchantmen, belligerent and neutral alike, should be allowed to come and go freely, but that the same immunity should be permitted to transports. Hostilities are not to begin until the enemy's coast is reached. We and every nation in the world are to be compelled to lay aside our shield of naval defence. The arm of military autocracy is to be extended so that it can reach to the further side of the Atlantic, into the Pacific, to the Antipodes, or anywhere it will. Against this outrageous demand, Great Britain stands, the one firm rock. The German reply, to the whole world, is, "Very well. So long as 'England' resists our demand, we will sink your ships, murder your people, destroy your property." It is "necessary" to Germany to have freedom of the seas in her sense of the word. It is "necessary," in

order to obtain it, to break "England's" sea power. To do so, it is "necessary" to use the submarine weapon, and, since "England's" supremacy above the surface prevents the Germans bringing ships into port, it is "necessary" to sink them. Moreover, as "England's" patrol craft swarm on the seas and her merchantmen are armed, it is "necessary" for the U-boats to remain below the surface and to use the torpedo without warning or an attempt to secure the safety of those on board the ships attacked. Thus the plea of necessity is turned into a doctrine of devils.

It is surely clear that we have reached the ultimate issue between sea power as the instrument of freedom and land power as that of military tyranny. Let us see what will happen if, in the upshot, the submarine is not rendered innocuous by force of arms. It is idle, in that case, to suppose that any international agreement will avail to stop its use as the Germans have used it. *Ex hypothesi*, the naval force of the whole world would be impotent. Mankind would be thrown back on a choice of these alternatives: either the German doctrine of the Freedom of the Seas must be accepted, in which case every country in the world will lie at the mercy of military power unless it lives armed to the teeth, or else the intercourse between nations separated by the sea must remain for ever subject to sudden and violent interruption by any Power which has an ambition to serve and which deems the time ripe for its fulfilment, provided it has sufficient military force to resist invasion and fortified ports from which its submarines can issue. We shall be thrown back upon the naked rule of force, and the counter check which sea power has always placed upon the misuse of land power and *vice versa* will be a thing of the past.

To those who hold Free Trade as an article of faith the prospect created by the methods of the German submarine attack upon merchantmen and the consequences which would flow from its success must be regarded as

particularly serious. No country will dare, in future, to rely on supplies of necessities from abroad if it values its national life. Home production even of the things which the country is least fitted to produce must be maintained, or the national security will be imperilled. International trade will receive a severe check, and, with it, the peaceful intercourse between nations. The world will be thrown back on the old conception of trade as a form of hostilities, in which the nation which attempts to thrust its goods into the markets of its neighbours is striking a blow at their national life. That view will be the better justified in the light of our past experiences of Germany's trade methods and aims.

To the British Empire the state of things here forecast would be particularly disastrous. We look to the future development of the Dominions and Dependencies as our great source for the supply of foodstuffs and raw materials. But that can only be if the way of the sea can be kept reasonably safe in war as well as in peace. Take sugar, for instance. We are never likely to repeat the costly mistake by which we became dependent on foreign bounty-fed sugar, especially from Germany. But sugar is an essential food, and the alternatives before us are to set up and foster the cultivation of beet in this country, or to develop the supply of cane-sugar within the Empire, which contains many areas particularly fitted for its production. If the submarine is allowed to continue a standing menace to the world, it is on the first and not the second alternative that we must rely. The same remarks apply to other commodities, though, perhaps, not so forcibly. The submarine menace, in fact, cuts at the very basis on which the Ocean Empire is founded. While all the world is interested, and profoundly interested, in its suppression, to us it is a matter of life or death.

It is essential, then, that we should have a clear understanding of a development which touches the future of the British Commonwealth so nearly. The "U-boat

warfare" of the Germans, in its eventual development, was a surprise sprung upon the world because it was the use of a weapon, new and not fully understood, in a way which set at defiance all the usages of the civilised world. It is quite justifiably described as piracy. Piracy in its strict sense is, of course, private war levied on the world for the sake of gain. But there have been States to which piracy was a policy, and the action of Germany does not differ from theirs except that direct robbery was not resorted to except in small and insignificant instances. But that Germany has levied war upon the whole world for her own ultimate gain, and that she is, in the words of the old jurists, *hostis humani generis*, is a matter which admits of no dispute. It is a rather singular instance of unconscious prophecy that, in 1849, when a German fleet, flying the colours of the empire which was not then in existence, had a skirmish with the Danes off Heligoland, Palmerston gave great offence to the Germans by declaring that any vessel committing acts of belligerency under the black-red-and-gold flag would render themselves liable to be treated as pirates. The black-red-and-white which has succeeded the black-red-and-gold has made good its claim to the inheritance of the "Jolly Roger."

It must, however, be borne in mind that the submarine is an engine of destruction merely. It may hamper and harass sea power. It might conceivably banish it from the earth by closing the seas altogether to the use of mankind. It can never confer sea power on any nation. The theory was advanced in the opening chapter of this book that the natural plane of man's existence is sea level. Above and below it he is involved in a ceaseless struggle with the law of gravity. Even in surface ships cranes are needed to extract cargo from holds below the water-line. This fact seems to secure the permanence of the surface ship as the ultimate factor in sea power, using the term in its broadest sense. Despite the boasted voyages of the *Deutschland*, submarine cargo-ships are never likely, for

very many reasons, to replace surface vessels for trade purposes. If that be so, it follows that the Power which is inferior in force on the surface and relies on submarine attack, while it may forbid to its opponent the use of the sea, can never acquire it for itself. The "fundamental basis of sea power, which has existed since Syracuse," is not therefore "shaken by this new development of submarine cruisers," as was somewhat absurdly asserted when the "unrestricted U-boat warfare" was at its height. No mere mechanical invention can effect that. The fundamental basis of sea power will still remain, and must always remain, the force which protects the use of the sea, and the ships and men which use it. The submarine menace does not differ in essence from the varying dangers which have threatened sea-borne commerce in the past. The instrument has the added power of becoming invisible at will, and the German method of its use involves a disregard of human life and human right which belong to the centuries before the reign of law was extended to the sea; that is, before peaceful intercourse between nations was established. The sea sense of a maritime nation may be trusted to prevail eventually over the particular advantage secured by invisibility. Merchantmen, as of old, will be compelled to go armed, and their crews will have to be included in the category of combatants. This will involve a revision of the rules which forbid the use of neutral ports to armed vessels, except for limited periods which are too short for the loading and unloading of cargo. It will make the preservation of neutrality far harder than it has hitherto been, and will probably extend the area of war, as, indeed, it has done in the present instance. But in the end the old qualities and aptitudes will prevail to give command of the sea to the nation fitted by character and natural advantages to possess it.

On the other hand, the disappearance of the reign of law from the sea in war-time will greatly modify international relationships, not only in war but in peace, unless

law can be re-established on some sure basis. It has been pointed out that nations must become more self-contained and self-supporting. It may be added that the great maritime Powers, and Britain first and foremost, will be compelled to rely more exclusively on their own ships, which they can protect and arm, and that in all probability it will be necessary to build a greater number of smaller ships, with a consequent increase in the cost of ocean travel and of freight. The eggs will have to be distributed in as many baskets as possible. This may involve a return to something like the Navigation Laws, and will be bad for the maritime prospects of such countries as Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Greece. But here a consideration of the first importance intrudes itself. After their first failure the Germans were quick to recognise that a submarine campaign against commerce offered no chance of success unless *all* merchantmen, neutral as well as belligerent, were subjected to attack. The reason is partly economic, and obvious, and partly military. To lie concealed and shoot at sight without exposing themselves to make inquiry was the only method by which the U-boats could obtain comparative immunity. If in future wars neutral nations choose to submit to such an assault on their rights; if they will not even resent it to the extent of closing their harbours and territorial waters to the pirate boats, but extend to them the privileges of warships; if they tamely submit to a haughty summons to stay at home or take the consequences, then this menace to the world's safety will never be removed. It will be bound to spread, for, once openly or tacitly admitted to be within the limits of lawful warfare, no nation will be able to abstain from its use any more than we and the French and the Russians could abstain from the use of poison gas, abhorrent as it was to our consciences.

No conventions in themselves will be binding. Deeds alone will avail to free the world from this assault on its rights. Only if every nation which uses the sea

determines and declares that submarines used for the indiscriminate destruction of sea-borne trade shall be treated as outlaws, refused all rights, and destroyed at sight whenever opportunity offers; only if every State which possesses warships will assist in hunting them out will the plague be abated. There need be no Declaration of War. Indeed, there should be none. They should be treated with exactly the consideration extended to sharks.

In the Heavenly Jerusalem, as seen by St. John in the Apocalypse, "there was no more sea." But there right and justice, love and the liberty of the sons of God prevailed. To man on earth, so far as the sea has been, and is, a divider, it has been a barrier which he can place between himself and oppression and wrong. To overleap that barrier has ever been the aim of tyranny. The tyrant loathes the thought that any man should be out of reach of his arm. Benevolent or harsh, he demands the tribute of the souls, no less than the bodies, of men. The tyrant may be a man or a system—even a democratic system. In either case, blue water is his bane. To the sons of freedom, on the other hand, the sea is a pathway which unites. Are freedom and tyranny empty words? Recent events have shown us that they are not, though they are terms easily misused. Let us hold fast our heritage. Though there is much yet to gain, something has been lost through the circumstances which have compelled us to abandon our historical policy and turn ourselves into a land Power on a European scale. So long as we are mindful that our past, our present, and our future lie on the water, we shall refuse the temptation which might possibly breed the will to enter into an era of conquests.

We had better avoid illusions. There is no security that this war will end war. Human passions remain what they ever were, and, when the sick-headache has passed, it is only too probable that Europe will return to its wallowing in the mire of jealousies and ambitions. The hope of

the world's peace rests on the free nations sprung from the loins of Britain, the offspring of sea power. On these united, the freedom-loving races of Europe can rest. To them can be entrusted the maintenance of a true freedom of the seas. The small nations, deemed by the Germans unfit for separate existence, will look to them with confidence to guarantee them equal rights with the greater Powers. There are, perhaps, internal struggles ahead of us, not less severe than the great struggle with the Powers of Darkness which we have been waging since 1914. Man will still seek to build the New Jerusalem on earth by social and political changes, oblivious of the truth that the Kingdom of God is within him. And greed and selfishness will resist his efforts. If we are to come through in safety, we shall need to be taken out of ourselves by remembrance of the duty laid upon us to all nations of mankind in return for the infinite blessings which sea power has brought us.

Where Britain's Flag flies wide unfurled,
All tyrant wrong repelling,
God make the world a better world
For man's brief earthly dwelling!

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